Liquidity and international bond pricing by Panyanukul, Sakkapop
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/35533
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
 LIQUIDITY AND INTERNATIONAL BOND PRICING 
 
by 
 
SAKKAPOP PANYANUKUL 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the 
degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN FINANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
WARWICK BUSINESS SCHOOL 
UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK 
September, 2010 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF TABLES v 
LIST OF FIGURES vii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT viii 
DECLARATION ix 
CURRICULUM VITAE x 
ABSTRACT xi 
  
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF RELATED 
LITERATURE 
1 
 1.1 Introduction 1 
 1.2 Overview of Related Literature 
1.2.1 Liquidity measures 
      1.2.2 Liquidity and bond prices 
5 
5 
9 
  
CHAPTER 2:  LIQUIDITY RISK AND THE PRICING OF SOVEREIGN                     
     BONDS IN EMERGING MARKETS 
12 
 2.1 Introduction 13 
 2.2 Related Literature 17 
 2.3 Data and the Liquidity-adjusted Capital Asset Pricing Model  
      (LCAPM) 
2.3.1 Data and summary statistics 
2.3.2 Liquidity-adjusted CAPM with sovereign bond portfolios 
24 
 
24 
29 
 2.4 Detailed Methodology 
2.4.1 Measuring illiquidity and bond returns 
2.4.2 Estimating bid/ask spreads (illiquidity) and returns on bond 
portfolios 
2.4.3 Computing innovations in illiquidity and returns 
2.4.4 Computing liquidity betas 
34 
34 
37 
 
38 
39 
ii 
2.4.5 Constructing the expected bond returns 42 
 2.5 Empirical Results: Cross-sectional Regression of LCAPM 
2.5.1 Single cross-sectional regression of unconditional LCAPM 
2.5.2 Economic significance 
2.5.3 Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression 
47 
50 
50 
53 
 2.6 Robustness Tests 
2.6.1 Liquidity betas versus bond characteristics in explaining bond 
returns 
2.6.2 Does U.S. stock market drive emerging sovereign bond markets? 
         2.6.2.1 U.S. stock market data 
         2.6.2.2 Results from cross-section liquidity-adjusted CAPM 
regression 
2.6.3 Out-of-sample analysis: August 2008 to February 2009 
57 
57 
 
59 
62 
62 
 
65 
 2.7 Conclusions 68 
  
CHAPTER 3:  PRICING OF GOVERNMENT BONDS AROUND THE   
     WORLD AND TIME-VARYING LIQUIDITY RISK 
70 
 3.1 Introduction 71 
 3.2 Related Literature 74 
 3.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
3.3.1 Bond realized returns 
3.3.2 Illiquidity measures 
3.3.3 Returns on bond portfolios and innovations in market illiquidity 
3.3.4 Bond characteristics 
79 
80 
82 
83 
85 
 3.4 Unconditional Liquidity Risk and Asset Pricing Models 
3.4.1 Unconditional liquidity risk – 1st stage time-series estimations 
3.4.2 Unconditional liquidity risk – 2nd stage cross-section regressions 
3.4.3 Economic significance of empirical results 
3.4.4 Robustness tests 
88 
88 
92 
97 
98 
 3.5 Conditional Liquidity Risk and Asset Pricing Models 
3.5.1 Regime-switching model of bond betas (time-series) 
         3.5.1.1 Regime-switching results 
103 
104 
107 
iii 
         3.5.1.2 Economic significance 
         3.5.1.3 Robustness test 
3.5.2 Estimation of conditional liquidity risk premium 
110 
113 
115 
 3.6 Conclusions 119 
 Appendix 3A: Testing for the Liquidity Effect with Individual Bonds 121 
 Appendix 3B: Regime-switching by Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) 125 
  
CHAPTER 4:  LIQUIDITY SPILLOVERS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
     FROM EMERGING BOND MARKETS 
127 
 4.1 Introduction 128 
 4.2 Related Literature 
4.2.1 Theoretical studies 
4.2.2 Empirical studies 
132 
132 
133 
 4.3 The Model: Transmission of Return, Trading and Liquidity 
4.3.1 Model setup 
4.3.2 Equilibrium prices and optimal holdings 
4.3.3 Trading volume and volatility   
4.3.4 Model implications: liquidity spillovers 
136 
137 
140 
142 
144 
 4.4 Data and Summary Statistics 
4.4.1 Bond returns and volatility 
4.4.2 Illiquidity measures 
4.4.3 Innovations in illiquidity, return  and volatility 
148 
149 
151 
153 
 4.5 Spillovers in Liquidity, Returns and Volatility: Empirical tests and   
      Resuls 
4.5.1 Liquidity lead/lag hypothesis 
4.5.2 Liquidity and return spillover hypothesis 
4.5.3 Liquidity and volatility spillover hypothesis 
156 
157 
161 
164 
 4.6 Importance of Idiosyncratic versus Systematic Shocks  
4.6.1 Summary statistics: commonality measures 
4.6.2 Cross-section analysis of commonality measures (35 countries) 
4.6.3 Time-series analysis of commonality measures (three regions) 
168 
169 
172 
174 
iv 
 4.7 Conclusions 178 
 Appendix 4A: Proof of the Liquidity Spillover Model 181 
  
CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUDING REMARKS 184 
 5.1 Summary of the Thesis 184 
 5.2 Contributions of the Whole Thesis 187 
 5.3 Suggestions for Future Research 189 
  
Bibliography 192 
 
  
v 
LIST OF TABLES 
 Page 
Table 2-1: Summary statistics on Emerging Market Bond Index 
(EMBI) 
28 
Table 2-2: Country portfolio characteristics: betas, bid/ask spreads and 
expected excess returns 
40 
Table 2-3: Beta correlations for country portfolios 41 
Table 2-4: Country portfolios and cross-sectional regression 48 
Table 2-5: Correlations of variables in testing the unconditional LCAPM 49 
Table 2-6: Summary statistics of data used in Fama-MacBeth 
regression 
54 
Table 2-7: Country portfolios and Fama-MacBeth regression 56 
Table 2-8: Country portfolios and cross-sectional regression with credit 
rating and modified duration 
59 
Table 2-9: Country bond portfolios and cross-sectional regression with 
both bond and U.S. stock market risk factors 
64 
Table 2-10: Country portfolios and cross-sectional regression with out-
of-sample excess bond returns 
66 
Table 3-1: Summary of the country bond characteristics included in our 
sample as of December 2008 
81 
Table 3-2: Summary statistics on aggregate bond market in our sample 87 
Table 3-3: Correlations of the time-series of risk factors 90 
Table 3-4: Country bond portfolio characteristics: whole sample 
averages of estimated betas, expected excess returns and 
bid/ask spreads 
91 
Table 3-5: Country portfolios and Fama-MacBeth regression 94 
Table 3-6: Average cross-section correlations of estimated risk loadings 
over our sample period 
97 
Table 3-7: Country portfolio and Fama-MacBeth regression with 
additional risk factors 
100 
   
vi 
Table 3-8: Regime-switching regression (time-series) with U.S. equity 
returns 
108 
Table 3-9: Economic significance of estimated coefficients in the 
regime switching model 
112 
Table 3-10: Regime-switching regression (time-series) with changes in 
bond volatility 
114 
Table 3-11: Country portfolios and Fama-MacBeth regression with 
conditional liquidity factor (cross-section) 
120 
Table 3A-1: Individual bonds and Fama-MacBeth regression 121 
Table 3A-2: Individual bonds and Fama-MacBeth regression by GBI and 
EM countries 
123 
Table 4-1: Summary statistics of the return, volatility and illiquidity 
measures at the portfolio level 
152 
Table 4-2: Spillovers in liquidity across regions  159 
Table 4-3: Spillovers in liquidity across regions in sub-periods 160 
Table 4-4: Spillovers in liquidity and returns across regions 163 
Table 4-5: Spillovers  in liquidity and volatility across regions 166 
Table 4-6: Summary of country/region bond portfolios’ statistics at the 
end of 2009 
170 
Table 4-7: Cross-sectional regression of county bond portfolio’s 
liquidity commonality on return and volatility commonalties 
173 
Table 4-8: Time-series regression of region bond portfolio’s liquidity 
commonality on return and volatility commonalities 
177 
 
 
 
  
vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 Page 
Figure 2-1: Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) composition by region, 
credit rating and country of issuance as of August 2008 
27 
Figure 2-2: Time series of weekly market-wide (EMBI) percentage quoted 
bid/asks spreads and expected excess returns 
44 
Figure 2-3: Relationship between expected bond spread and credit rating 45 
Figure 2-4: Empirical fit of CAPM versus LCAPM 51 
Figure 2-5: Out-of-sample empirical fit of CAPM versus LCAPM 67 
Figure 3-1: Time series of monthly global bond-market liquidity 85 
Figure 3-2: Liquidity risk premia in sub-periods 104 
Figure 3-3: Indicator variable of high illiquidity regime (Regime 1) from a 
regime-switching model 
111 
Figure 4-1: Systematic liquidity shock and co-movement in liquidity and 
volatility (Systematic Liquidity Hypothesis, SLH) 
145 
Figure 4-2: Idiosyncratic liquidity shock and co-movement in liquidity and 
return (Idiosyncratic Liquidity Hypothesis, ILH) 
146 
Figure 4-3: Return correlation, idiosyncratic liquidity risk of bond A and 
expected trading volume spilled over to bond B 
147 
Figure 4-4: EMBI composition by region, credit rating and maturity at the 
end of 2009 
150 
Figure 4-5: Time-series of daily market-wide illiquidity cost (bid/ask spread) 
and its innovations 
154 
Figure 4-6: Time-series of correlations in liquidity, return and volatility 
across regions 
155 
Figure 4-7: Liquidity, return and volatility commonalities 172 
Figure 4-8: Time-series of commonality measures by a region bond portfolio 175 
  
viii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
First and foremost, I am most heartily grateful to my supervisor, Gordon Gemmill, 
whose tremendous encouragement, guidance and support from the initial to the final 
level enabled me to complete my doctoral work. He also continuously encourages me to 
develop my analytical thinking and research skills. He teaches me many things not only 
valuable for the research but also for my life. This thesis would not have been possible 
without him. 
 
I would like to thank all faculties, who taught the Ph.D. courses in the first year of my 
Ph.D. They give me a chance to explore many advanced finance topics, which greatly 
help me settle on my research topic. Especially, I would like to thank Peter Corvi, 
Pasquale Della Corte, Kostas Koufopoulos, Mark Salmon, Ilias Tsiakas and Nick 
Webber for their insightful comments, efforts and guidance. I am also indebted to 
Subin Liengpunsakul and Varisa Pudtalsri for their assistance on the data and Tai-kuang 
Ho for his useful suggestions on programming. 
 
I wish to express my deep appreciation to my colleagues and friends including Gino 
Cenedese, Pokpong Chirayukool, Pollarat Ekkayokkaya, Ratchada Pattaranit, Wila-Sini 
Wongkaew and Huazhu Zhang, whose consultation, encouragement and friendship are 
always of the great help.   
  
I thank the Bank of Thailand for all the financial support. Also the staffs at the Office of 
Educational Affairs, Royal Thai Embassy in London always assist me in many issues.  
 
Not only have I thanked my parents for their overwhelming supports in pursuing my 
doctoral study, but also for love and care throughout my whole life. 
 
Last but not least, I owe my loving thanks to my wife who has lost a lot due to my 
research abroad. She also gave me the most-needed support and understanding during 
the years I have been working on this thesis, especially all the holidays and free-times 
that she arranged to give me time to write, to think and to talk to her about this subject.  
 
 
 
 
  
ix 
DECLARATION 
 
“I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my 
knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another 
person nor material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or 
diploma of the university or other institute of higher learning, except where due 
acknowledgment has been made in the text” 
 
 
Sakkapop Panyanukul 
September 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
 
Sakkapop Panyanukul 
Nationality: Thai 
Education Ph.D. in Finance 
Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, U.K. 
2007 present 
 M.Sc. in Finance and Economics 
London School of Economics, U.K. 
20002001 
 B.A. in Economics 
Thammasat University, Thailand 
19951999 
Publications Key Determinants of Liquidity in the Thai Bond Market (2008), China, Asia and the 
New World Economy edited by Barry Eichengreen, Charles Wyplosz, Yung Chul 
Park, Oxford University Press 
The Corporate Bond Market in Thailand (2006), BIS Papers No. 26 - Developing 
corporate bond markets in Asia  
Conference 
Presentations  
Chapter 2: Liquidity Risk and the Pricing of Sovereign Bonds in 
Emerging Markets 
 Samaggi Academic, University of Cambridge 
 Liquidity and Volatility in Today’s Markets, NYSE Euronext 
Amsterdam and the Tinbergen Institute (The paper is awarded NYSE 
Euronext Best Paper by Young Scholar Award) 
 Individual Decision Making, High Frequency Econometrics and 
Limit Book Order Dynamics, Warwick Business School  
 Warwick Business School Finance Group Workshop series 
 Understanding and Measuring Liquidity Premia in Asset Markets, 
Barrie & Hibbert and  the Money Macro and Finance Research 
Group 
 8th INFINITI Conference on International Finance, The School of 
Business, Trinity College Dublin 
 37th Annual Meeting of the European Finance Association (EFA), 
The Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany 
Chapter 3: Pricing of Government Bond around the World and 
Time-varying Liquidity Risk 
 8th INFINITI Conference on International Finance, The School of 
Business, Trinity College Dublin 
 
 
Feb 2009 
Jul 2009 
 
 
Sep 2009 
 
Oct 2009 
Nov 2009 
 
 
Jun 2010 
 
Aug 2010 
 
 
 
Jun 2010 
 
  
xi 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis focuses on the liquidity risk and its impact on bond prices of the 
international markets and comprises three self-contained research papers.  
In the first research paper, we examine the role of the liquidity in the pricing of 
sovereign U.S. dollar bonds in emerging markets. We extend Acharya and Pedersen’s 
(2005) liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model to the bond market and find that 
both liquidity level and multiple liquidity risks are priced factors for the expected excess 
return of U.S. dollar bonds issued by developing countries. The combined effects of 
liquidity risk and liquidity level can explain as much as 1% per annum extra yield 
spread for the countries that have higher liquidity betas. Countries, which have a high 
correlation with the global market or U.S. stock market, have higher required bond 
returns than low correlation countries. The liquidity factor helps explain the credit 
spread puzzle of high yields. Our empirical results also support a flight to liquidity 
across the studied countries and are robust after controlling for bond characteristics and 
the U.S. risk factors. 
The second research paper finds that both liquidity level and liquidity risk are important 
in explaining the cross-section of domestic government bond returns in 39 countries 
(both emerging and developed) around the world. After controlling for other market 
factors and bond characteristics, liquidity level and liquidity risk together can explain as 
much as 0.41% per annum of extra yield for the highest versus the lowest liquidity risk 
countries, which are China and Argentina respectively. There is also an evidence of 
liquidity spillovers from the U.S. equity market to domestic bond markets around the 
world. Employing a conditional model, which allows both time-series and cross-
sectional variations in liquidity betas, we find that the impact of liquidity risk is time 
varying across two different regimes: it increases in times of high uncertainty and is 
always larger in emerging than in developed countries. Nevertheless, the price of risk or 
premium required by investors for holding this time-varying risk is relatively modest. 
The third research paper examines whether liquidity spillovers between sovereign bonds 
are systematic or idiosyncratic in character. A theoretical model is developed, which 
demonstrates that idiosyncratic spillovers require returns to be correlated, whereas 
systematic spillovers require volatilities to be correlated. We apply the model to 
sovereign bonds in 35 emerging markets, aggregated for some analyses into Asian, 
European and Latin American regions. We find liquidity spillovers mainly from Latin 
America to the other regions and they are both systematic and idiosyncratic in character. 
Further cross-sectional analysis (by country) and time-series analysis (by region) show 
that systematic spillovers are more important than idiosyncratic spillovers. The 
conclusion is that most liquidity risk across emerging bond markets is systematic and 
therefore cannot easily be hedged away. This has important implications for portfolio 
selection by fund managers and for the regulation of systemic risk.  
 
1 
 
   
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
 
This chapter contains both an introduction and overview of the literature in the 
following two sub-sessions. 
1.1 Introduction 
Academics have long agreed that less liquid securities should offer higher expected 
returns than would be justified by the market risk alone. Most previous studies of 
liquidity and asset pricing have focused on the price discount of illiquid securities (as 
compared with securities in a frictionless market) rather than on the risk premium that 
investors require for holding securities for which liquidity risks cannot be diversified 
away (i.e., for bearing systematic risk). In addition, the asset-pricing research, which 
includes liquidity as a factor, normally focuses on one particular market or one 
particular country, implicitly assuming that markets or countries can be separated in 
economic terms from another. Most empirical studies are concentrated on the U.S. stock 
market because of the availability of data. The assumption that liquidity risk is local and 
not global has been shown to be naive, following the recent global liquidity crisis over 
2007-2009. The significance of liquidity for international asset pricing has not been 
systematically studied.   
This PhD thesis, “Liquidity and International Bond Pricing”, incorporates three self-
contained research papers. We focus on bond markets because they provide a relatively 
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good environment in which to test asset pricing models because the expected (forward-
looking) return on bonds can be carefully constructed.
1
 The first research paper is titled 
“Liquidity Risk and the Pricing of Sovereign Bonds in Emerging Markets”.2 An original 
question of how liquidity level and liquidity risk affect cross-sectional returns of 
emerging markets’ sovereign bonds is investigated. No previous study has been made of 
the effects of liquidity (liquidity premium in particular, not only the illiquidity cost) on 
bond pricing on a global basis. We extend Acharya and Pedersen (2005)’s liquidity-
adjusted capital asset pricing model to the international bond market. The main 
hypothesis is that there exists a market-wide liquidity shock, which is transmitted across 
countries (i.e., contagion in liquidity). If this contagion exists, securities for which 
returns and liquidity have a greater degree of co-movement with the market must also 
award investors higher expected returns. Empirical results show that both liquidity level 
and liquidity risk are priced factors for the expected returns of U.S. dollar bonds issued 
by developing countries (i.e., global or systematic liquidity risk is priced). Countries, 
which have a high correlation with the global market or U.S. stock market, have higher 
required bond returns than low correlation countries. Hence, the liquidity factor helps 
explain the credit spread puzzle of high yield on bonds. We also test whether the U.S. 
stock is a driving force in determining the average bond returns. However, evidence of a 
liquidity spillover from the U.S. stock market to emerging U.S. dollar bond market is 
statistically weak. 
                                                          
1
 This contrasts with using stocks for which the historical (backward-looking) mean is often 
used as the proxy for the expected return. 
2
 Sovereign bonds herein refer to U.S. dollar bonds issued by government entities. 
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So far, the study on the effect of liquidity on the cross-sectional asset pricing has been 
unconditional by nature. Although the first research paper finds that a bond’s 
comovement with market factors is priced, the significance of both market and liquidity 
risks in explaining bond spreads seems to be time-varying. Further investigation on 
time-varying liquidity beta and liquidity risk premium can be beneficial. Therefore, the 
second research paper, “Pricing of Government Bonds around the World and Time-
varying Liquidity Risk”, further investigate the effects of liquidity risk and time-varying 
risk on bond pricing around the world (both developed and emerging countries).  We 
allow both time-series and cross-sectional variations in liquidity betas. Using a regime 
switching model, we find that the transition from the low to the high liquidity-beta state 
can be predicted by a decline in U.S. equity market performance (as a proxy for the 
world economy) and also by a rise in the global bond market volatility.  The results 
suggest that the liquidity risk or liquidity beta is time varying across two different 
regimes: it increases in times of high uncertainty and is always larger in emerging than 
in developed countries. This is consistent with the results for U.S. equity markets: 
Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) report that the high-beta state for U.S. equities is 
associated with high equity volatility and preceded by a period of declining expectations 
about future market liquidity. Nevertheless, in the cross-sectional analyses, the price of 
risk or premium required by investors for holding this time-varying risk is relatively 
stable.  
The first two research papers show the existence and importance of the commonality in 
liquidity (systematic or undiversified liquidity risk factor). Up to now, in most cases, 
liquidity is taken as an exogenous factor and its dynamic is disregarded. A well-
specified dynamic liquidity risk may be a milestone in an accurate and more prefect 
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asset pricing model. To this regard, the third research paper, titled “Liquidity Spillovers: 
Theory and Evidence from Emerging Bond Markets”, aims to study how and why 
liquidity is transmitted across markets in the international setting. This paper will 
examine the dynamic interaction of liquidity across national boundaries, i.e., how does 
liquidity transmit from a certain market to the others and how important are systematic 
and idiosyncratic liquidity in explaining the liquidity spillovers. Our model suggests 
different commonalities caused by systematic and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. 
Idiosyncratic shocks induce spillovers in liquidity only if asset returns are correlated.  
Systematic liquidity shocks are associated with spillovers in volatility. Our empirical 
results find the consistent patterns of liquidity spillovers across regions from Asia to 
Europe and from Latin America to both Asia and Europe. And they show that 
systematic and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are both relevant in explaining liquidity 
transmission across regions. However, further empirical investigation suggests that the 
commonality in liquidity is more associated with that in volatility than that in returns. In 
other words, the liquidity risk or the co-movement of liquidity with the market factor is 
likely a result of systematic liquidity shocks rather than idiosyncratic ones. Moreover, 
we find that the commonality in liquidity varies significantly over time and sharply 
increases during global financial crises. In line with the results found in the second 
research paper, these confirm that liquidity risk is time-varying. 
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1.2 Overview of Related Literature 
In order to avoid repetition, this section provides an overview rather than a complete list 
of related literature on liquidity and bond pricing. The specific literature will be covered 
in each associated research paper. The following two sub-sections briefly discuss how 
previous studies measure liquidity and how liquidity has been related in those studies to 
bond spreads. 
1.2.1 Liquidity measures 
Liquidity (or its converse, illiquidity) is hard to measure precisely as liquidity is a 
relative measure. A market is more liquid than another if it is possible: (i) at a given 
price, to buy or sell more rapidly a given quantity of an asset (e.g., in one minute rather 
than ten); or (ii) at the same speed and price, to buy or sell more of the asset (e.g. $100 
million of asset rather than $1 million). In other words, liquidity relates to the speed 
with which an asset can be traded and the price impact for the purchase or sale of a 
given quantity. As far as the current theories are concerned, the potential sources of 
illiquidity are: 
(i) Transaction costs such as exchange fees, brokerage fees, order-processing 
costs or taxes. This source of illiquidity is most obvious and least interesting 
because these costs should be fairly constant in the short-run and so are 
unlikely to determine short-term changes in liquidity. 
(ii) Inventory risk faced by market makers, e.g., Stoll (1978) and Amihud and 
Mendelson (1980). This risk arises mainly from unexpected variation in both 
order flows and future prices, leading to risks in the size of the inventory that 
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dealers need to keep on-hand. The bid/ask spread needs to compensate 
dealers for holding less than fully diversified portfolios. 
(iii) Information asymmetries, e.g., Bagehot (1971), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
and Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002).3 Adverse selection problems arise 
when a group of investors– known in the literature as the “informed” 
traders– have private information on the value of an asset not currently 
reflected in prices. Informed traders will want to trade only if the current ask 
price they face is below– or the bid price is above– the fundamental value of 
the asset. Since the uniformed market participants (particularly, dealers) will 
always make a loss from dealing with informed traders, they have to recoup 
these losses from other investors by charging a larger bid/ask spread for 
trading. 
(iv) Market impact costs, e.g., Kyle (1985). 4  These costs reflect the price 
concession incurred by a buyer or a seller when trading, i.e., a premium 
when buying or a discount when selling.  For small trades, the market impact 
is confined to the bid/ask spread, which is the difference between the buying 
and selling price quoted by liquidity providers. 
(v) Search frictions and delay costs, e.g., Longstaff (1995) and Duffie, Garleanu 
and Pedersen (2005), which are incurred when a trader looks for better prices 
than those quoted in the market or wishes to minimize the price impact cost 
(component (iv)) of her order. To minimize the price impact, the trader bears 
                                                          
3
 The model of Easley at el. (2002) implies that a bid/ask spread is greater if the probability of 
trading with informed traders is larger. 
4
 Kyle (1985) describes the market impact as the price change per unit of net order flow. The 
less liquid stock has a larger impact. 
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search and delay costs resulting from the fact that the trade is not executed 
immediately and the market can turn against her 
Note that some of liquidity components are correlated and overlap, for example, an 
asset with a high bid/ask spread or high price impact often has high transaction costs as 
well as friction and delay costs.  
With respect to measuring liquidity, the obvious measure is the bid/ask spread. Of 
course, the bid/ask spread is quoted for a given quantity of asset and it might be quite 
different for a larger quantity. There can therefore be an "illusion" of liquidity. Often 
studies have to resort to other measures because they do not have reliable bid/ask data.  
And with the multi-dimensional nature of liquidity, it is not surprising that the literature 
on market microstructure and liquidity proposes many different measures or proxies.  
While the most appropriate liquidity measure is still debatable
5
, a widely used choice in 
literature is a price impact measure developed by Amihud (2002), which is denoted as 
ILLIQ (an absolute change in return per dollar volume). However, most corporate bonds 
and sovereign bonds have no daily volume data. Another approach by Amihud and 
Mendelsen (1987) provides a framework based on the idea that the intrinsic value of a 
firm may differ from its market value because of a liquidity premium. Lesmond, Ogden 
and Trzcinka (1999) outline an estimation procedure for this called the LOT measure. 
The LOT measure is similar to one based on zero returns, but extracts more information 
including the spread and other costs that may impinge on informed trade such as 
                                                          
5
 While trading volume is an intuitive and traditional measure of market liquidity, main 
drawback is that it is also associated with price volatility, which tends to be negatively related to 
market liquidity. This becomes more apparent during periods of stress. In addition, both trading 
volume and turnover do not directly capture the buying and selling costs over the long time.  
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commission cost, opportunity cost and price impact cost.  If the value of the information 
is less than the transaction cost of implementing a trade, the market participants will 
choose not to trade and zero returns are observed. The advantage of this measure is that 
it requires only a time series of daily returns. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2007) 
show that this measure is highly correlated with more traditional measures of 
transactions cost for emerging equity markets. This measure also receives support from 
Lesmond (2005) in his study of emerging equity markets. Using more than 4,000 U.S. 
corporate bonds, Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) examine several measures of bond-
specific liquidity, i.e., traditional bid/ask spread, percentage of zero return and LOT. 
They report that percentage of zeros and LOT are highly associated with the underlying 
bid/ask spread and in contrast to Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005), the paper finds 
little evidence of the size of issue in explaining bond liquidity. 
A very recent measure of liquidity is “latent liquidity”, which is the weighted average 
turnover of funds holding a particular bond. The weights are the funds’ fractional 
holdings of the bond. Latent liquidity reflects the degree to which a bond is held by 
those investors who are expected to trade more frequently. While it can be used to 
measure liquidity in markets with sparse transactions data, its calculation requires that 
the holding and turnover data of a security are available (from the custodian houses). 
Using this measure, Chacko (2006) and Mahanti, Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, Chacko 
and Mallik (2008) show that liquidity is priced in the U.S. corporate bond market.  
Because of the data availability, we are fortunate to be able to employ the bid/ask spread 
as a direct measure of liquidity throughout this thesis. The bid/ask spread reflects some 
part of all liquidity components (i) to (v). Therefore, it is not surprising that many 
studies including Fleming (2003) and D’Souza, Gaa and Yang (2003) support bid/ask 
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spread as one of the most appropriate liquidity indicators due to its high degree of 
correlation with other measures such as price impact, benchmark/non-benchmark yield 
spreads and price volatility. In addition, it remains the most commonly used benchmark 
for liquidity measure. 
1.2.2 Liquidity and bond prices 
There are two approaches to modeling prices for risky bonds– the structural and 
reduced-form models– and neither incorporates the effect of liquidity or liquidity risk.  
The early work in the structural model, for example, Merton (1974), Black and Cox 
(1976), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-
Barral and Perraudin (1997), ignores the liquidity effect on the bond spread. The 
empirical work by Eom, Helwege and Huang (2004) shows that structural models do 
not generate spreads as high as those seen in the bond market. Liquidity risk might help 
to alleviate this problem because riskier bonds usually have more liquidity constraints. 
In addition, the structural models, which directly capture the default incentives and 
solvency of the issuer, can be problematic when we model sovereign bonds, which are 
the focus of this thesis. As in Duffie, Pedersen and Singleton (2003), the incentive to 
sovereign default is rather complex. A holder of sovereign debt may not have recourse 
to a bankruptcy code in the event of default. Sovereign default is largely a political 
decision. Governments trade off the cost of making debt payments against reputation 
costs (Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)). When it defaults, a country may lose assets held 
abroad, but assets held within the country cannot be seized as collateral. For sovereign 
debt, willingness to pay is more important than ability to pay. Note, however, that the 
incentive of a corporation to default is much simpler.  
10 
 
   
Another approach to bond spread modeling is the reduced-form (or hazard rate) model. 
This model does not try to explain why default happens, rather it models default 
explicitly by an intensity process. But even in the reduced-form models such as Duffie 
and Singleton (1999) and Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull (1997), the dynamics of bond 
values are specified in a way that is appropriate for fitting the evolution of credit quality 
rather than liquidity. The reduced-form models again cannot fully explain bond spread 
with the default risk and recovery rate alone. While the best way of incorporating a 
liquidity premium into a theoretical pricing model remains a subject for research, a 
recent paper by Ericsson and Renault (2006) has begun to examine this issue.  
For empirical works, among others, Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001) and 
Huang and Huang (2003) confirm that corporate bond yields are too high to be 
explained by default alone. Many papers find that taxes, a market-risk premium and 
jump-risk premium can explain some portion of bond yield spreads, but not the full 
magnitude (tax effects: Elton et al. (2001), Amato and Remolona (2003) and Liu, Shi, 
Wang and Wu (2007) and jump risk premium: Amato and Remolona (2003), Driessen 
(2005), Cremers, Driessen and Maenhout (2008) and Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and 
Helwege (2010)). Many studies argue that there must be a common factor other than 
credit risk behind the change in the credit spread in the corporate bond and sovereign 
bond markets (for example, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Marting (2001) and Weigel 
and Gemmill (2006)) and the country-specific fundamentals alone cannot explain the 
change in the international sovereign bond spread (for example, Cantor and Packer 
(1996), Eichengreen and Mody (1998) and Kamin and von Kleist (1999)). Using the 
data from CDS spreads, Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen and Singleton (2007) find that returns 
from sovereign credit are mainly attributed to global risk with only a small country-
11 
 
   
specific credit risk premium. One of the possible candidates for that missing factor may 
be liquidity, both liquidity level and liquidity risk. If a liquidity risk premium is an 
important feature of these data, the focus on emerging markets should yield powerful 
tests and useful independent evidence because liquidity is particularly important in these 
markets.  
Therefore, the focus of this thesis, “Liquidity and International Bond Pricing”, is 
liquidity and its impact on bond prices in the international markets. In doing so, the next 
three chapters incorporate three self-contained research papers. Chapter 2 is the first 
research paper, “Liquidity Risk and the Pricing of Sovereign Bonds in Emerging 
Markets”. It originally deals with multiple liquidity-risk channels for the U.S. dollar 
emerging bond markets. Chapter 3 presents the second research paper, “Pricing of 
Government Bonds around the World and Time-varying Liquidity Risk”, which is the 
first study of the effects of liquidity risk and its time-variation on local-currency 
government bond prices in a comprehensive set of both developed and emerging 
countries. The last research paper, “Liquidity Spillovers: Theory and Evidence from 
Emerging Bond Markets”, in Chapter 4 takes a step back and investigates the reason 
behind the existence of liquidity risk (i.e., contagion in liquidity or liquidity spillover 
across markets) in the international bond market settings. Chapter 5 provides the 
thesis’s concluding remarks.    
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CHAPTER 2 
LIQUIDITY RISK AND THE PRICING OF SOVEREIGN BONDS 
IN EMERGING MARKETS 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the role of the liquidity in the pricing of sovereign U.S. dollar 
bonds in emerging markets. We extend Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity-
adjusted capital asset pricing model to the bond market and find that both liquidity level 
and multiple liquidity risks are priced factors for the expected excess return of U.S. 
dollar bonds issued by developing countries. The combined effects of liquidity risk and 
liquidity level can explain as much as 1% per annum extra yield spread for the countries 
that have higher liquidity betas. Countries, which have a high correlation with the global 
market or U.S. stock market, have higher required bond returns than low correlation 
countries. The liquidity factor helps explain the credit spread puzzle of high yields. Our 
empirical results also support a flight to liquidity across the studied countries and are 
robust after controlling for bond characteristics and the U.S. risk factors. 
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2.1 Introduction 
One of the main economic questions in finance is why average returns vary across 
assets. Investors, who hold assets that have greater systematic risk exposure or higher 
betas, should be compensated by higher expected returns. However, the non-default 
components of yield spreads cannot be explained by a single market risk premium 
alone.
6
 Recent literature has given more attention to liquidity risk (see more discussion 
in the Related Literature section below). Many studies argue that investors require 
higher expected returns or liquidity premia in order to compensate for holding less 
liquid securities. Possibly due to the paucity of information on bond markets, heretofore 
most previous studies of liquidity have concentrated on stock markets, despite the fact 
that bonds are generally considered to be less liquid securities. 
There is widespread evidence that liquidity (both in terms of a security’s individual 
characteristics and its systematic risk) is priced in the security market. Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005) develop a unified equilibrium model including both liquidity level and 
liquidity risk, called the liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model (henceforth 
denoted as “LCAPM”). In addition to expected illiquidity cost and the traditional capital 
asset pricing model (henceforth denoted as “CAPM”) market beta, this new model 
captures three possible different forms of liquidity risk for an asset: (i) commonality in 
liquidity with the market liquidity, Cov(c
i
,c
M
), (ii) return sensitivity to market liquidity, 
Cov(r
i
,c
M
) and (iii) liquidity sensitivity to market returns, Cov(c
i
,r
M
), where r and c are 
the return and illiquidity cost. Superscripts i and M represent the asset i and aggregate 
market respectively. They apply the model to the U.S. stock market.  
                                                          
6
 Work by Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001) argues that non-default component consists 
of risk premium and tax effects. 
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Following Acharya and Pedersen (2005), this paper extends the application of the 
LCAPM to the international bond markets from the perspective of an U.S. investor. 
Moreover, the bond-version LCAMP is modified and jointly tested against the U.S. 
stock market. We use the bonds in the JPMorgan Emerging Markets Bond Index 
(EMBI), which has comprehensive coverage of U.S. dollar emerging market bonds 
issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities.
7
 
As mentioned, studies on liquidity and asset pricing have been concentrated on the 
highly-liquid U.S. stock market because of data availability. Consequently, the question 
of whether liquidity is priced in many studies does not have a consensus answer. 
Despite their relative lack of market data, bond markets can provide some advantages in 
testing the liquidity channel in asset pricing as follows: 
1. Unlike stock returns, the ex ante risk premium for bond returns is readily 
available. The bond yield (forward-looking internal rate of return), after 
adjusting for the expected loss, provides a more accurate and cleaner measure of 
the expected returns than does a simple average of realized past returns as used 
for stock market. Subsequently, this leads to more reliable empirical asset 
pricing tests for bonds. The construction of the expected bond returns in this 
paper follows the work by Campello, Chen and Zhang (2008).  
2. Bonds, in general, have significantly lower liquidity compared with stocks. 
Therefore, they provide an ideal setting in which to examine liquidity effects on 
expected returns. Several papers on stocks, for example, Amihud (2002) and 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), focus on equally-weighted returns and 
                                                          
7
 From the perspective of an U.S. investor, EMBI bonds have no foreign exchange risk. 
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illiquidity measures as a way to compensate for the over-representation in their 
samples of highly liquid U.S. stocks. With bonds, such adjustment is less needed. 
In addition, since the U.S. equity markets contain a huge number of highly 
diversified investors, the liquidity effects in emerging bond markets may be 
stronger than those in the U.S. equity markets. 
3. There are very few papers that study the effects of both liquidity level and 
liquidity risk on expected bond returns. This paper offers a liquidity explanation 
for unexplained credit spreads or “the credit spread puzzle”. 
Our results show the effects of three liquidity risk measures on expected excess bond 
returns for the countries, which have higher liquidity beta, to be as follows: (i) the risk 
premium resulting from the co-movement between country-specific liquidity and 
market liquidity, Cov(c
i
,c
M
), is small, being 0.03% per annum; (ii) the risk premium due 
to the return sensitivity to market liquidity, Cov(r
i
,c
M
), is 0.11% per annum; (iii) the risk 
premium owing to the commonality in the country-specific liquidity and market returns, 
Cov(c
i
,r
M
), is 0.70% per annum. Base on historical average turnover, the return 
premium due to the expected level of liquidity is estimated to be 0.16% annually. 
Therefore, the total effect of the liquidity risk and liquidity level can be as much as 
1.00% per annum (100 basis points) between the highest liquidity beta countries and the 
lowest (or about 35% of the 290 basis points difference in spreads between Croatia and 
Ghana). The empirical findings also indicate that there is a flight to liquidity across all 
emerging countries during our study period. Our results are still robust even if we 
control the bond’s characteristics and the U.S. risk factors.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the related literature on 
liquidity and asset pricing. Section 2.3 includes the explanation of data used, the 
16 
 
   
construction of liquidity measures and the brief introduction to the LCAPM. The 
detailed methodology is presented in Section 2.4. Empirical results are reported in 
Section 2.5. Section 2.6 provides the robustness tests. And finally Section 2.7 concludes. 
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2.2 Related Literature 
There have been many papers that relate an individual security’s liquidity to its price. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986 and 1989) study the effect of liquidity on expected stock 
returns and find that they are an increasing and concave function of illiquidity costs as 
measured by the stock’s bid/ask spread. Using a finer measure of illiquidity (in response 
to unexpected trading), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) find that liquidity has a 
positive and significant effect on required returns after adjusting for the Fama and 
French factors and after allowing for the effects of the stock price level. Datar, Naik and 
Radcliffe (1998) find a strong negative relation between average stock returns and 
turnover as a measure of liquidity.
8
 Consistent with other studies, Amihud (2002)’s 
ILLIQ measure of illiquidity has a positive effect on ex ante expected stock returns in 
the cross-section of NYSE stocks from 19631996, controlling for the impacts of beta, 
size, volatility, dividend yield and past returns.
9
 Interestingly, Chordia, Subrahmanyam 
and Anshuman (2001) extend the work by Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) 
by including the stock characteristics and the volatility of trading activity. Their results 
indicate that both level and volatility of trading activity have a negative and significant 
effect on cross-sectional risk-adjusted returns. The authors suggest that the effect of the 
second moment of liquidity may result from its correlation with some omitted and 
unknown risk factor.  
                                                          
8
 The turnover or the reciprocal of hold period is defined as the ratio of the security’s trading 
volume to the amount outstanding.   
9
 The ILLIQ measure is defined as the absolute change in return per dollar volume. A security 
with the higher ILLIQ measure has lower liquidity. 
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Until recently, when Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi 
(2001) and Huberman and Halka (2001) found commonality in the individual security’s 
liquidity and market-wide liquidity, people considered liquidity to be a diversified risk 
factor. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) are the first to investigate the liquidity risk and 
show that U.S. stock returns are exposed to market-wide liquidity. Stocks with greater 
systematic liquidity risk (i.e., their returns are highly correlated with the market 
liquidity) are compensated by higher returns. They also report that the average returns 
on stocks with high sensitivity exceed those for stocks with low sensitivity by 7.5% per 
annum. Similar results are presented by Martinez, Nieto, Rubio and Tapia (2005) using 
Spanish stock market data from 19932000. 
Combining empirical findings that return sensitivity to market liquidity is priced and 
that liquidity co-moves with returns and predicts future returns, Acharya and Pedersen 
(2005) develop an asset pricing model that includes both liquidity level and liquidity 
risk. Expected excess return over the risk-free rate is a function of both the expected 
illiquidity cost and four systematic risk variables: the market return beta, 1 = 
Cov(r
i
,r
M
)/Var(r
M  cM) and another three liquidity betas, 2 = Cov(ci,cM)/Var(rM  cM), 
3 = Cov(ri,cM)/Var(rM  cM) and 4 = Cov(ci,rM)/Var(rM  cM), where ri is the gross 
return of security i. c
i 
and c
M
 are the illiquidity cost of individual stock i and the market 
respectively. r
M  cM is the market net return after paying illiquidity cost.  In their cross-
sectional analysis, liquidity risk explains about 1.1% of returns, whereas the premium 
for liquidity level is 3.5%. The liquidity risk in previous studies is nested in the LCAPM 
of Acharya and Pedersen (2005). For example, the liquidity risk in Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) (i.e., return sensitivity to market liquidity, 3) is one of the three 
covariance components of liquidity risk in the Acharya and Pedersen (2005)’s model. 
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Surprisingly, empirical work on the effects of liquidity on asset pricing usually employ 
data from U.S. stock markets, for which the liquidity effects are substantially mitigated 
because of client effects in portfolio choice. Works outside U.S. are rare. Rouwenhorst 
(1999) reports a strong cross-sectional correlation between the return factors and stock 
turnover in 20 emerging countries. Using stock data from Japan, U.K. and U.S. from 
1980 to 2001, Stahel (2005) finds that global liquidity is priced. Bekaert, Harvey and 
Lundblad (2007) find that models incorporating local liquidity risks for stock markets 
outperform all other models that use only market-risk factors in predicting future returns. 
Interestingly, their results show that while the price of local market risk is not 
significant, the price of local as well as global liquidity risks is positive and significant. 
Jun, Marathe and Shawky (2003) find that the stock returns in emerging countries are 
positively correlated with aggregate market liquidity as measured by turnover ratio, 
trading value and turnover. The results hold in both cross-section and time series. Liang 
and Wei (2006) employ data from 23 developed countries’ stock markets and find that 
global liquidity risk in addition to the Fama-French three factors is positively priced in 
the cross-sectional return analysis. Work by Lee (2010) also finds similar results with 
individual stocks, but he includes 48 developed and emerging countries around the 
world. All of these previous works on international asset pricing and liquidity utilize 
stock market data and not bonds.  
In terms of pricing, liquidity may help to explain the credit spread puzzle in the bond 
market, where spreads on bonds tend to be a lot higher than would be implied by 
expected default losses alone. Many papers find that tax, a market-risk premium and a 
jump-risk premium can explain some portion of bond yield spreads, but not the full 
magnitude (tax effect: Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001), Amato and Remolona 
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(2003) and Liu, Shi, Wang and Wu (2007) and jump risk premium: Amato and 
Remolona (2003), Driessen (2005), Cremers, Driessen and Maenhout (2008) and 
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Helwege (2010)). Theoretical bond pricing models, 
whether structural models or reduced-form models, usually ignore liquidity effects and 
produce spreads that are smaller than observed ones (see Eom, Helwege and Huang 
(2004)).
10
  Even in the reduced-form models such as Duffie and Singleton (1999) and 
Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997), the dynamics of bond values are specified in a way 
that is appropriate for fitting the evolution of credit quality rather than liquidity. While 
the best way of incorporating a liquidity premium into a theoretical pricing model 
remains a subject for research, a recent paper by Ericsson and Renault (2006) has begun 
to examine this question.  
Many empirical works support that liquidity level is priced in U.S. corporate bonds (e.g., 
Perraudin and Taylor (2003), Houweling, Mentink and Vorst (2005), Chacko (2006) 
and Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007)). For example, in a study of over 4,000 U.S. 
corporate bonds, Chen et al. (2007) find empirical evidence that liquidity is a key 
determinant in yield spreads both in terms of yield levels and yield changes over time. 
Cossin and Lu (2005), Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005) and Chen, Cheng and Wu 
(2005) use information from credit default swaps (CDS) to relate the credit spreads that 
cannot be explained by the default component to bond-specific liquidity. However, only 
two papers, by De Jong and Driessen (2006) and Jacoby, Theocharides and Zheng 
(2007), have thus far investigated the pricing of liquidity risk (systemic change in 
                                                          
10
 See for example of structural models, Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976), Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997). By 
contrast, the reduce form models does not try to explain why default happens, rather they model 
default explicitly by intensity process. 
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liquidity) per se in the bond market. De Jong and Driessen (2005) employ a two-step 
multifactor model that includes two market risk factors: the U.S. stock market index 
return and the change in the market volatility (using the VIX index) and two liquidity 
risk factors: the Amihud (2002) ILLIQ measure for stock market (a proxy for the stock 
market illiquidity) and the quoted bid/ask spread for long maturity U.S. Treasury bond 
(a proxy for the bond market illiquidity). In their first step, the factor loading and the 
liquidity betas
 
of the bond portfolio are estimated from the time-series regression.
11
 
They find that bonds with lower credit ratings and longer maturities have higher 
exposure to both liquidity and stock index factors. In the second step, a cross-sectional 
regression of the expected bond returns on the two liquidity betas shows that liquidity 
risk is priced. The liquidity premia for the long-term investment grade and speculative 
bonds are around 0.6% and 1.5% per annum respectively. Jacoby et al. (2007) follow 
the LCAPM framework and find similar results that liquidity risk monotonically 
increases with illiquidity for U.S. corporate bonds and the liquidity risk is priced in 
cross-sectional analysis. However, their sample period only covers July 2002 to 
December 2004 because they extract the corporate bond transaction data (including the 
transaction dates, prices and quantities traded) from the recently-established TRACE 
system, which allows them to compute a measure of illiquidity similar to ILLIQ.
12
 
While there are a relatively large number of studies about U.S. market or international 
stock market liquidity, no paper extends the impact of liquidity risk on expected returns 
                                                          
11
 Liquidity beta in their paper is comparable to the one in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and 3 
in Acharya and Pedersen (2005). 
12
 TRACE system is introduced by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) in 
2002 to make the corporate bond market more transparent. The dealers are obliged to report the 
over-the-counter secondary market transactions. The current reporting time is 15 minutes. 
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to the international bond markets especially to emerging bond markets for which 
illiquidity is a major concern. Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (2001) report that 
transaction cost in emerging markets is significantly higher than that in developed 
markets, even after correcting for factors such as market capitalization and volatility. 
Hund and Lesmond (2008), who apply a similar methodology to Chen et al. (2007), 
investigate 16 emerging bond markets during 1997-2004 and find that illiquidity cost is 
significant in explaining the cross-sectional yield level and variation in yields of 
sovereign and corporate bonds. Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009) and Favero, Pagano 
and von Thadden (2010) find that liquidity is an important factor in explaining 
European sovereign bond spreads after the introduction of the Euro. Many studies 
question whether there is a common factor other than credit risk behind the change in 
the credit spread in the corporate bond and sovereign bond markets (for example, 
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Marting (2001) and Diaz-Weigel and Gemmill (2006)) 
and the country-specific fundamentals alone cannot explain the change in the sovereign 
bond spread (for example, Kamin and von Kleist (1999), Eichengreen and Mody (1998) 
and Cantor and Packer (1996)). Using the data from CDS spreads, Longstaff, Pan, 
Pedersen and Singleton (2007) find that returns from sovereign credit are mainly 
attributed to global risk with only a small country-specific credit risk premium. Global 
liquidity risk is perhaps our missing answer. 
Our study is original in that it extends the LCAPM to jointly investigate how liquidity 
level and liquidity risk have an impact on the cross-sectional returns of international 
bond markets. A main hypothesis is that there exist shocks to market-wide liquidity, 
which are transmitted across countries (i.e., contagion or spillover in liquidity). In the 
main specification, we group the sovereign bonds according to the country of issuance. 
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This is to avoid the size effects occurring when the existing literature usually sorts the 
test portfolio by size.
13
 With a country-specific portfolio, contagion effects of market-
wide liquidity in emerging countries can be examined. We also modify the LCAPM 
model to include the U.S. stock risk factors and we confirm the empirical findings of the 
previous studies that U.S. equity markets play a significant role in the expected bond 
returns in emerging markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 The study by Lewellen, Nagel and Shanken (2010) suggests that since there is the strong 
factor structure of size-B/M portfolios, any factor is likely to produce betas that line up with 
expected returns. One simple solution is to expand the set of test assets to include other 
portfolios, sorted by industry, beta, or other characteristics, not by any criteria related to the size 
and B/M. 
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2.3 Data and the Liquidity-adjusted Capital Asset Pricing Model (LCAPM) 
2.3.1 Data and summary statistics 
After the First World War, financial intermediation in developing countries was limited 
almost entirely to the loan market (Mauro, Sussman and Yafeh (2006)). There was no 
significant activity in the international bond markets before the introduction of Brady 
bonds in the early 1990s as the repackage of the non-performing loans. Mauro et al. 
(2006) p.19 report the change in the composition of sovereign debt from bank loans to 
bonds in the emerging market countries. They also present the rapid growth of 
international bonds issued by emerging market countries from almost nothing in early 
1990s to more than 300 billion U.S. dollar in 2001. Unlike the bond structure before the 
First World War, most of the sovereign bonds now have 5 to 10 year maturity rather 
than having maturity of 20 years or more.   
In response to such expansion, J.P. Morgan established a new database on 31 December 
1993. Their MorganMarket system reports on a daily basis the Emerging Market Bond 
Index (EMBI), which is the most comprehensive U.S. dollar emerging-markets debt 
benchmark. Included in the EMBI are U.S. dollar-denominated Brady bonds, 
Eurobonds and traded loans issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities.
14
 The 
                                                          
14
 The EMBI defines emerging markets countries with a combination of World-Bank defined 
per capita income brackets and each country’s debt-restructuring history. These two criteria 
allow the EMBI to include a number of higher-rated countries that international investors have, 
nevertheless, considered part of the emerging markets universe. 
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following 42 countries are (or used to be) included in the EMBI and are used in this 
study.
15
 
Latin America Asia Europe Africa 
1. Argentina (AR) 
2. Brazil (BR) 
3. Belize (BZ) 
4. Chile (CL) 
5. Columbia (CO) 
6. Dominican  (DO) 
7. Ecuador (EC) 
8. Jamaica (JM) 
9. Mexico (MX) 
10. Panama (PA) 
11. Peru (PE) 
12. El Salvador (SV)  
13. Trinidad Tobago (TT) 
14. Uruguay (UY) 
15. Venezuela (VE) 
1. China (CN) 
2. Indonesia (ID) 
3. Korea (KR) 
4. Kazakhstan (KZ) 
5. Lebanon (LB) 
6. Sri Lanka (LK) 
7. Malaysia (MY) 
8. Philippines (PH) 
9. Pakistan (PK) 
10. Thailand (TH) 
11. Vietnam (VN) 
 
1. Bulgaria (BG) 
2. Serbia (CS) 
3. Greece (GR) 
4. Croatia (HR) 
5. Hungary (HU) 
6. Poland (PL) 
7. Russia (RU) 
8. Turkey (TR) 
9. Ukraine (UA) 
1.  Egypt (EG) 
2.  Gabon (GA) 
3.  Ghana (GH) 
4.  Morocco (MA) 
5.  Nigeria (NG) 
6.  Tunisia (TN) 
7.  South Africa 
(ZA) 
From the universe of emerging-market countries, the eligible bonds in the EMBI consist 
of those that are:
16
  
 denominated in U.S. dollar with face amount outstanding of 50 million U.S. 
dollar or more 
 issued by sovereign or quasi-sovereign entities17 
 at least 2.5 years away from maturity at the inclusion (a bond is removed from 
the EMBI when its maturity is less than 12 months)  
                                                          
15
 As of 1 January 2008 the MSCI Emerging Markets Equity Index consisted of the following 
25 emerging market country indices: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech 
Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. Most 
of them are included in the EMBI. 
16
 More detail about how to construct the EMBI can be found in the Introducing the J.P. Morgan 
Emerging Markets Bond Index Global (EMBI Global), 3 August 1999. 
17
 Quasi-sovereign is defined as an entity that is 100% guaranteed or 100% owned by the 
national government. Therefore, its credit rating is equivalent to the sovereign credit rating. 
However, more than 90% of the market value is the bonds issued by sovereign. 
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 accessible to international investors (a country is excluded if it introduces capital 
controls or tax hurdles to international investors) 
 issued with legal jurisdiction that is domestic to a G7 country  
 able to settle internationally either through Euroclear or another institution 
domiciled outside the issuing country 
 available for the bid and offer prices on a daily basis either from an interdealer 
broker or JP Morgan
18
 
The above criteria ensure that international investors consider such bonds as a part of 
the emerging-market portfolio, which to some certain extent implies that the risk in 
different countries commands the same influence on expected returns. The sample 
period in this study spans from 5 January 1995 to 8 August 2008. To ensure the 
maximum number of data points, we employ weekly data.
19
 With approximately 200 
eligible bonds, the market value of EMBI is about 295 billion U.S. dollar on 8 August 
2008, rising more than threefold since 1995. Ever since started, Latin American 
countries have accounted for the largest proportion of the total market capitalization, 
although their proportion is decreasing gradually. More than half of the bonds are of 
investment grade. As of June 2008, the EMBI includes about 60% of total international 
debt securities issued in foreign currency by developing countries.
20
 Thus, our data set 
                                                          
18
 By contrast, the bid/ask spreads that are obtained from Bloomberg by construction tend to 
under-estimate the illiquidity as they are computed from the highest offer yields and lowest bid 
yields quoted by several bond dealers .  
19
 The weekly interval was chosen as opposed to daily or monthly as a compromise between the 
problems of measurement errors inherent in daily data and sampling inefficiencies associated 
with longer intervals.  
20
 The international debt securities, including money market instruments, notes, and bonds, 
issued by the interested countries, have the amount outstanding of 480 billion U.S. dollar as of 
June 2008 (source: the Bank for International Settlement Quarterly Review, September 2008).  
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may be considered representative for the universe of debt securities in the emerging 
countries. The composition of the EMBI market capitalization by region, credit rating 
and country of issuance is reported in Figure 2-1. 
Figure 2-1: Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) composition by region, credit rating 
and country of issuance as of August 2008 
 
  
 
In additional to the total market capitalization, MorganMarket provides daily 
information on the bid/ask spreads, bond yields, yield spreads over U.S. Treasury with 
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in the EMBI. Table 2-1 summarizes the statistics of data used in the paper. While bond 
characteristics, such as bond maturity and coupon, have been quite stable over our 
sample period, yield spreads over U.S. treasuries at the corresponding maturity and 
percentage quoted bid/ask spreads have been quite volatile especially during the 
Russian default, the LTCM crisis and the Brazilian Real devaluation in 1998 and 1999.  
This suggests that it may be difficult to discern any difference in spreads, which are due 
to bond characteristics because returns are dominated by a number of “one-off” events. 
Table 2-1: Summary statistics on Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) 
This table reports the year-by-year summary statistics on all eligible U.S. dollar sovereign bonds included 
in EMBI. The weekly-data sample spans from January 1998 to August 2008. The data start from 1998 
because some data do not available for the years 1995 to 1997. The mean (except for total return) are 
reported year-by-year. The numbers in the parentheses is standard deviation. Yield spread over U.S. 
Treasury is defined as the EMBI yield minus the U.S. Treasury yield at the corresponding maturity. 
Percentage quoted bid/ask spread is calculated as, (quoted ask pricet
EMBI
 – quoted bid pricet
EMBI
)/ mid  
pricet
EMBI
, which reflects illiquidity cost of the overall international bond markets. Total return is the 
EMBI realized return taking account of capital gain, coupon and accrued interest. Bond maturity, 
modified duration and coupon are the market-weighted average of bonds included in EMBI. Market 
capitalization is sum of total market value of bonds included in EMBI.  
 
  
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
2008 
(Aug) 
1995-2008 
(Aug) 
Yield spread over U.S. 
Treasury (%) 
7.96 9.89 7.10 7.87 7.04 5.17 4.13 3.08 2.03 2.02 3.02 5.48 
(25.7) (8.3) (3.4) (7.0) (7.5) (6.4) (2.8) (3.7) (1.0) (2.5) (1.3) (20.9) 
Percentage quoted 
bid/ask spread (%) 
1.01 0.97 0.71 0.88 0.85 0.71 0.65 0.58 0.49 0.51 0.64 0.69 
(4.9) (1.6) (0.7) (1.3) (1.2) (0.5) (0.7) (0.6) (0.3) (0.6) (0.3) (2.2) 
Total return (%) -11.63 20.05 13.41 4.37 11.91 22.81 12.80 10.93 8.65 6.06 0.79 166.31 
Bond maturity (year) 13.23 12.58 13.09 12.99 11.93 11.39 11.33 11.93 12.64 12.99 13.15 12.45 
Modified duration 
(year) 
5.86 5.11 5.48 5.58 5.58 6.06 6.22 6.73 7.18 7.38 7.36 6.19 
Average coupon (%) 6.87 7.31 8.37 8.24 8.15 8.25 8.27 8.27 8.14 8.06 7.99 7.99 
Market capitalization 
(billion U.S. dollar) 
171.5 167.5 187.7 193.5 188.5 226.4 248.7 278.1 291.0 295.1 291.5 208.2 
 
  
29 
 
   
2.3.2 Liquidity-adjusted CAPM with sovereign bond portfolios 
For our methodology, we extend the LCAPM framework developed by Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005), which examines all four potential channels for a liquidity premium 
(both individual liquidity and market liquidity) to the bond market. Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005) show how the CAPM in the imagined frictionless economy translates 
into a CAPM in net returns for the original economy with illiquidity costs. The one-beta 
CAPM in net returns can be re-written in terms of gross returns. It introduces three 
liquidity betas and the expected net return of asset i is  
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
cov ( , )
( ) ,
var ( )
i i M M
i i f t t t t t
t t t t t M M
t t t
r c r c
E r c r
r c
     
 
 
  

       (2.1) 
where ct is the relative illiquidity cost at time t (i.e., the security illiquidity cost divided 
by security price), r
f
t 
is the risk-free rate and t = Et(r
M
t+1  c
M
t+1 – r
f
t) is the risk 
premium. Superscripts i and M represent the asset i and aggregate market respectively. 
Equivalently, the conditional expected gross return is 
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
cov ( , ) cov ( , )
( ) ( )
var ( ) var ( )
cov ( , ) cov ( , )
.
var ( ) var ( )
i M i M
i f i t t t t t t
t t t t t t tM M M M
t t t t t t
i M i M
t t t t t t
t tM M M M
t t t t t t
r r c c
E r r E c
r c r c
r c c r
r c r c
 
 
   
 
   
   
   
   
      
    
   
    
    
                           (2.2) 
Note that covariance and variance terms in the four brackets are equivalent to betas. 
Therefore, the conditional expected gross return is 
1, 2, 3, 4,
1 1( ) ( ) .
i f i i i i i
t t t t t t t t tE r r E c                                (2.3) 
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Equation (2.3) investigates all potential channels for a liquidity premium, which simply 
state that the required excess security return is the expected relative illiquidity cost, 
Et(c
i
t+1), plus four betas (covariances) multiplied by a risk premium, t. A security 
might have to pay a premium to compensate for its particular illiquidity or transaction 
costs, Et(c
i
t+1), but this is the least interesting effect.
21
 The four betas depend on the 
asset’s payoff and liquidity risk. They are: 
1. As in the standard CAPM, the required return on an asset increases linearly with 
the market beta, 1,i, i.e., with the covariance between the asset return and the 
market return.  
2. The model also yields three additional effects, which could be regarded as three 
forms of liquidity risks. The first liquidity beta, 2,i, is generally positive because 
a security generally becomes more liquid when the market becomes more liquid. 
The model implies that expected return increases with the covariance between 
an asset’s illiquidity and the market illiquidity because investors want to be 
compensated for holding a security that becomes illiquid when the market in 
general becomes illiquid. Previous studies by Chordia et al. (2000), Hasbrouck 
and Seppi (2000) and Huberman and Halka (2001) confirm this commonality in 
liquidity.  
3. The second liquidity beta, 3,i, which measures the exposure of asset i to market-
wide illiquidity, is usually negative because a rise in market illiquidity reduces 
asset values. This beta affects required returns negatively because investors are 
willing to accept a lower return on an asset with a high return in times of market 
                                                          
21
 As mentioned in the Session 2.2 (Related Literature), this is simply the effect of the individual 
security characteristics on the asset returns. 
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illiquidity. Consequently, the more negative is the exposure of the asset to 
market illiquidity, the greater is the required return. This is the main mechanism 
that Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Martinez et al. (2005) investigate. 
4. The last liquidity beta, 4,i, is also negative for most securities. This liquidity 
beta has a negative sign in the pricing model, meaning that the required return is 
higher if the sensitivity of the security’s illiquidity to market condition is more 
negative. The negative effect stems from the willingness of an investor to accept 
lower returns on a security that is liquid in a down market. When the market 
declines, investors are poor and the ability to sell easily is especially valuable. 
Hence, an investor is willing to accept a discounted return on a stock with low 
illiquidity cost in states of poor market return. The effect of this liquidity risk is 
the most important one reported in Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) results and 
has not been studied before for emerging-markets bonds. 
We have to obtain the unconditional LCAPM under the assumption of independence 
over time of returns and illiquidity costs. However, liquidity is empirically persistent.
22
 
It is therefore important to rely on an assumption of constant conditional covariance of 
innovations in liquidity and returns. Under such an assumption, the “unconditional” 
CAPM version has the following specification:
23
 
1, 2, 3, 4,( ) ( ) ,i f i i i i it t tE r r E c                  (2.4) 
where 
                                                          
22
 This is reported by Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Huberman and Halka (2001), Amihud 
(2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Korajczyk and Sadka (2008). 
23
 It is unconditional in the sense that the model is independent from time-variation. 
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where r
i
t, r
f
t and r
M
t are returns on security i, risk-free security and market portfolio. c
i 
and c
M
 are the illiquidity costs of security i and the market respectively.  = E(t) = 
E(r
M
t – c
M
t – r
f
t) is the risk premium. 
In order to ensure more reliable asset pricing tests, we use forward looking expected 
spreads after adjusting for default loss, E(r
i
t – r
f
t)
*
, rather than average realized excess 
stock returns as used by Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and most works in asset pricing 
as a proxy for expected excess returns, E(r
i
t – r
f
t). If we assume that the risk premium, , 
for all four betas is the same, we can then define the sum of four betas for the net beta 
(NET,i) and the sum of three liquidity betas for liquidity beta sum (LIQ,i) as 
NET,i = 1,i + 2,i – 3,i – 4,i and LIQ,i = 2,i – 3,i – 4,i.                 (2.6) 
We can finally write our unconditional liquidity-adjusted CAPM as 
* ,( ) ( )  ori f i NET it t tE r r E c           (2.7a) 
* 1, ,( ) ( ) .i f i i LIQ it t tE r r E c             (2.7b) 
From Equation (2.7a), it is clear that expected excess bond returns after adjusting for 
default loss depend on two components: (i) a security’s illiquidity cost ci, (ii) the 
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covariance of returns with market conditions, NET,i. Alternatively if NET,i is taken into 
two components, we have Equation (2.7b) in which there is market risk (1,i) and 
liquidity risk (LIQ,i or the sum of 2,i – 3,i – 4,i). If a security has a higher illiquidity 
level or transaction cost, an investor required higher expected returns for holding it. The 
same is applied for a security with higher market and liquidity risks given that the price 
of risk, , is positive or investors are not risk-loving. 
In order to test Equations (2.4) and (2.7) in the global bond market context, the 
assumption that the emerging bond markets have a high degree of integration is crucial 
and, therefore, the risk in different countries commands the same influence on expected 
returns.
24
 Without such an assumption, the global illiquidity cost (c
M
) and global bond 
market returns (r
M
) may not be priced in the cross-section of expected returns. Therefore, 
comparing across countries, the expected bond returns may not necessarily be higher in 
a country with a higher level of liquidity risk. If the market is totally segmented, the 
covariance with the national market portfolio, as opposed to global market portfolio, 
will solely determine the cross-sectional expected return. Nonetheless, the bond 
selection criteria for the EMBI ensure the highest possible degree of integration.
25
 Asset 
pricing theory suggests that cross-sectional differences in a country’s risk exposures 
should explain the cross-sectional variation in expected returns. 
                                                          
24
 We assume that the bond markets are integrated among the emerging markets. If we assume 
that the emerging U.S. dollar bond markets are fully integrated to the global bond market, the 
more appropriate benchmark portfolio for measurement of market return and illiquidity cost is 
the global bond market portfolio, which consists of bonds issued by both emerging and 
developed countries. 
25
 Jun, Marathe and Shawky (2003) report the lower degree of integration with the global 
economy in the emerging equity markets comparing to the developed-country equity markets. 
Cumby and Glen (1990) and Harvey (1991) report the world market portfolio beta influences 
the expected returns in the developed countries. 
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2.4 Detailed Methodology  
This section elaborates on the estimation procedure of the unconditional LCAPM as 
specified in Equation (2.7) and presents the empirical results. The following steps are 
implemented and described below is the relevant subsection. 
1) At each week t during the study period, data on a percentage quoted bid/ask 
spread as our measure of illiquidity, c
j
t, is collected for each individual bond j 
included in the EMBI (Section 2.4.1). 
2) A country-specific bond portfolio (i) and market-wide (EMBI) bond portfolio 
(M) are formed. The returns and illiquidity measures for each portfolio in each 
week are estimated (Section 2.4.2). 
3) For both the country-specific bond portfolio and the market-wide portfolio, the 
innovations in illiquidity costs and achieved market-wide returns, (c
i
t – Et-1(c
i
t), 
c
M
t – Et-1(c
M
t) and r
M
t – Et-1(r
M
t)), are computed (Section 2.4.3). 
4) With these innovations, the liquidity betas can be computed according to 
Equation (2.5) (Section 2.4.4). 
5) Forward-looking expected excess bond returns or E(rit – r
f
t)
*
, are estimated 
after correcting for the expected loss (Section 2.4.5). 
6) We are then ready to run the cross-section regression in order to test the 
empirical fit of the unconditional LCAPM in Equation (2.7) using expected 
returns from spreads (Section 2.5: Empirical Results). 
2.4.1 Measuring illiquidity and bond returns 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) in their studying of equities use Amihud’s (2002) 
measure of illiquidity (ILLIQ). This has two shortcomings. First, by construction, this 
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illiquidity measure has a size effect: smaller stocks, which have less amount outstanding 
for a given same turnover, are automatically more illiquid. This might be one of the 
reasons why their model is able to explain the portfolio returns sorted by size, but fails 
to hold for the portfolio sorted by both size and book-to-market. Second, Amihud’s 
measure of illiquidity needs data on trading volume, which is often not available for 
sovereign bonds. 
In the liquidity-related literature, one of the biggest challenges is how to measure 
liquidity and to some extent how to define liquidity both at individual and at market 
level. This problem is even worse for studies of liquidity in bond markets, where data 
are hard to obtain. Since trading volumes in bond markets are usually unavailable, 
volume-based measures of illiquidity such as trading volume, turnover, ILLIQ and 
latent liquidity measures cannot be obtained.
26
  Fortunately, with our MorganMarket 
database, the percentage quoted bid/ask spread of the emerging-markets bonds can be 
gathered on a daily basis. Fleming (2003) and D’Souza, Gaa and Yang (2003) support 
the bid/ask spread as the most appropriate liquidity indicator because of its high degree 
of correlation with other measures. Goldreich, Hanke and Nath (2005) suggest that 
quoted bid/ask spread is a better proxy for liquidity than effective spread (bid/ask spread 
immediately before each trade) in term of the explanatory power over bond yields. 
                                                          
26
 Latent liquidity is a very recently developed measure of liquidity based on the bond’s 
accessibility to dealers is developed by Chacko (2006). It is defined as the weighted average 
turnover of funds holding a particular bond. The volume data from the year 2000 are available 
for Eurozone sovereign bonds, which are traded via the MTS Global Market bond trading 
system. The MTS data are essentially the European equivalent of the U.S. GovPX data. 
However, using these data will greatly reduce the number of countries included in the cross-
sectional analysis. 
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Another important advantage of the bid/ask spread over the ILLIQ measure of 
illiquidity is that it directly measures the percentage cost incurred, while the ILLIQ 
measure the percent of return change per one unit of dollar trading volume. Moreover, it 
is relatively more stationary because there is no effect of inflation that is embedded in 
the trading. As such, the bid/ask spread can directly enter into the asset pricing 
function.
27
  As opposed to trading volume, the bid/ask spread monotonically increases 
with illiquidity.  For example, even though, trading volume can be very high during a 
period of crisis, the bid/ask spread is still high and reflects the cost of transaction. 
At each week t during the study period, a measure of illiquidity or percentage quoted 
bid/ask spread, c
j
t, is collected for each individual bond j, which is included in the 
EMBI. Where c
j
t is the ratio of the quoted bid/ask spread to the bid/ask midpoint. 
Weekly estimates are obtained as a simple average through the week as follows: 
1
1
,
j
tn j j
j t t
t j j
jt t
Ask Bid
c
n Mid

             (2.8) 
where Midt
j
 = (Askt
j
 + Bidt
j
)/2, Askt
j
 and Bidt
j
 are mid, ask and bid quoted prices of bond 
j in week t and n
j
t is the number trading days in week t (normally n
j
t = 5).
28
 The total 
returns for an individual bond between period t1 and t is calculated as shown below: 
1 1
1,
j j j
j t t t
t j j
t t
P AI Coupon
r
P AI 
  
  
 
         (2.9) 
                                                          
27
 In Acharya and Pedersen (2005), ILLIQ is normalized and adjusted for the inflation effect. 
28
 Trading days are based on U.S. calendar. 
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where r
j
t is total return of bond j at week t incorporating principal and interest, P
j
t is 
closing clean price for the bond j at week t, AI
j
t is accrued interest, which is the coupon 
payment scaled by the ratio of days since the last payment date to the days between last 
payment and next payment and Coupon
j
t 
is the coupon payment, if any, of bond j at 
week t. 
2.4.2 Estimating bid/ask spreads (illiquidity) and returns on bond portfolios 
As in other empirical works in asset pricing, grouping the individual securities into 
portfolios reduces the estimation error. Our test portfolios contain the bonds sorted by 
the country of issuance. Not only, does such grouping enable the study of liquidity 
transmission across countries on a global basis, it also provides more convincing results 
from the statistical perspective. Lewellen, Nagel and Shanken (2010) argue that because 
of the strong factor structure of size and B/M portfolios, any risk factor is likely to 
explain the size and B/M effects and one of their suggestions is to sort the test portfolios 
by other criteria, which are not related to size and B/M. Interestingly, sorting portfolios 
according to the measure of illiquidity or illiquidity-variation used by Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005) might still be subject to the size and B/M problem because liquidity  
and its variation have  a close association with size.  
Every week t, we compute the measure of illiquidity (quoted bid/ask spread) for each 
individual bond j when the bond is available at that time to avoid survivorship bias and 
average the daily bid/ask spread during the five U.S. working days (Monday to Friday) 
to reduce noise and sampling errors. The measure of illiquidity of the country portfolio i 
and market-wide portfolio M is calculated as follows: 
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j in i
,i ji jt t tc w c                   (2.10a) 
 in 
,M iM it t ti Mc w c                       (2.10b) 
where wt
ji
 is the bond j weight for country portfolio i at week t and wt
iM
 is the country 
portfolio i weight for market-wide portfolio M. We focus on the market-value 
weighting.
29
 Similarly the return including coupon payment of a portfolio i and market-
wide return is computed as 
 in i
,i ji jt t tjr w r                    (2.11a) 
 in 
.M iM it t ti Mr w r                   (2.11b) 
Note that the unobservable nature of the market portfolio is always a potential problem 
embedded in the asset pricing test. The market portfolio in this paper is formed by the 
sovereign bonds issued by emerging markets, which should be a better proxy for the 
“true” market portfolio than the market portfolio consisting only of highly liquid U.S. 
equities such as S&P500, NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ, which have commonly been 
used in the previous literature since the bond market stands in between the most liquid 
instruments (e.g., U.S. stocks) and least liquid assets (e.g., real estate or human capital). 
Value-weighting also ensures investability of the test and market portfolios.   
2.4.3 Computing innovations in illiquidity and returns 
                                                          
29
 Using equal weighting is the way to compensate the over-representing of liquid instruments 
as compared to true market portfolio, which consists of less-liquid instruments such as small 
corporate bonds or real estates. However, the problem of over-representation is more severe 
when the asset class only consists of equities.  
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As mentioned earlier, liquidity is highly persistent. In order to compute the liquidity 
betas according to Equation (2.5), we compute innovations in illiquidity costs for the 
country portfolio and market-wide portfolio and innovations in market-wide returns, c
i
t 
– Et-1(c
i
t), c
M
t – Et-1(c
M
t) and r
M
t – Et-1(r
M
t), with an autoregressive (AR) process. The 
residuals from the AR process capture these innovations and are assumed to be i.i.d. 
random variables.  
We follow Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005), who 
employ an AR specification with 2-month lags to compute the liquidity innovation for 
both the market portfolio and all the test portfolios. As weekly data are used in our 
analysis, we use an AR specification with 8-week lags to capture these innovations.
30
 
This AR(8) specification for market illiquidity provides an R
2
 of 90%  and a standard 
deviation of residuals of 0.10%. The autocorrelation of these residuals is very low at 
0.01 and they appear stationary (when 36 lags are included). The estimated innovations 
in market illiquidity (not tabulated here) are high during periods of liquidity crises in 
emerging countries, including the Mexican Peso devaluation (December 1994), the 
Asian Crisis (1997), the Russian Ruble devaluation (August 1998), the LTCM crisis 
(September 1998), the Brazilian Real devaluation (January 1999), the Turkish Lira 
devaluation (March 2001) and Argentina’s debt moratorium (December 2001).  
2.4.4 Computing liquidity betas 
With these innovations (from Section 2.4.3) and Equation (2.5), Table 2-2 reports all 
four betas, average quoted bid/ask spreads and average expected excess returns using all  
                                                          
30
 An AR specification with 2-week and 4-week lags gives similar results. We also try an 
autoregressive moving average (ARMA) process and the results do not change. 
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Table 2-2: Country portfolio characteristics: betas, bid/ask spreads and expected excess 
returns 
In addition to traditional CAPM market beta, 1,i, three possible different forms of liquidity risk (liquidity 
betas) for an asset are: (i) commonality in liquidity with the market liquidity, 2,i, (ii) return sensitivity to 
market liquidity, 3,i, (iii) liquidity sensitivity to market returns, 4,i. NET,i= 1,i +
 
2,i  3,i  4,i and LIQ,i 
= 2,i  3,i  4,i. E(cit) is the average quoted bid/ask spread for country i.  E(r
i
t
 – rft)
*
 is annual expected 
excess bond returns after correcting for expected loss at default and subtracting U.S. Treasury bond yields 
of the same maturity.  Countries are sorted according to their values of LIQ,i. 
 
Country 1,i 2,i 3,i 4,i NET,i LIQ,i E(c
i
t) E(r
i
t
 – rft)
*
 
Ghana 0.48 0.05 -0.03 0.13 0.44 -0.04 0.98 0.11 
El Salvador 4.05 0.03 -0.19 0.26 4.01 -0.04 1.04 1.34 
Hungary 1.62 0.00 0.01 -0.01 1.62 0.00 0.38 0.77 
Chile 6.12 0.00 -0.03 0.01 6.15 0.03 0.65 1.42 
Trinidad 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.65 2.10 
Kazakhstan 4.34 0.01 -0.06 0.01 4.39 0.05 1.67 3.35 
Serbia 4.62 0.03 -0.16 0.07 4.74 0.12 1.06 0.98 
Vietnam 4.12 0.00 -0.14 -0.11 4.37 0.25 0.61 0.52 
Indonesia 5.74 0.02 -0.18 -0.09 6.02 0.29 0.72 0.53 
Tunisia 5.83 0.02 -0.11 -0.27 6.22 0.40 0.96 1.22 
Gabon 0.81 0.03 -0.13 -0.24 1.21 0.40 1.00 2.30 
Jamaica 2.73 0.00 -0.13 -0.30 3.17 0.44 0.95 0.69 
Sri Lanka -0.28 -0.05 -0.24 -0.27 0.18 0.46 1.98 3.16 
Lebanon 1.20 0.07 -0.08 -0.33 1.68 0.48 1.39 1.32 
Egypt 6.97 0.02 -0.28 -0.17 7.45 0.48 0.97 1.16 
Pakistan 6.77 0.03 -0.34 -0.27 7.41 0.64 1.50 1.99 
Dominican 10.13 0.02 -0.22 -0.47 10.84 0.71 1.37 1.69 
China 7.09 0.04 -0.19 -0.55 7.87 0.78 0.62 1.04 
Greece 6.68 0.08 -0.37 -0.40 7.53 0.86 0.48 0.86 
Ukraine 12.72 0.06 -0.49 -0.59 13.87 1.14 0.82 3.89 
Poland 24.43 0.10 -0.76 -1.06 26.35 1.92 0.63 1.56 
Korea 24.10 0.12 -0.87 -1.02 26.11 2.01 0.58 1.59 
Uruguay 25.41 0.10 -0.66 -1.30 27.46 2.05 1.71 2.09 
Belize 1.80 0.06 -0.21 -1.80 3.87 2.07 3.02 2.15 
Morocco 53.92 0.07 -1.91 -0.29 56.18 2.27 0.86 3.37 
Mexico 39.66 0.11 -1.05 -1.13 41.95 2.29 0.46 3.15 
Thailand 31.13 0.23 -1.32 -1.32 34.00 2.87 1.03 1.47 
Malaysia 16.99 0.13 -0.64 -2.12 19.88 2.90 0.78 1.76 
Philippines 28.75 0.14 -1.28 -1.66 31.83 3.08 0.80 2.67 
Columbia 30.20 0.18 -1.27 -1.83 33.48 3.28 0.84 3.21 
Argentina 65.99 0.19 -2.05 -1.45 69.68 3.69 1.37 14.53 
Panama 43.01 0.25 -1.21 -2.45 46.92 3.91 0.79 2.13 
Venezuela 58.71 0.16 -1.60 -2.17 62.64 3.93 0.71 4.51 
Turkey 35.87 0.24 -1.15 -2.59 39.84 3.97 0.79 1.61 
Brazil 71.99 0.16 -2.23 -2.13 76.50 4.51 0.63 4.31 
South Africa 19.35 0.23 -0.74 -3.85 24.18 4.83 0.91 1.68 
Bulgaria 63.93 0.21 -2.12 -2.78 69.05 5.12 0.85 3.56 
Peru 50.40 0.28 -2.07 -2.84 55.58 5.19 1.41 2.90 
Ecuador 83.63 0.28 -2.65 -2.97 89.53 5.90 1.18 6.53 
Russia 105.44 0.27 -3.90 -2.91 112.53 7.09 0.69 6.44 
Nigeria 49.36 0.61 -2.09 -6.47 58.54 9.18 2.88 8.91 
Croatia 45.40 0.61 -1.82 -11.36 59.19 13.79 1.06 3.01 
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available time-series data.
31
 The table is sorted in ascending order of estimated sum of 
liquidity betas (LIQ,i). In the table, country portfolios, which have higher market betas, 
liquidity betas and quoted bid/ask spreads, tend to have greater expected excess returns.  
Note, however, that more illiquid portfolios (higher quoted bid/ask spreads) do not 
always have a higher level of liquidity risk (higher liquidity betas). A country with high 
illiquidity costs may enjoy low costs of borrowing if its bonds have low covariance with 
global factors: international investors require lower returns for holding them since they 
consider them to be a hedging instrument.   
Table 2-3 shows that there is a high degree of correlation across the different measures 
of liquidity risk. It is therefore difficult to distinguish empirically the effects of each 
liquidity beta. Assuming that the risk premium, ,  for all four betas is the same and 
defining the sum of four betas as the net beta (NET,i) as in Equation (2.6) will help 
alleviate this statistical problem. Table 2-5 also shows that the cross-sectional 
correlation between the net beta and expected cost of illiquidity is very low (0.04), so 
grouping betas in this way makes sense statistically. 
Table 2-3: Beta correlations for country portfolios 
We report correlations of 1,i ,
 
2,i , 3,i and 4,i for the 42 value-weighted country portfolios. The 
collinearity of measure of liquidity risks makes it hard to measure the impact of each beta separately.  
 
  1,i 2,i 3,i 4,i 
1,i 1.00 0.65 -0.98 -0.52 
2,i 
 
1.00 -0.71 -0.93 
3,i 
  
1.00 0.57 
4,i 
   
1.00 
                                                          
31
 How to estimate the expected excess bond returns is outlined in Section 2.4.5. The scale of 
betas may not seem realistic at the first glance. For example, Russia has a market beta of around 
100. However, it makes senses because the betas are calculated from innovations in liquidity 
and returns rather than their level. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) also report the betas of similar 
magnitude. 
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2.4.5 Constructing the expected bond returns 
Expected bond returns are computed by a method similar to that used by De Jong and 
Driessen (2006) and Campello et al. (2008). The following equation is used to calculate 
the expected bond returns: 
( )* ( ) ,i f i f i it t t t t tE r r y r EDL ERND                                 (2.12) 
where E(r
i
t – r
f
t)
*
 is the expected bond excess return, r
f
t 
is the risk-free rate, y
i
t is the 
yield to maturity given that there is no change in bond yield, EDL
i
t or expected default 
loss rate is defined as default probability  (1 recovery rate)/dt < 0 and ERNDit or 
expected return due to yield change conditional on no-default. In Equation (2.12), we 
ignore this ERND
i
t term because Campello et al. (2008) stress that it is on average very 
small and De Jong and Diessen (2005) also ignore this term. 
We start by computing bond yield spread subtracting U.S. Treasury bond yield of the 
same maturity, y
i
t  r
f
t. Then expected default loss rate, EDL
i
t, is calculated using the 
default probability and recovery rate provided by Standard & Poor’s. In computing 
default probability, we obtain the long-term foreign-currency sovereign credit rating and 
its one-year transition rates from Standard & Poor’s. 32  We estimate the maturity-
matching default probability under Markov chain with an absorbing state (i.e., default 
state). The default probability data are available for the entire sample period and for all 
countries included in the EMBI. In computing the recovery rate, we use the recovery 
rate applied from recovering rating issued to 25 speculative-grade sovereign issuers 
                                                          
32
 Please see Standard & Poor’s, Sovereign Rating History Since 1975, published on 3 January 
2007 for credit ratings and Sovereign Defaults and Rating Transition Data: 2006 Update, 
published on 1 February 2007 for one-year transition rates.   
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published by Standard & Poor’s.33 In assigning the recovery rating, Standard & Poor’s 
considers three major aspects: 1) the sovereign’s ability to resume payments after 
default, 2) the sovereign’s recovery incentives and 3) the impact of official creditors. 
For other sovereigns for which the recovery rating is not available, the recovery rate for 
corporate bonds provided by Alman and Kishore (1998) (which are the following; 
68.34% for AAA, 59.59% for AA, 60.63% for A, 49.42% for BBB, 39.05% for BB, 
37.54% for B, and 38.02% for CCC bonds) are used for the expected bond returns 
estimation.
34
 Finally if the estimated E(r
i
t – r
f
t)
*
 for any week t is less than zero, it is 
replaced by zero value. After correcting for expected loss, the bond market should 
provide a cleaner (less noisy) ex ante expected return than the stock market and should 
deliver reliable empirical results without needing very long time-series data. The 
statistics of expected excess bond returns, estimated betas and percentage quoted 
bid/ask spreads by sovereign are reported in Table 2-2.  
Time series of percentage quoted bid/asks spreads calculated as in Section 2.4.2 and 
expected excess returns of the EMBI, which represent the market-wide or global  
portfolio, are shown in Figure 2-2. Note that the spreads and expect excess returns move  
very closely to each other. As expected, both increase sharply during periods of 
financial turmoil. 
 
                                                          
33
 Twenty-five speculative sovereign issuers consist of Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Columbia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Indonesia, Jamaica, 
Lebanon, Macedonia, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, 
Venezuela and Vietnam. The recovering rating of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 implies the recovery rate of 
95%, 80%, 60%, 40% and 20% respectively. See article titled “Introduction of Sovereign 
Recovery Ratings” published on June 12, 2007 for more detail. 
34
 Elton et al. (2001) and Campello et al. (2008) also use this recovery rate. Using only the 
recovery rate by Alman and Kishore (1998) also gives the similar empirical results. 
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Figure 2-2: Time series of weekly market-wide (EMBI) percentage quoted bid/asks 
spreads and expected excess returns 
This figure shows time series of quoted bid/asks spreads calculated as in Section 2.4.2 and expected 
excess returns calculated as in Section 2.4.5 of the EMBI, which represents the market-wide or global 
portfolio. Percentage quoted bid/ask spread is calculated as, (quoted ask pricet
EMBI
  quoted bid 
pricet
EMBI
)/ mid  pricet
EMBI
, which reflects illiquidity cost of the overall international bond markets. The 
expected excess bond return, E(r
i
t
 – rft)
*
, is bond yields after correcting for expected loss at default and 
subtracting U.S. Treasury bond yields of the same maturity. The market portfolio is formed using the 
value weighting method. Events, which significantly impacted global liquidity level and the global 
expected bond returns, are also depicted in the figure. Two series report a correlation of 0.83.  
 
 
 
In general, lower credit rating bonds command higher expected spreads over risk-free 
rates. However, if expected bond spreads are adjusted for their default loss and 
illiquidity cost, we should not expect to find a strong relationship between credit ratings 
and expected bond spreads. Figure 2-3 shows the relationship between average credit 
rating and average expected bond spread before and after adjusting for expected default 
loss and illiquidity cost for each country’s bond portfolio during our sample period.  In 
the calculation, we use our computed percentage quoted bid/ask spread as a proxy for 
illiquidity cost and adjust default loss as outlined above. In addition, the lower panel of  
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Figure 2-3: Relationship between expected bond spread and credit rating  
The upper panel plots the average expected bond spread against average credit rating for each country’s 
bond portfolio during January 1995 to August 2008. The lower panel plots the average expected bond 
spread after adjusting for default loss and illiquidity cost (bid/ask spread) against average credit rating for 
each country’s bond portfolio during January 1995 to August 2008. The expected bond spread is equal to 
the difference between the average yield to maturity in the emerging country and the corresponding yield 
to maturity on the U.S. Treasury spot curve, after 'stripping' out the value of any collateralized cash flows. 
The expected bond spread after adjusting for default loss and illiquidity cost is the bond spread minus 
expected loss and recovery if default occurs and minus illiquidity cost. Illiquidity cost is percentage 
quoted bid/asks spread. Standard & Poor’s Rating is an integer representation of each country’s rating 
with 1 assigned to AAA and 21 assigned to C.  The fitted solid lines are from OLS regression. Its 
regression results are also reported.  
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Figure 2-3 suggests that potential sovereign bond default, as represented by credit rating,  
alone cannot explain credit spreads in emerging-markets’ sovereign bonds. Bond 
duration does not also help to explain the cross-section of average expected bond spread 
(results are not reported here). Our findings are consistent with Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer and 
Swaminathan (2005) that corporate bond characteristics such as credit rating and 
duration are less important than systematic risk factors as far as bond returns are 
concerned. The systematic risks such as market risk and liquidity risk may be more 
important.
35
 
 
  
                                                          
35
 Because of our focus in the LCAPM of Acharya and Pedersen (2005), we do not include the 
default risk in this paper. However, the second research paper in Chapter 4 shows that the 
liquidity risk is still important for bond prices after controlling for the default risk.  
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2.5 Empirical Results: Cross-sectional Regression of LCAPM 
In this section, we employ two estimation methods in testing our 42 sovereign bond 
portfolios. One is a cross-sectional regression of the unconditional LCAPM, using data 
for the whole available sample (data from Table 2-2). The other is a weekly Fama-
MacBeth regression using historical 5-year rolling data to compute all betas according 
to Equation (2.5). These two different methods provide a chance to examine the 
robustness of our results. Both give similar results at the end.  
2.5.1 Single cross-sectional regression of unconditional LCAPM 
From Table 2-2, we are now ready to run the cross-section regression in order to test the 
empirical fit of the unconditional LCAPM in Equation (2.7). Equivalently, we 
investigate whether cross-sectional differences in average risk explain the differences in 
average expected returns of sovereign bonds in emerging markets. Table 2-4 reports the 
regression results, where standard errors are computed using the Newey and West 
(1987) method. We run seven different cross-sectional regressions. 
Model 4.1 in Table 2-4 is a regression containing only the standard market beta. 
Basically, it is the standard CAPM equation. As expected, the risk premium,  , is 
positive and significant. However, the constant or pricing error is also positive and 
significant.  
Models 4.2 and 4.3 present the results for regressions that include the quoted bid/ask 
spread, E(c
i
t), and a net beta, (
NET,i
 = 1,i + 2,i – 3,i – 4,i). The LCAPM implies that 
the coefficient of E(c
i
t) should be positive, to adjust for the difference between  
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Table 2-4: Country portfolios and cross-sectional regression 
This table reports results from the cross-sectional regression of the unconditional LCAPM in Equation 
(2.7) for 42 value-weighted country portfolios using weekly data during January 1995 to July 2008 with a 
value-weighted market portfolio. Specifications, which are considered, are alternative cases of the 
following equation: 
1 1, 2 2, 3 3, 4 4, 5 , 6 ,( )* ( ) ,i f i i i i i NET i LIQ it t tE r r E c                       
where E(r
i
t
  –  rft)
*
   is the average expected excess return for country i. E(cit) is the average quoted bid/ask 
spread. 1,i is the market beta, 2,i , 3,i and 4,i represent three liquidity betas.  NET,i= 1,i +
 
2,i  3,i  4,i 
and LIQ,i= 2,i  3,i  4,i. Betas are pre-estimated using Equation (2.5). In some specification,  is set to 
be the average weekly turnover ( = 0.04 or annual turnover of about two). The t-statistics from Newey 
and West (1987) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error & covariance least square regression are in 
the parentheses. R
2
 and Adjusted R
2
 are reported in the last column. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level is indicated by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 respectively.  
 
 constant 
() 
E(cit)
 
1,i
 2,i 3,i 4,i NET,i LIQ,i R
2 
 
Cov(ri,rM) Cov(ci,cM) Cov(ri,cM) Cov(ci,rM) 
Sum of 
4 betas  
Liquidity 
Beta sum 
(adj-R2) 
4.1 0.0181
c 
  0.0013
c 
          0.45 
  (3.88)   (4.58)           (0.44) 
4.2 -0.0250
c
 0.0400         0.0012
c
   0.51 
  -(4.01) ( - )         (4.94)   (0.50) 
4.3 -0.0133 0.0290
c 
        0.0012
c
   0.56 
  -(1.12) (2.72)         (4.88)   (0.54) 
4.4 -0.0241
c
 0.0400 0.0024
c 
0.0934 0.0313 0.0075 
  
0.56 
 
-(4.41) ( - ) (2.87) (1.17) (1.38) (1.45) 
  
(0.51) 
4.5 -0.0173 0.0332
b 
0.0022
a 
0.1049 0.0269 0.0075     0.59 
  -(1.24) (2.43) (2.01) (1.11) (0.99) (1.49)     (0.54) 
4.6 -0.0098 0.04           0.0075
c 
0.19 
  -(1.24) ( - )           (2.78) (0.17) 
4.7 0.0101 0.0193 
     
0.0082
c 
0.29 
  (1.14) (1.62)           (3.00) (0.26) 
estimation periods (weekly) and investors’ holding periods. In model 4.2, the coefficient  
of E(c
i
t) is constrained to be 0.04, which is equivalent to the average holding period of 
about 1/0.04  25 weeks or 0.5 year.36 The risk premium attached to NET,i is positive 
with correct sign and significant. In model 4.3, when we do not fix the coefficient on 
E(c
i
t), the estimated coefficient on E(c
i
t) is 0.029 and fairly closed to our calibrated 
number (0.04). Both significant evidences, that E(c
i
t) in model 4.3 is positive and 
NET,i
 
is positive in models 4.2 and 4.3, lend support to the LCAPM. In addition, comparing 
                                                          
36
 Unlike stocks, the trading volumes on bond markets are difficult to obtain because bonds are 
normally traded over-the-counter. Therefore, their data are fragmented and not centralized. The 
annual average turnover of about two is approximated from Knight (2006). 
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models 4.1 with 4.2, the adjusted R
2
 is higher when liquidity risks are included in the 
pricing equation, even if we maintain the number of the free parameters (i.e., same 
degrees of freedom).  
The evidence of liquidity risk is weaker when we allow each of the betas to have a 
different risk premium. In models 4.4 and 4.5, the betas are not very significant because 
of multicollinearity (see Table 2-3). It is hard to distinguish empirically the significance 
of liquidity risk versus market risk on expected excess bond returns. Models 4.6 and 4.7 
exclude the market beta. The aggregate liquidity beta (LIQ,i = 2,i – 3,i – 4,i ) is now 
positive and significant in both models. In conclusion, there is some evidence that 
liquidity risk and liquidity level are priced.  
Table 2-5 indicates low correlations between E(c
i
t) with both 
NET,i
 and LIQ,i, hence, the 
multicollinearity problem is less relevant in models 4.3 and 4.7 than other regressions. 
In general, the results here are consistent with those reported by Acharya and Pedersen 
(2005) and Lee (2010) for U.S. equity and global equity markets respectively. Although 
not tabulated here when we include only one particular beta (1, 2, 3 and 4) in the 
cross-sectional regression, it has the correct sign (positive sign for 1 and 2 and 
negative sign for 3 and 4) and is significant.   
Table 2-5: Correlations of variables in testing the unconditional LCAPM 
E(c
i
t) is 
the average effective bid/ask spread for country i. E(r
i
t
 – rft)
*
  is expected excess returns.  NET,i= 
1,i +
 
2,i  3,i  4,i and LIQ,i= 2,i  3,i  4,i. Correlations are reported for the 42 value-weighted 
country portfolios. E(c
i
t) has a low correlation with both 
NET,i
 and LIQ,i . 
 
  E(c
i
t) 
LIQ,i
 NET,i E(rit
 – rft)
*
 
E(c
i
t) 1.00 0.17 -0.04 0.31 
LIQ,i 
 
1.00 0.77 0.49 
NET,i 
  
1.00 0.67 
E(r
i
t
 – rft)
*
 
  
1.00 
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Respectively, Panels A, B and C in Figure 2-4 show the empirical fit of the standard 
CAPM from model 4.1 in Table 2-4, constrained LCAPM from model 4.2 in Table 2-4 
and unconstrained LCAPM from model 4.5 in Table 2-4. Liquidity risks improve the fit 
for both low-yield and high-yield sovereign bond portfolios and the improvement in fit 
does not result from an increase in the number of explanatory variables in the regression 
(models 4.1 versus 4.2).  Note that Argentina represents an extreme case, with weekly 
average return of more than 0.25%. However, the result in this section is still the same 
when Argentinian bond portfolio is excluded.  
To summarize, the results are very supportive of the hypothesis that liquidity risk is 
priced in the international bond market or the cross-sectional differences in average risk 
can explain the differences in average returns in the international bond market. 
2.5.2 Economic significance 
Using the empirical results from model 4.2 in Table 2-4 (with  = 0.0012 and using the 
six-month holding period, i.e., coefficient of E(c
i
t) or  is fixed at 0.04), the economic 
significance of three estimated liquidity risk measures on expected bond returns can be 
determined. For example, consider Ghanaian and Croatian bond markets for which the 
difference in unconditional expected excess return is about 2.90% (3.01%  0.11%)  per 
annum (from Table 2-2, last column) given our model is correctly specified:
37
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37
 I pick Ghana and Croatia because they are respectively the lowest and highest liquidity risk 
countries as measured by the magnitude of LIQ,i. From Table 2-2, LIQ,Ghana
 
 = 0.04 and 
LIQ,Croatia
 
 = 13.79.  
51 
 
   
Figure 2-4: Empirical fit of CAPM versus LCAPM  
Panel A depicts the fitted CAPM returns against realized returns using weekly data from January 1995 to 
August 2008 for value-weighted country portfolios. Panel B shows the same for the constrained LCAPM 
and Panel C represents the same for the unconstrained LCAPM.  
 
Panel A Panel B 
  
 
                                  Panel C 
 
(i) The difference in annualized expected excess returns between those two 
sovereign bond portfolios that results from the difference in the co-movement 
between country-specific liquidity and market liquidity, Cov(c
i
,c
M
) or 2, is  
 (β2,Croatia   β2,Ghana)  52 = 0.03% per annum.  
(ii) In a similar manner, the difference in annualized expected excess returns that is 
due to the difference in the return sensitivity to market liquidity, Cov(r
i
,c
M
) or 3, 
is  (β3,Croatia   β3,Ghana)  52 = 0.11% per annum. 
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(iii) The difference in annualized expected excess returns owing to the difference in 
the commonality in the country-specific liquidity and market returns, Cov(c
i
,r
M
) 
or 4,  is   (β4,Croatia   β4,Ghana)  52 = 0.70% per annum.  
Hence, the total effect of liquidity risk is 0.84% (0.03% + 0.11% + 0.70%) annually.  
(iv) Meanwhile, the difference in annualized expected excess returns that can be 
attributed to the difference in the expected level of liquidity is estimated (based 
on historical average turnover) to be 0.04  [E(ct
Croatia
) – E(ct
Ghana
)]  52 = 0.16% 
annually. 
Therefore, the combined effects of liquidity risk and liquidity level can explain as much 
as 1.00% per annum of credit spread or about 35% of the 2.90% difference in spreads 
between Croatia and Ghana.
38
 Interestingly, in terms of credit ratings, Ghana has the 
average credit rating of B+, whereas Croatia’s average credit rating is BBB.  Ghana also 
issues longer-term sovereign bonds (average modified duration of 6.42 year versus 3.42 
years). However, Ghana commands lower cost-of-borrowing partly because it is the 
lowest liquidity-risk country. This finding also indicates that the impacts of liquidity 
(flight to liquidity) are stronger than those of credit quality (flight to quality) across our 
set of emerging countries during our study periods (January 1995 to August 2008). 
International investors require lower expected returns when holding a security that 
performs well in the times of difficulties. Such effects at times can overcome the risk 
premium from credit risk and interest rate term risk.  
                                                          
38
 Expected excess returns are 0.11% annually for Ghana’s bond portfolio and 3.01% for 
Croatia’s bond portfolio.   
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In U.S. stock markets, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) find the total effect of liquidity risk 
is 1.10% per annum and the effect of expected liquidity level is 3.50% annually. Pastor 
and Stambaugh (2003) and Sadka (2006) report a high illiquidity risk premium between 
5% and 7.5%, but they do not take expected liquidity level into account. Since they do 
not have data on the expected liquidity of U.S. corporate bonds, De Jong and Driessen 
(2006) do not include an expected liquidity level in the model and they report a liquidity 
risk premium for CCC bonds of 1.00% per year. In summary, the liquidity risk premium 
estimated for the emerging U.S. dollar sovereign bond markets are relatively in line 
with the estimates obtained in the U.S. equity and corporate bond market.  
2.5.3 Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression
39
 
In the same way as in the previous section, we now study how liquidity risk affects 
expected bond returns, but using the standard Fama-MacBeth (1973) method for our 42-
country bond portfolios and results are reported in this section. We employ the same 
methodology as in Section 2.4.1 to Section 2.4.5 except that all betas are computed 
using 5-year rolling data. Four betas are computed using the prior 260 weeks’ 
innovations in returns and illiquidity. Betas are included if they have at least 144 weeks’ 
(36 months’) observations of data before the test week. Since we require five years of 
prior data to estimate betas, our Fama-MacBeth regression uses data from January 2000 
to August 2008, even though the sample starts in January 1995. In total, 9,957 data 
points are included. Standard errors are computed using the Newey and West (1987) 
method with three lags. The summary statistics of data used and their correlation 
                                                          
39
 The previous approach that first calculates the mean return for each country bond’s portfolio 
over the sample and then regresses the mean returns on the betas estimated over the same  
sample period could be problematic because returns are often cross-sectionally correlated and 
heteroscedastic. Therefore results based on this approach can be misleading. 
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coefficients are provided in Table 2-6. The data show similar patterns to those used in 
the single unconditional LCAPM. In Panel B, all individual betas are shown to exhibit a 
high degree of correlation. We therefore again expect a multicollinearity problem in 
betas when all betas are individually included in the regression. However, this problem 
is not an issue when either  NET,i or LIQ,i is used as an explanatory variable because of 
the relatively low correlations between E(c
i
t) and 
NET,i
 (as well as E(c
i
t) and 
LIQ,i
).  
Table 2-6: Summary statistics of data used in Fama-MacBeth regression 
These tables report the summary statistics on all data used in Fama-MacBeth regressions (Table 2-6.1) 
and correlations (Table 2-6.2). The weekly-data sample spans from January 2000 to August 2008.  E(c
i
t) 
is the average quoted bid/ask spread for country i. E(r
i
t
 – rft)
*
  is expected excess bond returns after 
correcting for expected loss at default and subtracting U.S. Treasury bond yields of the same maturity.
 
In 
addition to traditional CAPM market beta (1,i), three possible different forms of liquidity risk (liquidity 
betas) for an asset are: (i) commonality in liquidity with the market liquidity, 2,i, (ii) return sensitivity to 
market liquidity, 3,i, (iii) liquidity sensitivity to market returns, 4,i. NET,i= 1,i +
 
2,i  3,i  4,i and 
LIQ,i= 2,i  3,i  4,i. Correlation coefficients in Table 2-6.2 are the time-series average of sectional 
correlation coefficients.  All coefficients are significant at all conventional level (H0: rho = 0 is all 
rejected). 
 
Table 2-6.1 
Variable 
Number of 
observation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Max Min 
E(c
i
t) 9,957 0.781 0.613 8.041 0.057 
E(r
i
t
 – rft)
*
   9,957 2.486 5.851 58.830 0.000 
1,i 9,957 35.890 29.985 170.226 -0.139 
2,i 9,957 0.126 0.102 0.723 -0.007 
3,i 9,957 -1.061 0.867 0.178 -4.641 
4,i 9,957 -1.300 1.432 1.534 -10.754 
NET,i 9,957 38.376 31.556 177.225 -0.039 
LIQ,i 9,957 2.486 2.097 14.130 -0.860 
 
Table 2-6.2 
  E(cit) 
1,i 2,i 3,i 4,i NET,i LIQ,i 
E(c
i
t) 1.000 0.057 0.278 -0.141 -0.061 0.061 0.114 
1,i 
 
1.000 0.628 -0.926 -0.469 0.999 0.733 
2,i 
  
1.000 -0.720 -0.693 0.651 0.820 
3,i 
   
1.000 0.506 -0.933 -0.794 
4,i 
    
1.000 -0.507 -0.926 
NET,i 
     
1.000 0.763 
LIQ,i 
      
1.000 
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Table 2-7 reports the Fama-MacBeth regression results, most of which are consistent 
with the results in Table 2-4 from the single cross-sectional regression both in terms of 
statistical properties and coefficient’s magnitudes. Model 7.1 indicates that market risk 
is significant and positive as expected. Models 7.2 and 7.3 show that NET,i is strongly  
priced in the emerging sovereign bond markets whether or not the calibrated holding 
period of about 6 months is imposed.  Again because of the multicollinearity in betas, 
results from models 7.4 and 7.5 are weak. When only liquidity betas, LIQ,i, are included 
in models 7.6 and 7.7,  liquidity risk works well in explaining cross-sectional difference 
of bond returns. When we include one particular beta (1, 2, 3 and 4) in the cross-
sectional regression, it has the correct sign (positive sign for 1 and 2 and negative sign 
for 3 and 4) and it is all significant (not tabulated here).  In sum, we find the same 
evidence as before that investors are compensated for holding emerging-markets’ 
sovereign bonds whose returns are sensitive to the global market factors (both market 
risk and liquidity risk). We also find that the liquidity level is highly priced in every 
specification.  
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Table 2-7: Country portfolios and Fama MacBeth regression 
This table reports the time-series of estimated premia from Fama-MacBeth regression based on the 
unconditional LCAPM in Equation (2.7) for 42 value-weighted country portfolios using weekly data 
during January 2000 to July 2008 with a value-weighted market portfolio. For each country portfolio, 
betas are pre-estimated using the previous five years returns and illiquidity. To be included, country 
portfolio must have at least 144 weekly (or three-year data) innovations in return and illiquidity. 
Specifications, which are considered, are alternative cases of the following equation: 
1 1, 2 2, 3 3, 4 4, 5 , 6 ,( )* ( ) ,i f i i i i i NET i LIQ it t tE r r E c                       
where E(r
i
t
 – rft)
*
 is the average expected excess return for country i. E(c
i
t) is the average quoted bid/ask 
spread. 1,i is the market beta, 2,i , 3,i and 4,i represent three liquidity betas. NET,i= 1,i +
 
2,i  3,i  4,i 
and LIQ,i= 2,i  3,i  4,i. Betas are pre-estimated using Equation (2.5). In some specification,  is set to 
be the average weekly turnover ( = 0.04 or annual turnover of about two). The t-statistics from Newey 
and West (1987) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error & covariance least square regression are in 
the parentheses. R
2
 and Adjusted R
2
 are reported in the last column. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level is indicated by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 respectively. 
 
 constant 
() 
E(cit)
 
1,i
 2,i 3,i 4,i NET,i LIQ,i 
R
2 
(adj-R2) 
 
Cov(ri,rM) Cov(ci,cM) Cov(ri,cM) Cov(ci,rM) 
Sum of 4 
betas  
Liquidity 
Beta sum 
7.1 0.0117
c 
  0.0014
c 
          0.14 
  (4.33)   (10.28)           (0.10) 
7.2 -0.0172
c 
0.0400         0.0011
c
   0.13 
  -(7.83) ( - )         (10.81)   (0.09) 
7.3 -0.0439
c 
0.0859
c
         0.0007
c
   0.41 
  -(6.68) (9.22)         (10.75)   (0.35) 
7.4 -0.0065
c
 0.0400 0.0027
c
 0.3114
c
 0.0295
c
 0.0526
c
 
  
0.42 
 
-(2.70) ( - ) (8.97) (4.45) (3.44) (6.24) 
  
(0.29) 
7.5 -0.0363
c
 0.0895
c
 0.0015
c
 -0.1562
c
 -0.0060 0.0245
c
     0.55 
  -(6.57) (9.85) (6.56) -(2.65) -(0.86) (3.68)     (0.44) 
7.6 0.0027 0.04           0.0084
c
 0.03 
  (0.94) ( - )           (6.66) (0.01) 
7.7 -0.0349
c
 0.0927
c
 
     
0.0035
c
 0.35 
  -(5.38) (9.01)           (5.28) (0.29) 
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2.6 Robustness Tests 
In this section, we perform some robustness tests on the results presented above by (i) 
investigating the bond characteristics in the cross-sectional regression, (ii) analyzing the 
impact of U.S. stock markets on emerging U.S. dollar sovereign bond markets and (iii) 
performing  the out-of-sample analysis.  
2.6.1 Liquidity betas versus bond characteristics in explaining bond returns 
We include the bond portfolios’ characteristics in our asset pricing equations to test 
whether they or factor loading (market risk and liquidity risk) are more relevant in 
explaining the cross-section of excess bond returns. In previous studies (for example, 
Fama and French (1993) and Gebhardt et al. (2005)), bond credit rating and duration 
have been used as bond characteristics. They might arguably be better proxies of true 
unobservable betas than the estimated betas. Credit rating and duration are supposed to 
be proxies for bond default risk and interest rate term risk. This section therefore 
incorporates bond portfolios’ characteristics (i.e., their credit rating and modified 
duration) into our cross-sectional LCAPM in Equation (2.7).
40
 The main question is 
whether our liquidity risk is still important after controlling for the systematic default 
risk and term risk represented by credit rating and duration respectively.  
                                                          
40
 There are drawbacks of using credit rating to control for default risk. While credit rating 
contains information about default intensity and loss given default, it may not a sufficient 
statistic for the true default spread or updated at the same pace as other risk factors. However, 
our results in Chapter 4 confirm that liquidity effect is still robust when we use the return spread 
between junk and investment bond portfolios as a proxy for bond default risk. We also 
experimented with this variable in this chapter as well and the results are still the same. In 
addition, the results do not change if we also include other characteristics such as amount 
outstanding scaled by taking natural log (in order to control for the issue size effect) and bond 
coupon into the pricing equation. 
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We follow the same methodology as in Section 2.4, where credit rating is converted into 
the numerical representation by the same way as described in Figure 2-3.
41
 We have 
done the analysis using both a single cross-sectional regression and Fama-MacBeth 
(with 5-year rolling betas) method. Since both give similar results, we report only the 
results from the first method to save space. In Table 2-8, when liquidity risks are 
included in the cross-sectional regression, the impacts of credit ratings and bond 
duration on expected bond returns are weak and insignificant. Only in model 8.1, where 
the market risk factor alone is entered into the pricing equation, are credit ratings 
positive and marginally insignificant, suggesting that credit rating and/or duration may 
partly represent unknown risks (possibly liquidity risk). Intuitively, we expect the 
coefficients in front of both E(CR
i
t) and E(MD
i
t) to be positive since they represent 
default and term risk respectively.
42
 In our results, E(CR
i
t) is correctly positive in all 
specifications, although it is not significant in all specifications. Investors expect higher 
returns from holding higher default-risk securities. Even though E(MD
i
t) is not 
significant in any specification, it is always negative, which is not as expected. A reason 
behind this might be the endogeneity problem: a low-cost-of-borrowing country may 
prefer to lock in its cost of capital by issuing longer-term bonds. A high-cost-of-
borrowing country usually with bad credit rating may not be able to sell its long-term 
bonds at a reasonable price and may be forced to issue shorter-term instruments. 
To summarize, the evidence indicates that liquidity risk and liquidity level are priced in 
the international bond markets even in the presence of individual bond portfolios’ credit 
                                                          
41
 The average credit rating during January 2000 to August 2008 is about 11.56 (around BB to 
BB+). The highest credit rating in our sample is A+. 
42
 If there is no default risk and interest rate term risk, we should expect the credit rating and 
modified duration to be zero and insignificant because in constructing our expected excess 
returns in Section 2.4.5, we adjust them for default loss and term structure of interest.  
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quality and maturity. Our results are in line with those reported by Gebhardt et al. 
(2005). They find that bond characteristics such as credit rating and duration are less 
important than systematic risk factors as far as U.S. corporate bond returns are 
concerned.  
Table 2-8: Country portfolios and cross-sectional regression with credit rating and 
modified duration 
This table reports results from the cross-sectional regression of the unconditional LCAPM in Equation 
(2.7) for 42 value-weighted country portfolios using weekly data during January 1995 to July 2008 with a 
value-weighted market portfolio. Specifications, which are considered, are alternative cases of the 
following equation: 
1 1, 2 2, 3 3, 4 4, 5 , 6 ,( )* ( ) ( ) ( ),i f i i i i i NET i LIQ i i it t t t tE r r E c E CR E MD                           
where E(r
i
t
 – rft)
*
 is the average expected excess return for country i. E(c
i
t) is the average quoted bid/ask 
spread. 1,i is the market beta, 2,i , 3,i and 4,i represent three liquidity betas. NET,i= 1,i +
 
2,i  3,i  4,i 
and LIQ,i= 2,i  3,i  4,i. Betas are pre-estimated using Equation (2.5). In some specification,  is set to 
be the average weekly turnover ( = 0.04 or annual turnover of about two). E(CRit) is the average 
Standard & Poor’s long-term and foreign currency debt credit rating for country i. E(MDit) is the average 
modified duration of eligible bonds for country i. The t-statistics from Newey and West (1987) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error & covariance least square regression are in the parentheses. 
Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 respectively. To save spaces, the R
2 
(and adjusted R
2
) is not reported here.   
 
 constant 
() 
E(cit)
 
1,i 2,i 3,i 4,i NET,i LIQ,i 
E(CRit) E(MD
i
t) 
 
Cov(ri,rM) Cov(ci,cM) Cov(ri,cM) Cov(ci,rM) 
Sum of 
4 betas  
Liquidity 
Beta sum 
8.1 -0.0163   0.0012c           0.0040 -0.0018 
  -(0.56)   (5.09)           (1.55) -(0.83) 
8.2 -0.0221 0.0400         0.0012c   0.0004 -0.0012 
  -(0.65) ( - )         (5.49)   (0.13) -(0.47) 
8.3 -0.0208 0.0248b         0.0012c   0.0018 -0.0014 
  -(0.65) (2.30)         (5.65)   (0.62) -(0.63) 
8.4 -0.0104 0.0400 0.0025c 0.0933 0.0364 0.0075 
  
0.0001 -0.0024 
 
-(0.39) ( - ) (3.22) (1.12) (1.61) (1.47) 
  
(0.02) -(0.89) 
8.5 -0.0126 0.0316b 0.0022b 0.1086 0.0303 0.0076     0.0009 -0.0022 
  -(0.49) (2.47) (2.40) (1.09) (1.21) (1.45)     (0.36) -(0.91) 
8.6 -0.0309 0.0400           0.0073c 0.0022 -0.0007 
  -(0.66) ( - )           (2.74) (0.56) -(0.16) 
8.7 -0.0315 0.0071 
     
0.0082c 0.0050 -0.0008 
  -(0.79) (0.54)           (3.31) (1.26) -(0.27) 
 
2.6.2 Does U.S. stock market drive emerging sovereign bond markets? 
It is interesting to test whether the U.S. stock market is a driving force of global 
liquidity risks. This section therefore investigates the pricing effect of the comovements 
of country bond portfolio returns and illiquidity with those of the U.S. stock market. In 
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building an econometric model, we decompose global market returns, r
G
t, and illiquidity, 
c
G
t, into those of total emerging U.S. dollar sovereign bond market and the U.S. stock 
market as follows: 
(1 ) ,
(1 ) ,
G M US
t t t
G M US
t t t
r r r
c c c
 
 
    
    
                      (2.13) 
where r
M
t (c
M
t) is return (illiquidity cost) on global emerging bond market (i.e., EMBI) 
and r
US
t (c
US
t) is return (illiquidity cost) from U.S. stock market.  is fraction of the 
market value of EMBI to the global market.  
Combining Equation (2.1) with Equation (2.13), the liquidity-adjusted CAPM can be 
extended to 
1 1
1 1
1 1
cov ( , (1 ) (1 ) )
( )* .
var ( )
i i M US M US
t t t t t t ti i f
t t t t t G G
t t t
r c r r c c
E r c r
r c
   

 
 
 
                 

 (2.14) 
Therefore, the unconditional version will be
43
 
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
1 2 3 4
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
1 2 3 4
( )* ( )
,
i f i M i M M i M M i M M i M
t t t
US i US US i US US i US US i US
E r r E c        
       
     
       (2.15) 
where 
1 , 1
1 1
cov( , ( ))
,
var( ( ) [ ( )])
i M M
i M t t t t
G G G G
t t t t t t
r r E r
r E r c E c
 
 


  
 
                                                          
43
 Lee (2010) uses a similar methodology in studying the global liquidity risk and ex post 
returns using data from individual stocks from 48 countries. However, we use bond data, which 
enable us to obtain more accurate measure of expected returns. 
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2 , 1 1
1 1
cov( ( ), ( ))
,
var( ( ) [ ( )])
i i M M
i M t t t t t t
G G G G
t t t t t t
c E c c E c
r E r c E c
  
 
 

  
 
3 , 1
1 1
cov( , ( ))
,
var( ( ) [ ( )])
i M M
i M t t t t
G G G G
t t t t t t
r c E c
r E r c E c
 
 


  
 
4 , 1 1
1 1
cov( ( ), ( ))
,
var( ( ) [ ( )])
i M M M
i M t t t t t t
G G G G
t t t t t t
c E c r E r
r E r c E c
  
 
 

  
 
1 , 1
1 1
cov( , ( ))
,
var( ( ) [ ( )])
i US US
i US t t t t
G G G G
t t t t t t
r r E r
r E r c E c
 
 


  
 
2 , 1 1
1 1
cov( ( ), ( ))
,
var( ( ) [ ( )])
iUSi i US
i US t t t t t t
G G G G
t t t t t t
c E c c E c
r E r c E c
  
 
 

  
 
3 , 1
1 1
cov( , ( ))
,
var( ( ) [ ( )])
i US US
i US t t t t
G G G G
t t t t t t
r c E c
r E r c E c
 
 


  
 
4 , 1 1
1 1
cov( ( ), ( ))
.
var( ( ) [ ( )])
i i US US
i US t t t t t t
G G G G
t t t t t t
c E c r E r
r E r c E c
  
 
 

  
                              
Therefore, we can now jointly test the effects of liquidity risks resulting from the global 
emerging U.S. dollar bond market and the U.S. stock market dimensions. The weight, α, 
in Equation (2.13) is forced to be included in the estimated premia of M and US in the 
regression. All betas in Equation (2.16) have a common denominator of variances 
related to the total return and illiquidity cost of EMBI and U.S. stock market. If we 
assume that G = M = US, Equation (2.15) can be rewritten in term of the net beta as 
follows: 
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* , ,
* , , , ,
( ) ( )  or 
( ) ( ) ,
i f i G NET i G
t t t
i f i M NET i M US NET i US
t t t
E r r E c
E r r E c
 
   
  
   
                                          (2.16) 
where 
, , , , , ,
1, , 2, , 3, , 4, , 1, , 2, , 3, , 4, ,+ .
NET i G NET i M NET i US
i M i M i M i M i US i US i US i US
  
       
 
            
 (2.17) 
Equation (2.16) is our unconditional LCAPM, incorporating risk factors both from 
emerging bond and U.S. stock markets. In the extreme case of fully-segmented 
emerging U.S. dollar bond markets and the U.S. stock market, we expect US to be equal 
to zero. 
2.6.2.1 U.S. stock market data  
For the U.S. stock market, we use monthly returns from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP), which includes all common shares listed on NYSE and AMEX, 
from January 1995 to December 2006. Our sample period is reduced because we 
employ the monthly measure of innovation in illiquidity calculated by Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003), which are available from Wharton Research Data Service website 
until December 2006.
44
 Their innovations in U.S. stock market illiquidity are estimated 
from the same CRSP data as the stock market returns. We derive the bond data as 
before, but with the corresponding monthly interval.  
2.6.2.2 Results from cross-section liquidity-adjusted CAPM regression 
                                                          
44
 In their paper, they measure liquidity. In order to obtain the measure of illiquidity, we simply 
switch their signs (i.e., from positive to negative and vice versa). 
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After decomposing global market factors (superscript “G”) into those of the bond 
market (superscript “M”) and the U.S. stock market (superscript “US”) in Equations 
(2.16) and (2.17), Table 2-9 reports the pricing effect of the comovements of bond 
returns with bond and U.S. stock factors. Model 9.1 shows that the risk premium of 
global net beta, NET,G, and the coefficient of expected illiquidity cost, E(cit), are highly 
significant and positive (as expected), while the pricing error or constant is not 
significant. However, when the bond net beta and the U.S. stock net beta are separately 
included in model 9.2, the risk factors in the bond market outshine those in the U.S. 
stock market. Understandably, this is because our test assets are bonds. Again, if we 
allow all of the betas to have different risk premia, i, in models 9.5, 9.6 and 9.7 
because of the multicollinearity problem in betas (see Table 2-3), the evidence of 
liquidity risk is weak. Nevertheless, those three specifications suggest that market risk 
relating to the U.S. stock market, 1,US, has some influence over the excess bond returns, 
whereas effects of liquidity risks resulting from the U.S. stock market illiquidity are 
relatively weak. The last statement is confirmed by regression results in model 9.10, 
where the sum of liquidity betas relating to the U.S. stock market illiquidity or LIQ,US
 
is 
not significant.  
Overall, our findings are consistent with previous results reported by Min, Lee, Nam, 
Park and Nam (2003), Diaz-Weigel and Gemmill (2006) and Longstaff et al. (2005) that 
the credit spreads in the emerging markets reflect the global and/or regional factors such 
as the U.S. stock market. Both bond and stock are subject to a common market factor or 
to some extent they share the same pricing kernel, which prices all risky assets. This 
also suggests that our bond-liquidity risk premium is not sensitive to the choice of 
market risk factors. However, the evidence of a liquidity spillover (or flight-to-liquidity
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Table 2-9 Country bond portfolios and cross-sectional regression with both bond and U.S. stock market risk factors 
This table reports results from the cross-sectional regression of the unconditional LCAPM in Equation (2.16) for 42 value-weighted country portfolios using monthly data 
during January 1995 to December 2006 with a value-weighted market portfolio. Specifications, which are considered, are alternative cases of the following equation:  
1 1 , 2 2 , 3 3 , 4 4 , 5 1 , 6 2 , 7 3 , 8 4 ,
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market respectively. Betas are pre-estimated using Equation (2.15). The t-statistics from Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error & covariance 
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65 
 
effect) from the U.S. stock market to emerging U.S. dollar bond markets is statistically 
weak. This is despite Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005) showing that liquidity in U.S. 
stock and Treasury bond markets is correlated. Further studies on these joint effects 
may yield interesting results. 
2.6.3 Out-of-sample analysis: August 2008 to February 2009 
With the same methodology as in Section 2.4, we confirm our previous results with out-
of-sample data from September 2008 to February 2009 (i.e., during global credit crunch 
period), i.e., we use in-the-sample betas from Section 2.5.1 to forecast out-of-sample 
expected excess bond returns. Table 2-10 shows that liquidity is still an important 
driving force in determining the expected excess bond return during this out-of-sample 
period. In general, results are very similar to those in Section 2.5.1. However, there is a 
meaningful difference in that the CAPM now has no explanatory power for the expected 
excess bond returns (model 10.1). In fact, the market beta, 1,i, is not significant in any 
specification, even though it is positively priced in models 10.1, 10.4 and 10.5. 
Liquidity betas maintain their significance and have a stronger economic effect in this 
out-of-sample period. Models 10.2 and 10.3 support our LCAPM. Again, comparing 
models 10.1 with 10.2, the adjusted R
2
 is a lot higher when liquidity risks are included 
in the pricing equation and the number of the free parameters is the same. 
During this out-of-sample period, the evidence of liquidity risk is stronger than before, 
even though all of the betas are allowed to have different risk premium, i, in models 
10.4 and 10.5.  Those two specifications again provide evidence that liquidity risk is 
important over and above the market risk during this period. Especially in model 10.4, 
where the holding period is fixed, liquidity betas are all significant and signed as 
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expected. Respectively, Panels A, B and C in Figure 2-5 show the empirical fit of the 
standard CAPM from model 10.1 in Table 2-10, constrained LCAPM from model 10.2 
in Table 2-10 and unconstrained LCAPM from model 10.5 in Table 2-10. Liquidity 
risks significantly improve fit and the improvement does not result from the increase in 
the degree of freedom. 
Table 2-10: Country portfolios and cross-sectional regression with out-of-sample 
excess bond returns 
This table reports results from the cross-sectional regression of the unconditional LCAPM in Equation 
(2.7)) for 42 value-weighted country portfolios using weekly data during September 2008 to February 
2009 with a value-weighted market portfolio. Specifications, which are considered, are alternative cases 
of the following equation:  
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  -(2.14) ( - )         (2.51)   (0.16) 
10.3 0.0379c 0.0208c         0.0859b   0.37 
  (3.81) (7.09)         (2.17)   (0.30) 
10.4 -0.0380 0.0400 0.0190 18.7854c -6.1139c -1.1358a     0.51 
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(0.59) 
10.6 0.0288 0.0400           1.6516c 0.29 
  (1.58) ( - )           (3.10) (0.27) 
10.7 0.0697c 0.0244c 
     
1.0030a 0.33 
  (4.56) (3.40)           (1.73) (0.29) 
In conclusion, the results are still very supportive of the hypothesis that liquidity is 
priced in the international bond market or the cross-sectional difference in liquidity can 
explain the differences in average returns in the international bond market during the 
out-of-sample period.  However, the market risk has lost its power in explaining the out-
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of-sample excess bond returns. It follows that the liquidity impact could be time-varying 
and increases during periods of crisis. We will investigate this issue more closely in the 
next chapter. 
Figure 2-5: Out-of-sample empirical fit of CAPM versus LCAPM 
Panel A depicts the fitted CAPM returns against realized returns using weekly data from September 2008 
to February 2009 for value-weighted country portfolios. Panel B shows the same for the constrained 
LCAPM and Panel C represents the same for the unconstrained LCAPM.  
 
Panel A Panel B 
  
 
                                  Panel C 
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2.7 Conclusions 
Our results show that liquidity level and liquidity risks are priced in the emerging U.S. 
dollar sovereign bond markets. Compared to the standard CAPM with the same degrees 
of freedom, liquidity risks from the LCAPM improve fit for both low yield and high 
yield sovereign-bond portfolios. Country bond portfolios, which have higher market 
beta, higher liquidity betas and higher quoted bid/ask spreads, tend to have greater 
expected excess returns after adjusting for default loss. Surprisingly more illiquid 
portfolios (higher quoted bid/ask spreads) do not always have a higher level of liquidity 
risk (higher liquidity betas). Provided that the LCAPM is correctly specified, the 
combined effects of liquidity risk and liquidity level can account for 100 basis points of 
yield spread difference between the highest and lowest liquidity risk countries in the 
sample, which are Croatia and Ghana respectively. Even though Ghana has a lower 
credit rating and issues longer-term bonds than Croatia, it has a lower bond yield spread. 
This evidence supports a flight to liquidity effect across our sample and is still robust 
when we include the portfolios’ characteristics in our model. In addition, liquidity betas 
are able to maintain their significance and have a stronger economic effect in an out-of-
sample period, while the market risk has lost its power in explaining bond expected 
returns. 
Our evidence also suggests that the U.S. stock market risk is a driving force in 
determining the average excess bond returns. Countries with a high correlation with the 
global market or U.S. stock market have higher expected bond returns than low 
correlation countries. When the U.S. stock market goes down, international investors 
would like to rebalance their portfolios. Bonds are less desirable if their prices decline 
when the U.S. stock market plummets. Therefore, investors require higher returns when 
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holding securities that have less diversification benefits. However, the impact of 
liquidity risk in the U.S. stock market on bond returns is not as statistically strong. 
So far, the analysis on the effect of liquidity on the cross-sectional asset pricing has 
been unconditional by nature. Although we find clear evidence that a bond’s 
comovement with market factors are priced, the significance of both market and 
liquidity risks in explaining excess returns seems to be time-varying when we compare 
the results in in-sample and out-of-sample analyses. Further investigation on time-
varying liquidity betas and liquidity risk premium could be beneficial. The next chapter 
features the study on a conditional version of the asset pricing model for the 
international bond market. 
 
  
70 
 
   
CHAPTER 3 
PRICING OF GOVERNMENT BONDS AROUND THE WORLD 
AND TIME-VARYING LIQUIDITY RISK  
 
Abstract 
This paper finds that both liquidity level and liquidity risk are important in explaining 
the cross-section of domestic government bond returns in 39 countries (both emerging 
and developed) around the world. After controlling for other market factors and bond 
characteristics, liquidity level and liquidity risk together can explain as much as 0.41% 
per annum of extra yield for the highest versus the lowest liquidity risk countries, which 
are China and Argentina respectively. There is also an evidence of liquidity spillovers 
from the U.S. equity market to domestic bond markets around the world. Employing a 
conditional model, which allows both time-series and cross-sectional variations in 
liquidity betas, we find that the impact of liquidity risk is time varying across two 
different regimes: it increases in times of high uncertainty and is always larger in 
emerging than in developed countries. Nevertheless, the price of risk or premium 
required by investors for holding this time-varying risk is relatively modest. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The fact that liquidity varies over time is well known (e.g., Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Huberman and Halka (2001), 
Amihud (2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Korajczyk and Sadka (2008)). We have 
witnessed very significant liquidity shocks at particular times (for example, 1987- U.S. 
stock market crash, 1997- Asian Crisis, 1998- Russia and LTCM crises and 2008-credit 
crunch). Such liquidity shocks can be transmitted from one country to another 
extremely fast. However, the analysis of most previous papers on the effect of liquidity 
on the cross-section of asset prices has been unconditional in nature and concentrated on 
U.S. market. 
In this paper, we investigate the relationships between local-currency bond returns and 
liquidity factors around the world incorporating 12 emerging countries and 27 
developed countries. Global risk factors are therefore taken into consideration. The data 
span more than 20 years, from December 1985 to February 2009. In the unconditional 
setting, we follow the framework of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and De Jong and 
Driessen (2006) and use a two-step Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure. We find that the 
global liquidity risk is priced in local-currency government bond markets around the 
world after controlling for bond characteristics and relevant risk factors. In the 
conditional setting, where we allow not only for time-series, but also for cross-sectional 
variations in liquidity betas, a regime-switching model is used as pioneered for liquidity 
risk by Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) on U.S. equities and Acharya, Amihud and 
Bharath (2010) on U.S. corporate bonds.  The former paper finds that for U.S. stocks, 
the pricing of liquidity risk becomes stronger in the high liquidity-beta state. The latter 
investigates liquidity risk of U.S. corporate bond returns, focusing on the conditional 
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effects during the bad state (high liquidity-beta state) and the difference between high-
rated and low-rated bonds. For low-rated U.S. corporate bonds, it finds that the effects 
of liquidity risk are significantly greater during periods of stress.  
This is the first paper to study the effects of liquidity risk and its time-variation on bond 
prices in a comprehensive set of both developed and emerging countries. Bonds provide 
a relatively good environment in which to test asset pricing models because the 
expected (forward-looking) return on a bond can be constructed with some precision.
45
 
Using a regime-switching model, we find that the transition from the low to the high 
liquidity-beta states (i.e., from states in which liquidity does not matter to states in 
which it does) can be predicted from a decline in U.S. equity market performance and 
from a rise in bond market volatility. This is consistent with results for U.S. equity 
markets: Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) report that the high-beta state for U.S. equities 
is associated with high equity volatility and preceded by a period of declining 
expectations about future market liquidity. We also investigate whether there is a time-
varying risk-premium for liquidity and find that the economic significance of time-
varying liquidity risk on the credit spread is about half that of unconditional liquidity 
risk.  
The importance of liquidity risk for asset prices is recognized by both academics and 
practitioners, so a well-specified dynamic model with liquidity risk is an essential step 
towards a more realistic pricing model for bonds. Our paper is a contribution to such a 
model, although, as yet, we can only explain part of the observed time variation in 
liquidity.  
                                                          
45
 This contrasts with using stocks for which the long-term historical (backward-looking) 
average return is often used as a proxy for the expected return.  
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In addition, our paper offers a new set of data to the literature, i.e., local-currency 
government bonds, which are issued under a country’s own legal jurisdiction. Domestic 
bonds have been by default disregarded by researchers, who always focus on sovereign 
debts or international bonds. However, the domestic debts constitute almost two-thirds 
of total public debts in 64 countries during 1900– 2007 and are the main source of 
country’s defaults and financial turbulences (Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)). We use the 
bid/ask spread as a direct measure of liquidity, where their series have not been 
compiled before.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the related 
literature. Section 3.3 describes the data used. The methodology and empirical results 
for unconditional liquidity risk are reported in the Section 3.4. Those for conditional 
liquidity risk are given in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes the paper. 
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3.2 Related Literature 
The difference between yields on risky and risk-free bonds of equivalent maturity, 
known as the credit spread, appears to be “too high”. It is inconsistent with observed 
default and recovery rates and with most models of credit risk (both structural models 
and reduced-form models).
46
 Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Marting (2001) find that 
changes in spreads cannot be explained by changes in factors affecting credit risk and 
that the unexplained portion appears to be driven by a common factor. Recent work by 
Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) supports their argument that the unexplained portion is 
likely to be independent from credit risk. Liquidity, liquidity risk and a time-varying 
risk premium are among a set of possible explanations.  
Studies of liquidity and asset pricing have been pioneered in a cross-sectional 
framework. The first among them is the paper by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), who 
report a positive cross-sectional relationship between equity returns and illiquidity. 
Since then, there have been many cross-sectional studies on liquidity and asset pricing, 
for example, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam 
(2000) and Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001). The last study finds a 
negative cross-sectional relationship between stock returns and trading activity as a 
proxy for liquidity and between returns and the volatility of trading activity as a proxy 
for liquidity risk after controlling for size, book-to-market, momentum, dividend yield 
and price level. These findings suggest that investors are averse to the variability of 
liquidity, i.e., to liquidity risk.  
                                                          
46
 Eom, Helwege and Huang (2004) provide good empirical evidence on various structural 
models. For reduced-form models, see for example, Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Jarrow, 
Lando and Turnbull (1997). 
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As already noted, following Amihud and Mendelson (1986), there have been several 
empirical studies, which emphasize the importance of liquidity in static models (for 
example, Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam 
(1998), Chalmers and Kadlec (1998), Datar, Naik and Radcliffe (1998), Chordia, 
Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001), Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2002), 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005)). The latter two papers 
focus on the significance of the price of liquidity risk, where stocks with higher liquidity 
betas should be compensated with higher expected returns. Lee (2010) extends the 
Acharya and Pedersen’s liquidity-adjusted CAPM to the international stock markets. 
Amihud (2002) introduces new tests, which distinguish between an increase in expected 
illiquidity, which positively affects ex ante stock returns and an increase in unexpected 
illiquidity, which has a negative effect on contemporaneous stock returns. Besides the 
novelty in testing the liquidity-return relationship over time, he also introduces a new 
measure of liquidity based on daily returns and volume data.
47
 Using a similar approach 
to Amihud (2002), Gibson and Mougeot (2004) define a liquidity proxy, which is the 
standardized number of shares traded in the S&P 500 index during a month.
48
 Using this 
measure, they find that the liquidity premium of the S&P 500 index return is time-
varying and related to the probability of a future recession. 
Despite all of the above results, the role of liquidity in time-varying models has not 
been adequately addressed both because of the potential omission of variables and 
because data are not available for the accurate measurement of liquidity. There has been 
                                                          
47
 His measure is calculated as the absolute change in return per dollar volume. The higher this 
measure, the lower security’s liquidity. 
48
 Gibson and Mougoet (2004)’s measure of liquidity should be negatively related to Amihud’s.  
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very little attempt to investigate how pricing models with liquidity dynamics might 
change over time. One exception is Watanabe and Watanabe (2008), who begin to study 
the dynamics of liquidity for stocks across two different economic states: high and low 
liquidity-beta states. Transition from the low to the high liquidity-beta state is predicted 
by a rise in trading volume, which is a proxy for greater preference uncertainty. Not 
only is liquidity risk or liquidity beta found to be contingent on the state of the world, 
but the liquidity risk premium is found to be economically more important in the high 
liquidity-beta state. Their findings imply that liquidity is closely linked with trading 
volume and perhaps with volatility. 
There is a paucity of studies about how liquidity dynamics could affect bond pricing 
and none has been done in the context of international bond markets. Works on liquidity 
and bond pricing start with Amihud and Mendelson (1991). They find differences in 
yields between U.S. Treasury bills and U.S. Treasury notes with the same maturity. As 
these two securities are completely identical, the yield spreads between them must be 
accounted for a difference in liquidity as measured by the bid/ask spread and broker 
fees.
49
 Moreover, the price impact on bills is smaller than on notes, meaning that a bill 
can trade in larger amounts without affecting its prevailing market price. Similarly, 
Kamara (1994) reports that note and bill spread differences hold after controlling for a 
number of security characteristics. Warga (1992) and Krishnamurthy (2002) find a 
similar pattern in the yield difference between U.S. on-the-run (most recent auctioned) 
and off-the-run government bonds: around 0.55% per annum yield difference is 
                                                          
49
 U.S. Treasury bills are much more liquid than notes. 
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estimated by Warga (1992).
50
 Longstaff (2004) investigates the dynamic nature of the 
liquidity risk premium in U.S. Treasury bond prices and reports that there is a large 
illiquidity premium, which is highly correlated with market sentiment measures such as 
changes in the Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index and in the amount of 
capital held in money-market mutual funds. However, he does not study how liquidity 
dynamics affect the cross-section of U.S. Treasury bond returns. Using data on the 
Euro-area government bond market, Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz (2009) find that yield 
spreads can be explained by differences in liquidity especially for low credit risk 
countries and during times of heightened market uncertainty. We conjecture that it is a 
result of conditional or time-varying effects of liquidity. 
Several empirical studies support an effect of liquidity level on U.S. corporate bonds’ 
prices including Perraudin and Taylor (2003), Howeling, Mentink and Vorst. (2005), 
Chacko (2006), Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) and Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri 
(2007).  In general, they suggest that a significant portion of the yield spread between 
corporate and government bonds is due to illiquidity costs.  Although most works are in 
the cross-sectional framework, Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) conduct a time-series 
analysis and report that changes in illiquidity induce changes in yields in the same 
direction. The price of liquidity risk in the U.S. corporate bond market is investigated by 
De Jong and Driessen (2006) and Jacoby, Theocharides and Zheng (2007). Both papers 
rely on an unconditional analysis and have relatively limited data in time-series. 
Acharya, Amihud and Bharath (2010) start to examine the unconditional and 
conditional sensitivity of monthly U.S. corporate bond returns to liquidity factors over 
                                                          
50
 See Elton and Green (1998), Chakravarty and Sircar (1999), Fleming (2002), Downing and 
Zhang (2004) and Longstaff (2004) for studies, which find that liquidity, as a bond 
characteristic, helps explain the government bond yield difference. 
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1973 to 2003. They find that liquidity risk, either from U.S. Treasury bonds or from the 
stock market, significantly affects returns on sub-investment grade bond, while little 
evidence is found for an effect on investment grade bond returns. Liquidity betas of sub-
investment grade bonds occasionally switch to a regime with extremely high values. 
Their analysis is confined to changes in time-series liquidity betas and does not extend 
to changes in the price of risk; the important question of how time-varying liquidity risk 
affects the cross-section of expected returns is therefore not investigated. 
So far, the study of liquidity in bond markets has been limited to U.S. markets and no 
paper has studied the impact of liquidity risk on the expected returns of government 
bonds in an international setting. Therefore, we focus our attention in this paper on 
internationally-traded local-currency government bonds, where the data on bid/ask 
spreads can be collected for a long period. Our paper fills a gap in the existing literature 
by examining both unconditional and conditional international bond pricing models and 
allowing for both time-series and cross-sectional variations in liquidity risks.   
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3.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
Our test assets are the local-currency government bonds, which are included in the 
JPMorgan Government Bond Index (GBI) and the JPMorgan Government Bond Index-
Emerging Market (EM). These bonds are regularly traded, fixed-rate, domestic 
government bonds of countries that offer opportunities to international investors.
51
 To 
be included, countries must have: relatively liquid and stable government debt markets; 
active trading in good volumes; regular issuance; and easy access for foreign 
investors.
52
 International investors would consider such bonds for inclusion in their 
global bond market portfolios.  
Available metrics for bonds included in the indices are the bond’s clean price, coupon, 
accrued interest, yield to maturity, modified duration, remaining maturity and bond 
market value outstanding. Data on each individual bond’s bid and ask prices are 
collected from Bloomberg. These are not matrix prices, but actual quotes from bond 
traders. It should be noted that these bonds are denominated in domestic currencies (not 
U.S. dollar, except for U.S. bonds). The U.S. dollar foreign exchange rates are also 
downloaded from the JPMorgan system. 
                                                          
51
 The universe of bonds excludes floating rate notes, perpetual bonds, bonds with less than one 
year to maturity, bonds targeted at the domestic market for tax reasons and bonds with callable, 
puttable or convertible features. 
52
 There is no universal standard of liquidity application to the international government bond 
market. However, the indices include only bonds that an investor can deal at relatively short 
notice and for which firm prices exist. The amount outstanding of bond has no influence on the 
inclusion criteria, but generally for a market to exist the issue must be of a certain size, although 
this will vary from market to market. As a guide, the smallest issue in the indices in January 
2009 was 72 million U.S. dollar. For more detail about how to construct these indices, see 
JPMorgan Government Bond Index (GBI), January 14, 2002 and Introducing the JPMorgan 
Government Bond Index-Emerging Markets (EM), January 2006. 
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With this dataset, our paper is able to include as many as 39 nations around the world, 
spanning both developed and emerging countries and making ours one of the most 
comprehensive studies on international asset pricing. The following countries are 
included (at some time) in the sample: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Czech, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Thailand and Turkey. The sample 
period runs for just over 19 years from December 1989 to February 2009. Monthly data 
are employed.
53
 In total we have 1,244 bond issues. 
Table 3-1 is a summary of the country bond characteristics as of 31 December 2008. 
The market value of all eligible issues is 13,771 billion U.S. dollar. Japanese bonds are 
the largest group, being about 30 per cent of the total. The U.S. accounts for almost 21 
per cent. Local-currency long-term credit ratings, issued by Standard & Poor’s, range 
from the highest AAA (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, U.K. and U.S.) to the 
lowest B- (Argentina).  Average modified duration is 6.26 years.  
3.3.1 Bond realized returns 
The monthly total return for an individual government bond between period t-1 and t is 
calculated as 
                                                          
53
 In contrast to the first research paper, which utilizes the weekly data, this paper uses the 
monthly data instead because 1) we have longer data series and 2) it can be served as another 
robustness check for our results of the first research paper.  
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Table 3-1: Summary of the country bond characteristics included in our sample as of 
December 2008  
 
Country 
Market cap (in billion U.S. dollar) Local-currency 
yield (%) 
Credit rating  
Modified duration 
(year)   (percent in total) 
Argentina 0.15 (0.00%) 57.12 B- 1.95 
Australia 35.00 (0.25%) 3.69 AAA 4.77 
Austria 180.60 (1.31%) 3.65 AAA 6.41 
Belgium 306.96 (2.23%) 3.66 AA+ 5.84 
Brazil 68.13 (0.49%) 12.66 BBB+ 2.71 
Canada 196.73 (1.43%) 2.94 AAA 7.35 
Chile 5.54 (0.04%) 3.32 AA 5.59 
China 258.83 (1.88%) 2.19 A+ 5.11 
Colombia 25.45 (0.18%) 10.26 BBB+ 3.73 
Czech 30.35 (0.22%) 4.05 A+ 5.13 
Denmark 73.32 (0.53%) 3.35 AAA 6.32 
Finland 56.34 (0.41%) 3.20 AAA 4.42 
France 963.74 (6.99%) 3.33 AAA 6.38 
Germany 1,087.84 (7.89%) 3.08 AAA 6.17 
Greece 224.44 (1.63%) 5.27 A 5.63 
Hong Kong 7.23 (0.05%) 0.93 AA+ 3.55 
Hungary 34.46 (0.25%) 8.88 BBB 3.68 
India 127.65 (0.93%) 5.95 BBB- 7.29 
Indonesia 20.59 (0.15%) 11.84 BB+ 5.51 
Ireland 52.83 (0.38%) 4.16 AAA 6.39 
Italy 1,041.75 (7.56%) 4.54 A+ 6.38 
Japan 4,185.80 (30.37%) 1.19 AA 6.56 
Korea 164.44 (1.19%) 4.20 A+ 4.55 
Malaysia 50.32 (0.37%) 3.30 A+ 5.04 
Mexico 67.89 (0.49%) 8.03 A+ 5.56 
Netherlands 242.50 (1.76%) 3.41 AAA 5.95 
New Zealand 9.06 (0.07%) 4.47 AAA 4.65 
Peru 5.42 (0.04%) 7.57 BBB+ 7.78 
Poland 76.25 (0.55%) 5.34 A 3.95 
Portugal 106.66 (0.77%) 3.84 AA- 6.02 
Russia 3.45 (0.03%) 9.52 BBB+ 2.04 
Singapore 44.52 (0.32%) 1.89 AAA 5.45 
South Africa 42.65 (0.31%) 7.19 A+ 5.54 
Spain 380.59 (2.76%) 3.75 AAA 6.08 
Sweden 57.07 (0.41%) 2.28 AAA 5.79 
Thailand 35.52 (0.26%) 2.72 A 6.04 
Turkey 35.66 (0.26%) 16.45 BB 1.64 
U.K. 629.53 (4.57%) 3.52 AAA 9.49 
U.S. 2,835.65 (20.58%) 2.21 AAA 5.68 
Total 13,770.91 (100.00%) 
         
      Mean 336.12   6.55 AA- to A+ 5.25 
Median 57.07   3.84 A+ 5.56 
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         (3.1) 
where rt
j
 is total return of bond j at month t incorporating principal and interest, Pt
j
 is 
closing clean price for the bond j at month t, AIt
j
 is accrued interest, which is the coupon 
payment scaled by the ratio of days since the last payment date to the days between last 
payment and next payment and Coupont
j
 is the coupon payment, if any, of bond j at 
month t.  
3.3.2 Illiquidity measures 
Government bonds, on average, provide more data points and arguably more degrees of 
reliability than corporate bonds. Analysis with government bonds around the world not 
only provides evidence on global liquidity risk, but also enables us to have a direct 
liquidity measure. By contrast, previous studies, including Acharya, Amihud and 
Bharath (2010) and De Jong and Driessen (2006), have used the illiquidity of U.S. 
Treasury bond as a proxy for the illiquidity of corporate bonds.   
Instead, we are able to measure bond illiquidity directly for each bond in each country 
by its quoted bid/ask spread. At each month t during the study period, the quoted 
bid/ask spread, ct
j
, is collected for each individual bond j, where ct
j
 is the ratio of the 
quoted bid/ask spread to the bid/ask midpoint. Monthly estimates are obtained as a 
simple average through the month (to reduce noise and sampling errors) as follows: 
1
1
,
j
tn j j
j t t
t j j
jt t
Ask Bid
c
n Mid

            (3.2) 
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where Midt
j
 = (Askt
j
 + Bidt
j
)/2, Askt
j
 and Bidt
j
 are mid, ask and bid quoted prices of bond 
j in month t and n
j
t is the number trading days in month t. The data are discarded if there 
are less than 10 daily quoted bid and ask prices in any month of interest. 
 
3.3.3 Returns on bond portfolios and innovations in market illiquidity 
Similar to other empirical works in asset pricing, we group the individual bonds into 
portfolios in order to reduce the estimation error. Our test portfolios contain the bonds 
sorted by country of issuance. Not only does this country grouping provide a useful 
prospective, it also delivers more desirable results from the statistical point of view by 
helping to avoid the strong factor structure of size and B/M portfolios.
54
 To check 
whether grouping makes a difference to the results, we also perform an equivalent 
analysis with individual bonds.  
The return including coupon payment of a country portfolio i and market-wide return 
are computed as  
 in i
 in 
and
,
i ji j
t t tj
M iM i
t t ti M
r w r
r w r




                                                          (3.3) 
where wt
ji
 is the bond j weight for country portfolio i at week t and wt
iM
 is the country 
portfolio i weight for market-wide portfolio M. Value-weighting is used to ensure the 
                                                          
54
 See Lewellen (2010) for more detail. 
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investability of the market-wide portfolio.
55
 Similarly, the illiquidity of the country i 
portfolio and of the market-wide portfolio M are calculated as follows: 
 in 
 in 
,
.
i ji j
t t tj i
M iM i
t t ti M
c w c
c w c




                 (3.4) 
For the whole market, illiquidity cost (i.e., bid/ask spread) has a high monthly 
autocorrelation of 0.96. Because of this high persistence, we need to compute 
innovations in illiquidity. Following Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005), an AR(2) specification is employed to compute the liquidity 
innovations for the market portfolio. This AR(2) gives an R
2
 of 0.91% for market 
illiquidity. The remaining autocorrelation of these innovations is very low, at –0.02.56 
We denote innovations in market illiquidity using the AR(2) specification as “ILLIQ”. 
Figure 3-1 shows the time series of the global bond-market illiquidity measured by 
percentage quoted bid/ask spread and innovations in that series based on the AR(2) 
specification. The estimated innovations in market illiquidity (ILLIQ) are large during 
periods of global liquidity crisis, for example, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait (August 
1990), the Asian Crisis (mid 1997), the Russian and LTCM crises (August-September 
1998), the Dot Com bubble burst (20002002) and most recently the subprime crisis 
(September 2007 onwards). These two series, the market illiquidity cost and market 
liquidity risk factor (ILLIQ), will be used in the empirical analyses. 
                                                          
55
 In addition, market weighting provides more stringent asset pricing tests because it 
overemphasizes large bonds, where liquidity is less concerned.  
56
 Using AR(1) instead of AR(2) would greatly increase the autocorrelation of innovation, 
whereas employing AR(3) would not show much further improvement. We also try an 
autoregressive moving average (ARMA) process and the results do not change. 
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Figure 3-1: Time series of monthly global bond-market liquidity 
This figure depicts time series of illiquidity cost and its innovation for the global or market-wide portfolio. 
The liquidity cost is the percentage quoted bid/ask spread and computed by (quoted ask pricet  quoted 
bid pricet)/ mid pricet. The innovation is computed using an AR(2) specification. The market portfolio is 
formed using the value weighting method.  
 
 
3.3.4 Bond characteristics 
We also include a bond’s modified duration, illiquidity cost (percentage quoted bid/ask 
spread) and outstanding market value (in natural logs) as additional explanatory 
variables in the cross-sectional pricing regression. We expect the modified duration 
(equivalently to the interest rate term risk) and illiquidity cost to have a positive 
relationship with the bond expected return. Bond market value is usually cited as 
another proxy for bond liquidity, so we expect this variable to be negatively related to 
expected bond returns. 
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Table 3-2 gives summary statistics of the time-series behaviour of average sample 
values by year. Even though global bond yields in local-currencies have declined over 
time in Column 2, the aggregate excess expected bond returns in U.S. dollar after 
adjusting for default loss in Column 3 move together quite closely with the market 
illiquidity cost and with the historical financial turmoil (for example, Asian crisis, Dot 
Com bubble burst and recent subprime crisis).
57
 Note that the data on excess bond yield 
in U.S. dollar adjusted for default loss are only available from 1993 when long-term 
local-currency sovereign credit rating information was firstly published. The total 
realized returns in U.S. dollar and aggregate bond maturity show no obvious historical 
trends. The market value of the portfolios rises strongly from 67 billion U.S. dollar in 
1986 to 13,285 billion U.S. dollar in 2008.  
  
                                                          
57
 See Section 3.4.2 for how to compute the expected excess bond return in U.S. dollar after 
adjusting for expected default loss. 
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Table 3-2: Summary statistics on aggregate bond market in the sample 
This table reports the year-by-year summary statistics on all eligible bonds included in our sample. The 
monthly-data sample spans from December 1985 to February 2009. The means (except for total return 
and bond market capitalization) are reported year-by-year. The numbers in the parentheses are yearly 
standard deviation. Excess yield in U.S. dollar adjusted for default loss is defined as the local-currency 
yield minus the one-month U.S. Treasury yield and adjusted 1) into U.S. dollar yield using corresponding 
currency forward markets with nearest maturity forward contracts and 2) for expected default loss. 
Market illiquidity or percentage quoted bid/ask spread is calculated as (quoted ask price – quoted bid 
price)/quoted bid price, which reflects the illiquidity cost of the global bond markets. Total market return 
is the realized return taking into account of capital gain, coupon and accrued interest. All are market-
weighted. Market cap is the total market value of all bonds in the sample. Where data are not available, 
NA is noted.  
 
Year 
Yield in local 
currency (%) 
Excess yield in 
U.S.$ adjusted 
for default loss 
(%) 
Market 
illiquidity (%) 
(% bid/ask 
spread) 
Total market 
return in 
U.S.$ (%) 
Maturity 
(year) 
Market cap 
(billion U.S. 
dollar) 
1986 7.50 (1.86) NA 
 
NA 
 
18.82 (9.43) 7.86 67.57 
1987 7.66 (2.34) NA 
 
NA 
 
13.27 (7.77) 7.58 75.28 
1988 8.02 (1.007) NA 
 
NA 
 
5.05 (5.32) 7.30 82.72 
1989 8.18 (0.94) NA 
 
NA 
 
6.81 (6.46) 7.42 119.69 
1990 9.01 (0.82) NA 
 
0.12 (0.01) 11.39 (6.33) 7.07 126.61 
1991 8.26 (1.19) NA 
 
0.11 (0.01) 14.73 (7.54) 7.23 179.53 
1992 7.60 (0.92) NA 
 
0.10 (0.02) 4.63 (6.75) 7.31 223.48 
1993 6.17 (1.54) 0.12 (0.05) 0.08 (0.03) 11.74 (3.56) 7.31 312.03 
1994 7.10 (2.59) 0.19 (0.08) 0.08 (0.01) 1.38 (3.23) 6.91 339.45 
1995 6.76 (1.96) 0.88 (0.11) 0.08 (0.01) 18.10 (6.30) 7.13 488.10 
1996 6.13 (1.05) 1.13 (0.05) 0.08 (0.01) 4.31 (3.47) 6.95 536.49 
1997 5.62 (0.93) 1.02 (0.08) 0.09 (0.04) 1.52 (5.19) 7.85 900.65 
1998 4.67 (1.30) 0.57 (0.06) 0.05 (0.07) 14.29 (6.01) 8.18 1,205.26 
1999 4.65 (1.15) 0.82 (0.07) 0.04 (0.04) -4.82 (5.02) 8.01 1,222.24 
2000 4.83 (0.77) 0.32 (0.11) 0.06 (0.04) 2.52 (7.49) 8.26 1,552.85 
2001 4.13 (0.76) 1.56 (0.27) 0.06 (0.04) -0.67 (6.62) 8.00 1,933.82 
2002 3.87 (1.24) 3.08 (0.07) 0.07 (0.03) 18.74 (7.22) 7.82 2,835.09 
2003 3.31 (0.680) 2.94 (0.07) 0.08 (0.02) 14.51 (8.74) 7.62 3,872.52 
2004 3.45 (0.557) 2.66 (0.16) 0.07 (0.01) 10.63 (6.98) 7.64 5,175.19 
2005 3.21 (0.455) 0.79 (0.10) 0.06 (0.01) -5.89 (4.61) 7.87 5,896.48 
2006 3.72 (0.554) 0.12 (0.04) 0.06 (0.01) 6.67 (4.86) 7.95 7,644.37 
2007 3.95 (0.509) 0.46 (0.15) 0.06 (0.01) 10.70 (5.46) 8.10 9,966.78 
2008 3.64 (1.362) 2.99 (0.16) 0.07 (0.03) 9.84 (10.73) 8.24 13,285.91 
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3.4 Unconditional Liquidity Risk and Asset Pricing Models 
We study how liquidity risk affects expected bond returns using the standard Fama-
MacBeth (1973) method for our 39-country government bond portfolios. First, we 
estimate betas from rolling time-series regressions. Then, in the second stage, we 
estimate cross-section regressions for each month and compute the sample means of the 
estimated slope coefficients (i.e., the risk premiums) associated with each of the 
different betas. 
3.4.1 Unconditional liquidity risk – 1st stage time-series estimations 
At first, the two-factor model with liquidity factor is 
, , ,
,
i f i DEF i TERM i ILLIQ i i
t t t t t t
r r DEF TERM ILLIQ                             (3.5) 
where rt
i
 is the monthly bond return in U.S. dollar on the country i bond portfolio at 
time t, r
f
 is the one-month U.S. Treasury-bill return, which represents the risk-free rate, 
DEF,i and TERM,i represent the default beta and term beta, respectively and ILLIQ,i is the 
liquidity beta.
58
  DEF and TERM are proxies for bond default risk and interest rate term 
risk factors respectively.
59
 DEF is defined as the difference between the monthly 
government bond return on a value-weighted market portfolio of all non-investment 
grade government bonds (below BBB) with at least ten years to maturity and the 
monthly government bond return on a value-weighted portfolio of all investment grade 
                                                          
58
 This liquidity beta is 3,i, which captures the exposure of asset i to market-wide illiquidity, 
one of three liquidity risks in Acharya and Pedersen (2005).  As suggested by the first research 
paper, using three separate liquidity betas is not necessary since all three liquidity betas are 
highly correlated. 
59
 The same risk factors as used in Fama and French (1993) and Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer and 
Swaminathan (2005) for the U.S. corporate bonds. 
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government bonds (AAA to BBB) with at least ten years to maturity.
60
 TERM is defined 
as the difference between the monthly government bond return on a value-weighted 
portfolio of all bonds with at least ten years to maturity and return on one-month U.S. 
Treasury-bills, which is from the CRSP and also used as the risk-free rate throughout 
the paper. ILLIQ is the market liquidity risk factor as described in Section 3.3.3. 
All betas are estimated in Equation (3.5) using the prior 50-month rolling window. Data 
are discarded if there are less than 20 observations before the test month. Since we 
require 50 months of prior data to estimate betas, our regressions start from January 
1995 and run to February 2009, while our whole sample starts from December 1989.  
Table 3-3 gives the correlations of risk factors used in Equation (3.5). It shows that 
TERM is highly correlated with market return (a correlation of 0.89), while DEF has a 
correlation of 0.29 with market return. The correlations between other factors and 
market returns are small. The high correlation between TERM and the bond market 
return and high correlation between DEF and the bond market return support the finding 
of Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer and Swaminathan (2005) that the market factor has almost no 
explanatory power for corporate bond returns when the default and term risk factors are 
included. The table also shows that the simple correlations of liquidity risk factor 
(ILLIQ) with market returns and other factors (DEF, TERM, global bond return 
volatility and U.S. equity market returns) are small, which help provide a clean 
interpretation of the liquidity effects. 
 
                                                          
60
 Long-term local-currency issue rating published by Standard & Poor’s is utilized. 
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Table 3-3: Correlations of the time-series of risk factors 
This table shows the correlations of all market factors used in our study. The data are from December 
1985 to February 2009. r
MKT  rf is the value-weighted monthly excess return on all government bonds in 
the GBI and EM over the one-month U.S. Treasury-bill return. DEF is the difference between value-
weighted monthly return on all non-investment grade bonds with at least ten years to maturity and that of 
all investment grade bonds. TERM is the difference between the monthly government bond return on a 
value-weighted portfolio of all bonds with at least ten years to maturity and the monthly one-month U.S. 
Treasury-bill return. ILLIQ is the innovation in the bond market illiquidity. VOL
BOND
 is the global bond 
return volatility. r
USEQ_MKT
  rf is the value-weighted monthly excess return on all common shares listed 
on NYSE and AMEX over the one-month U.S. Treasury-bill return. 
 
 
 
r
MKT
 - r
f
 DEF TERM ILLIQ VOL
BOND
 r
USEQ_MKT
 - r
r
 
r
MKT
  rf 1.00 -0.29 0.89 -0.10 0.14 0.02 
DEF 
 
1.00 -0.35 0.15 -0.07 0.30 
TERM 
  
1.00 -0.08 0.05 -0.02 
ILLIQ 
   
1.00 0.00 -0.06 
VOL
BOND
 
   
 1.00 0.02 
r
USEQ_MKT
  rr 
   
  1.00 
Table 3-4 reports the betas (ILLIQ,i, DEF,i and TERM,i) for country bond portfolio i 
estimated from Equation (3.5) using the whole sample, average expected excess bond 
returns (E(r
i
t  r
f
t)) (see Session 3.4.2 for the estimation method) and average quoted 
bid/ask spreads (E(c
i
t)). The country portfolio is sorted in descending order of estimated 
liquidity risk beta (ILLIQ,i). In Table 3-4, we expect country bond portfolios with higher 
liquidity risk (i.e., more negative values for estimated liquidity risk beta) and higher 
illiquidity cost (i.e., larger bid/ask spreads) to have higher expected excess returns. 
China has the lowest liquidity risk (ILLIQ = +1.72) and Argentina the largest (ILLIQ = 
30.99). The correlation between unconditional ILLIQ,i and cit 
is 0.22, showing that 
countries with higher liquidity risk also tend to have higher illiquidity costs. A sound 
feature of the table is that the Euro-zone countries (for example, France, Germany, 
Spain, etc.) have similar liquidity betas. 
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Table 3-4: Country bond portfolio characteristics: whole sample averages of estimated 
betas, expected excess returns and bid/ask spreads 
This table reports betas estimated from Equation (3.5) using the whole monthly data from January 1990 to 
February 2009. For betas, ILLIQ,i, DEF,i and TERM,i
   
represents the liquidity, default and term betas for the 
country bond portfolio i. E(r
i
t – r
f
t) is the average expected excess bond returns after adjusting for 
expected default loss.
 
E(c
i
t) is the average percentage bid/ask spread. Countries are sorted to their values 
of ILLIQ,i. 
 
Country ILLIQ,i DEF,i TERM,i E(r
i
t – r
f
t) E(c
i
t) 
Date when bid/ask 
data first available 
China 1.72 0.04 0.25 0.24 0.02 Mar-05 
Czech 1.07 0.12 1.08 0.18 0.10 Nov-01 
India 0.71 0.38 0.49 0.17 0.07 Nov-02 
Hungary 0.63 0.46 1.12 0.11 0.20 May-02 
Thailand 0.39 0.46 1.02 0.12 0.28 Jan-01 
Korea 0.35 0.41 0.82 0.21 0.19 Aug-02 
Denmark 0.34 0.00 0.85 0.15 0.08 May-94 
Malaysia 0.29 -0.82 0.10 0.08 0.07 Jun-03 
Sweden 0.28 0.05 0.81 0.13 0.08 Jan-98 
Italy 0.27 0.00 0.88 0.12 0.03 Nov-98 
Austria 0.26 0.09 1.11 0.11 0.09 Dec-97 
Spain 0.25 -0.01 0.87 0.11 0.08 Aug-97 
Portugal 0.22 -0.02 0.83 0.11 0.08 Sep-98 
Finland 0.22 0.04 0.83 0.10 0.06 May-00 
France 0.22 -0.04 0.90 0.11 0.03 Dec-01 
Ireland 0.20 0.01 0.97 0.11 0.08 Jun-99 
Germany 0.20 -0.02 0.86 0.11 0.02 Jan-99 
Netherlands 0.19 -0.01 0.86 0.11 0.03 Dec-01 
Hong Kong 0.19 0.00 0.30 0.10 0.15 Jan-01 
Belgium 0.18 -0.01 0.86 0.11 0.07 Jul-99 
New Zealand 0.15 0.18 0.83 0.39 0.21 Jan-93 
Canada 0.01 0.10 0.62 0.15 0.04 Dec-89 
Poland -0.02 0.54 0.84 0.18 0.19 Feb-01 
Greece -0.02 0.16 0.94 0.13 0.11 Jul-98 
Singapore -0.02 0.10 0.54 0.15 0.10 Jul-00 
US -0.07 -0.03 0.44 0.14 0.05 Nov-89 
Australia -0.09 0.19 0.73 0.30 0.21 Sep-98 
South Africa -0.15 0.69 1.03 0.08 0.13 Feb-95 
Japan -0.19 0.07 0.39 0.12 0.13 Mar-93 
UK -0.24 -0.08 0.85 0.18 0.04 Sep-02 
Brazil -0.95 0.45 0.03 0.23 0.14 Jul-96 
Indonesia -1.19 0.66 0.60 0.09 0.34 Apr-03 
Mexico -2.00 0.52 0.28 0.09 0.31 Jan-93 
Russia -2.97 -0.07 0.19 0.07 0.18 Mar-06 
Colombia -2.98 0.31 0.53 0.18 0.12 Sep-05 
Turkey -3.82 0.64 0.95 0.12 0.14 Apr-06 
Chile -4.01 0.11 0.29 0.04 0.21 Dec-05 
Peru -5.66 0.40 0.52 0.19 0.75 Oct-06 
Argentina -30.99 0.11 1.14 0.32 0.17 Jun-06 
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3.4.2 Unconditional liquidity risk – 2nd stage cross-section regressions 
The main question to be addressed is whether the liquidity risk is important after 
controlling for systematic default risk, interest rate term risk and other bond 
characteristics. We do this with the second stage regression, in which we estimate an 
unconditional cross-sectional regression of the expected excess return on the factor 
loading (betas) estimated from Equation (3.5):  
, , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ,i f DEF DEF i TERM TERM i ILLIQ ILLIQ i L i it t LE r r B                            (3.6) 
where  represents an estimated pricing error, DEF ,
TERM
 and ILLIQ are the risk 
premiums associated with the default risk, term risk and liquidity risk respectively and 
E(r
i
t  r
f
t) is the expected (forward-looking) excess bond return after adjusting for 
expected default loss.
61
 We also include each bond portfolio’s characteristics in the 
cross-sectional analysis: ,L iB  is a three dimensional vector of bond characteristics. In 
some alternative specifications, we include the percentage quoted bid/ask spread for 
each country bond portfolio since both Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and the first 
research paper find that the liquidity level is important in explaining the expected 
returns for financial assets. The bond’s modified duration and the bond’s market value 
scaled by taking natural log are also included in some specifications of Equation (3.6).  
                                                          
61
 It is important to note that unlike DEF and 
TERM
, ILLIQ or liquidity risk premium should be 
negative because a high ILLIQ bond gives higher returns when market illiquidity is high, i.e., this 
bond has a lower liquidity risk, so it is more attractive to investors and therefore its price is 
higher and  expected return is lower. If we measure liquidity rather than illiquidity, ILLIQ should 
be positive. To be consistent with Chapter 2, we again measure illiquidity not liquidity here. 
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The expected excess bond return after adjusting for expected default loss is computed 
by a method similar to that used by Campello, Chen and Zhang (2008) with the 
following equation: 
( ) ( ) ,i f i f i it t t t t tE r r y r EDL EFX             (3.7) 
where y
i
t 
is the current yield to maturity. EDL
i
t, or expected default loss rate, is defined 
as default probability  (1  recovery rate)/dt < 0.62 The equation is the same as that 
used in the first research paper (see Equation (2.12)) except for the extra term, EFX
i
t, 
which is defined as the expected foreign exchange gain/loss in terms of U.S. dollar. This 
adjustment of forward-looking foreign exchange returns is required because our 
collected government bond yields are quoted in their local-currencies. We extract the 
expected currency gain/loss from the currency forward market. From JP Morgan, the 
forward points on a given currency against U.S. dollar at the maturity of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 
and 10 years are collected on a monthly basis.
63
 We then compute the expected currency 
loss/gain for a given maturity that most closely matches each bond’s duration. 
Table 3-5 reports the cross-section regression results of the unconditional factor models 
with liquidity risk, where standard errors are computed using the Newey and West  
 
                                                          
62
 We compute the expected default loss rate as in Section 2.4.5 except that we use the local-
currency rating rather foreign-currency sovereign credit rating since our test assets are local-
currency government bonds. 
63
 The number of basis points are added to or subtracted from the current spot rate to determine 
the forward rate. When points are added to the spot rate, there is a forward point premium; when 
points are subtracted from the spot rate, there is a points discount. The forward points are 
determined by prevailing interest rate between two countries. For example, if the current spot 
rate of the U.S. dollar/GBP is 1.60 and the five-year forward rate is 1.62, the number of forward 
points is 200 basis points. 
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Table 3-5: Country portfolios and Fama-MacBeth regression 
This table reports the time-series averages of coefficients of each beta obtained in a cross-sectional 
regression. A two-step Fama-Macbeth (1973) procedure is employed. First, estimates of the systematic 
risk (betas) are obtained by running a regression of bond’s monthly returns, rit on different risk factors. 
The models are alternative cases of the following equation: 
, , , , ( ),i f i DEF i TERM i ILLIQ i MKT i MKT ft t t t t t tr r DEF TERM ILLIQ r r             
where i
 
is the intercept, r
f
t 
is the risk-free rate, DEF,i is the default beta of the ith bond, DEFt is the 
difference between value-weighted monthly return on all non-investment grade bonds with at least ten 
years to maturity and that of all investment grade bonds, TERM,i
 
is the term beta, TERMt is the difference 
between the monthly government bond return on a value-weighted portfolio of all bonds with at least ten 
years to maturity and the monthly one-month U.S. Treasury-bill returns, ILLIQ,i is the liquidity beta, 
ILLIQt is the innovation in the market illiquidity, 
MKT,i
  
is the bond market beta and rt
MKT 
is the value-
weighted bond market monthly return. The betas are estimated over 50 months. Our sample starts from 
December 1985 to February 2009.  
In the second stage, expected bond returns adjusted for default loss, E(r
i
t – r
f
t), are regressed on the 
estimated betas from Equation (3.5) and other three bond individual characteristics, which are the bond 
illiquidity cost (c
i
t), bond maturity (in year) and natural log of the U.S. dollar market value of bond issue 
in the different cross-sectional models for each month in the sample period. The betas to be used in each 
monthly cross-sectional regressions are estimated using data from the period preceding each month and 
they are “rolling” betas.  For each month, the cross-sectional regressions are of the following alternatives:  
, , , , 1 2
3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
ln(   ) .
i f DEF DEF i TERM TERM i ILLIQ ILLIQ i MKT MKT i i i
t t t t t t t t
i
t
E r r c maturity
bond market value
          

       

  
t-statistics from Newey West (1987) are reported in the parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level is indicated by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 respectively.  
 
Variable 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 
Intercept () 0.149c 0.139c 0.105c 0.117c 0.110c 0.134c 
 (13.68) (12.68) (6.88) (5.11) (7.55) (5.69) 
DEF beta ( ,ˆDEF i
t ) 0.017 0.001 0.069
c 0.079c 0.077c 0.070c 
 (1.33) (0.13) (3.62) (3.99) (3.66) (2.81) 
TERM beta ( ,ˆTERM i
t ) 0.015 0.009 0.052
b 0.054 b 0.045c 0.014 
 (1.07) (0.64) (2.38) (2.45) (1.93) (0.43) 
Liquidity beta *100( ,ˆ ILLIQ i
t )  
-0.023a -0.022b -0.028 c -0.028b -0.029b 
 
 
-(1.94) -(2.46) -(2.90) -(2.31) -(2.31) 
Bond market beta ( ,ˆMKT i
t )     
0.013 -0.001 
 
    
(0.97) -(0.05) 
Illiquidity cost ( itc )   
0.179c 0.175 c 0.182c 0.165c 
 
  
(3.16) (2.96) (3.98) (3.27) 
Modified duration
 
   
0.007b 
 
0.009b 
 
   
(2.07) 
 
(2.33) 
ln(bond market value)
 
   
-0.009b 
 
-0.010c 
 
   
-(2.36) 
 
-(2.82) 
R2 0.195 0.282 0.444 0.503 0.474 0.527 
Adjusted R2 0.109 0.161 0.219 0.145 0.178 0.135 
Number of observations 4,362 4,362 3,633 3,633 3,633 3,633 
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(1987) method, which adjusts for heteroskedasticitiy and autocorrelations. Model 5.1 is  
the regression containing only the default risk and term risk. Although the risk premia 
attached to both risks (DEF and TERM) are positive, neither is statistically significant. 
The R
2
 is fairly low at 0.195, but that is similar in magnitude to those reported by both 
Fama and French (1993) and Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer and Swaminathan (2005) for the 
same specification using U.S. corporate bonds.  
In model 5.2, liquidity risk (ILLIQ) is included. There is a large increase in the R2 to 
0.282. The coefficient of  ˆ ILLIQ  is 0.023 and significant at the 10% level. It is negative, 
which is expected, because investors should require lower expected returns to hold an 
asset with a high return in times of market illiquidity. Alternatively, the more negative 
is the exposure of the asset to market illiquidity, the greater is the expected return.
64
 The 
default beta and term beta remain both positive and insignificant.  
The regression in model 5.3 is the same as in model 5.2, but illiquidity cost (ct) is 
added-in, being measured by the percentage bid/ask spread. As expected, the coefficient 
of i
tc is positive and significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, the DEF and TERM risks 
now become positive and significant, but liquidity risk beta (0.022) remains significant. 
This suggests that the liquidity level might be an omitted variable in the previous two 
regressions. One implication of the theoretical model is that the coefficient on illiquidity 
cost should reflect the difference between estimation periods (in this case, monthly) and 
investors’ holding periods. From our results, the estimated coefficient of ct is 0.179, 
which is equivalent to an average holding period of about 1/0.179  5.6 months, i.e., an 
                                                          
64
 This is the same liquidity mechanism investigated by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and 
Martinez, Nieto, Rubio and Tapia (2005) for the stock returns. 
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annual turnover of about 2.1. This is consistent with the historical turnover reported for 
domestic government bond markets.
65
 
In model 5.4, two bond characteristics bond modified duration and natural log of 
market value of bond issue are entered into the pricing equation. Both bond modified 
duration and market value, which have usually been considered as proxies for interest 
rate term risk and liquidity level respectively in the previous literature, are significant. 
In fact, they have the correct signs even in the presence of the illiquidity cost, which is 
the more direct measure of liquidity. The shorter is bond maturity and the greater is 
bond market value, the lower is the interest rate term risk and the higher is bond 
liquidity, which leads to lower required bond returns. However, the inclusion of both 
bond characteristics does not produce any improvement in terms of the adjusted R
2
, 
which is lower for model 5.4 than that for model 5.3.  
Models 5.5 and 5.6 show that adding-in the market (CAPM) beta factor hardly changes 
any of the findings. The estimated market risk premium is very close to zero in both 
regressions (0.013 and 0.001 respectively) and not significant. This is consistent with 
previous empirical findings that the market factor has almost no explanatory power for 
corporate bond returns, especially when the default and term risk factors are included.
66
    
Table 3-6 reports the time-series average of correlations among the dependent variables 
used in the cross-sectional regressions in Table 3-5. It shows that the market beta has a 
                                                          
65
 Knight (2006) reports an average annual turnover of about two in the local bond markets 
across many countries.   
66
 Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer and Swaminathan (2005) find that empirically the market factor has 
almost no explanatory power for corporate bond returns in the presence of default and term risk 
factors. 
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correlation of 0.90 with the term beta, so these variables are close substitutes. That 
explains why market beta has no significant input when the term beta is present. 
Table 3-6: Average cross-section correlations of estimated risk loadings over our 
sample period 
 
 
Market beta Liquidity beta DEF beta TERM beta Illiquidity cost 
Market beta 1.00 0.06 -0.31 -0.90 -0.22 
Liquidity beta 
 
1.00 -0.12 -0.03 -0.06 
DEF  beta 
  
1.00 0.43 0.33 
TERM beta 
   
1.00 0.22 
Illiquidity cost 
    
1.00 
 
3.4.3 Economic significance of empirical results 
The results so far are statistically impressive. For example, model 5.4 can explain over 
50% of the cross-sectional variance of expected bond excess returns. However, the 
results also show that the economic significance of liquidity risk is small relative to that 
of liquidity level. As an example, consider Argentinian and Chinese bonds, for which 
the difference in unconditional U.S. dollar expected excess return is 1.00% (3.86%  
2.86%) per annum.
67
 Using the results from model 5.3 in Table 3-5, the difference in 
annualized expected excess returns between these two countries due to liquidity risk 
(ILLIQ) is [(0.022/100)12(ILLIQ,Argentina  ILLIQ,China)] = 0.09% per annum, whereas 
the difference in annualized expected excess returns due to the expected level of 
illiquidity cost (c
i
) is estimated to be [(0.179)12(cArgentina  cChina )] = 0.32% per annum. 
Together, liquidity risk and liquidity level can explain as much as 0.41% per annum of 
                                                          
67
 Argentina and China are chosen because they are respectively the highest and lowest liquidity 
risk countries as measured by the unconditional magnitude of ILLIQ over our sample reported in 
Table 3-4. See top and bottom rows of the table. 
98 
 
   
the 1.00% credit spread between Argentinian and Chinese bonds. The rest is mostly 
captured by the difference in TERM betas (TERM), which explains about 0.55% per 
annum. The DEF beta (DEF) contributes only about 0.06% per annum in explaining the 
credit spread between these two countries. 
Even though there is strong statistical evidence that liquidity level and global liquidity 
risk are priced in the domestic government bond markets around the world, the 
economic significance of liquidity risk is only about one quarter as large as that of 
liquidity level in this unconditional analysis. 
3.4.4 Robustness tests 
As a test of robustness, we experiment with other three risk factors in our pricing 
equation, Equation (3.6), to see whether the liquidity effect remains important. The 
additional market factors include 1) aggregate bond volatility, 2) U.S. equity market 
returns and 3) liquidity in the U.S. equity market. Bond volatility is another proxy for 
liquidity risk because volatility is expected to have a positive relation with bid/ask 
spreads or a negative impact on liquidity. Intuitively, an increase in bond volatility 
poses higher risks for dealers, who have to hold less than fully-diversified portfolios, 
therefore they need to be compensated directly through a higher bid/ask spread. With 
respect to U.S. equity factors, we would like to see whether the U.S. equity market 
both in terms of its returns and its liquidity is a driving force in pricing domestic bonds 
around the world. When U.S. stocks fall in price or become illiquid, does that affect 
domestic bond markets worldwide?  
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For the estimation of monthly volatility of the aggregate bond market, we employ an 
exponentially-weighted moving average (EWMA) as used, for example, by 
Riskmetrics.
68
 For the U.S. stock market returns, we use monthly data from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).  For the U.S. market illiquidity, we employ the 
factor estimated by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).
69
 Note that Pastor and Stambaugh 
measure liquidity and we focus on illiquidity, so we simply switch the signs of the 
measures.  
Results from cross-sectional regressions with these extra risk factors are given in Table 
3-7.  They show that 1) the liquidity beta is the only risk factor that is significantly 
priced in all cross-sectional pricing equations and 2) in some specifications, domestic 
government bonds, which are grouped by country of issuance, have a significant 
exposure to the bond volatility beta, U.S. equity market beta and U.S. equity market 
illiquidity beta.  
In model 7.1 when bond volatility beta ( ˆ
BONDVOL
t ) is included, only an exposure to the 
bond liquidity risk is priced. In model 7.2, when we add-in both U.S. equity market beta 
( _ˆUSEQ MKTt ) and U.S. equity market illiquidity beta (
,ˆ PS i
t ), they are not significantly 
priced and the price of bond volatility risk ( ˆ
BONDVOL
t ) becomes significantly negative.
70
 
 
                                                          
68
 The EWMA approach gives more weight to recent observations than to older ones. The 
smoothing or decay parameter used in this paper is lambda  = 0.97, with rolling window of 24 
months. 
69
 The return reversal measure of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) reflects that the price changes 
with large trading volume tend to be reversed when market-wide liquidity is low. 
70
 We expect a negative sign because investors should require less expected returns for holding a 
security that performs well in times of high market volatility. 
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Table 3-7: Country portfolios and Fama-MacBeth regression with additional risk 
factors 
This table reports the time-series averages of coefficients of each beta obtained in a cross-sectional 
regression. A two-step Fama-Macbeth (1973) procedure is employed. First, estimates of the systematic 
risk (betas) are obtained by running a regression of bond’s monthly returns, rit on different risk factors. 
The models are alternative cases of the following equation: 
, , , , ,
_ , _ ,
( )
( ) ,
BOND
t
i f i DEF i TERM i ILLIQ i MKT i MKT f VOL i
t t t t t t t
USEQ MKT i USEQ MKT f PS i
t t
BOND
t
r r DEF TERM ILLIQ r r VOL
r r PS
     
 
       
  
  
where i
 
is the intercept, r
f
t 
is the risk-free rate, DEF,i is the default beta of the ith bond, DEFt is the 
difference between value-weighted monthly return on all non-investment grade bonds with at least ten 
years to maturity and that of all investment grade bonds, TERM,i
 
is the term beta, TERMt is the difference 
between the monthly government bond return on a value-weighted portfolio of all bonds with at least ten 
years to maturity and the monthly one-month U.S. Treasury-bill returns, ILLIQ,i is the liquidity beta, 
ILLIQt is the innovation in the market illiquidity, 
MKT,i
  
is the bond market beta, rt
MKT 
is the value-
weighted bond market monthly return and
,
BOND
VOL i
 is the bond market volatility beta, VOLt
BOND
 is the 
aggregate bond market volatility, USEQ_MKT,i
 
is the U.S. equity market beta, rt
USEQ_MKT
 
is the value-
weighted U.S. equity market return, PS
 
is the U.S. equity market liquidity beta and PSt is the monthly 
measure of innovation in illiquidity in the U.S. equity market calculated by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). 
The betas are estimated over 50 months. Our sample starts from December 1985 to February 2009.  
In the second stage, expected bond returns adjusted for default loss, E(r
i
t – r
f
t) are regressed on the 
estimated betas from Equation (3.5) and other three bond individual characteristics, which are the bond 
illiquidity cost (c
i
t), bond maturity (in year) and natural log of the U.S. dollar market value of bond issue 
in the different cross-sectional models for each month in the sample period. The betas to be used in each 
monthly cross-sectional regressions are estimated using data from the period preceding each month and 
they are “rolling” betas.  For each month, the cross-sectional regressions are of the following alternatives:  
, , , , , _ _ ,
, 1 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
ˆ ln(   ) .
BOND BOND
i f DEF DEF i TERM TERM i ILLIQ ILLIQ i MKT MKT i VOL VOL i USEQ MKT USEQ MKT i
t t t t t t t t
PS PS i i i i
t t t t
E r r
c maturity bond market value
            
    
      
  


 
t-statistics from Newey West (1987) are reported in the parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level is indicated by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 respectively.  
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Table 3-7 (continued) 
 
Variable 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 
Intercept () 0.062 0.164c 0.120c 0.085c 0.123c 0.094c 
 
(0.82) (12.11) (8.19) (6.71) (8.23) (3.70) 
Liquidity beta *100( ,ˆ ILLIQ i
t ) -0.038
c -0.023b -0.015c -0.031b -0.052c -0.590c 
 
-(2.48) -(2.31) -(2.77) -(2.26) -(3.81) -(4.16) 
DEF beta ( ,ˆDEF i
t )     
0.102c 0.116c 
     
(3.42) (3.81) 
TERM beta ( ,ˆTERM i
t )     
0.032 0.047c 
     
(1.26) (3.47) 
Illiquidity cost (
i
tc ) 0.295 0.006 0.158
c 0.536b 0.115c 0.141c 
 
(1.36) (0.11) (2.98) (2.07) (3.85) (3.47) 
Modified duration
 
     
0.003 
      
(0.89) 
Ln(bond market value)
 
     
-0.000 
      
(0.04) 
Bond volatility beta( ,ˆ
BONDVOL i
t ) 0.017 -0.039
c 
  
0.003 0.004 
 
(0.08) -(3.01) 
  
(1.10) (1.46) 
U.S. Market beta ( _ ,ˆUSEQ MKT i
t )  
0.051 0.120c 0.092a 0.064c 0.068c 
  
(1.50) (5.09) (1.91) (3.85) (3.50) 
U.S. equity liquidity beta ( ,ˆPS i
t )  
-0.000 
 
-0.002c -0.002c -0.002c 
  
-(0.38) 
 
-(2.97) -(3.85) (3.69) 
R2 0.457 0.573 0.420 0.511 0.600 0.664 
Adjusted R2 0.205 0.224 0.138 0.123 0.290 0.302 
Number of observations 3788 3738 3,738 3,738 3,633 3,633 
Nonetheless, both coefficients on _ˆUSEQ MKTt and 
ˆ PS
t  are significant with expected signs 
in models 7.3, 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6. The risk premium of U.S. equity returns is positive and 
significant. The exposure to illiquidity shocks in the U.S. equity market is also 
important and has the expected negative sign, indicating that investors are willing to 
accept a lower yield on a bond with a high return in times of U.S. stock market 
illiquidity. In other words, a bond has more hedging value if it performs well when the 
U.S. equity market becomes illiquid and such a bond requires a lower expected return. 
In models 7.5 and 7.6, the same empirical results are found when DEF and TERM risk 
factors and bond characteristics are entered into the pricing equation. The bond liquidity 
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beta ( ˆ ILLIQt ) is the only explanatory variable that remains significant in every model 
and has the expected sign. Table 3-7 therefore confirms that the effect of liquidity risk is 
robust to the inclusion of a number of other potentially relevant risk factors and bond 
characteristics. 
As another robustness check, we have repeated the previous tests using individual bonds 
(rather than country bond portfolios) as test assets. Liquidity is still priced. Moreover, 
liquidity risk becomes relatively more important than liquidity level for bonds in the 
emerging economies. Appendix A provides detailed discussions and results. 
In summary, we find some evidence that bond volatility, U.S. equity returns and U.S. 
equity volatility are important in the cross-sectional pricing of global bonds.
71
 For 39 
countries, domestic bond credit spreads over U.S Treasury reflect a global risk factor, 
proxied by the U.S. stock market. Table 3-7 also suggests that illiquidity can spill over 
from the U.S. stock market to domestic bond markets around the world. In addition, the 
impact of bond liquidity risk is not sensitive to the choice of market risk factor or of 
global illiquidity factor.  
 
 
 
                                                          
71
 This finding is consistent with Diaz-Weigel and Gemmill (2006), Longstaff, Mithal and Nes 
(2005) and Min, Lee, Nam, Park and Nam (2003). They report that the credit spread in the 
emerging markets has the global and/or regional factors such as the U.S. stock market or U.S. 
Treasury market. Lee (2010) also finds the U.S. equity market is an important driving force of 
global liquidity risk for equity. 
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3.5 Conditional Liquidity Risk and Asset Pricing Models 
In the previous section, even though liquidity risk was significantly related to expected 
government bond returns in the cross-section of 39 countries, its economic impact was 
rather small. This might be because the estimated risk premia in the second stage cross-
sectional regression are averaged over time, so there is no time variation, although a 
rolling (time-varying) beta approach in the first stage time-series estimation is used. 
Most previous papers on asset pricing have also used this “unconditional” approach. 
However, not only the liquidity betas, but also the liquidity premium or investor 
aversion to risk could exhibit time-variation. The premium might be extremely high 
during stress periods and negligible during normal times. That would explain why we 
do not see a significant economic impact of liquidity risk from unconditional models 
when the liquidity impacts are averaged across periods.  
In order to take a preliminary look at whether liquidity risk premia are time-varying, we 
divide the whole sample into five three-year sub-periods (199496, 199799, 200002, 
200305 and 200609) and re-estimate model 5.3 in Table 3-5. Figure 3-2 shows the 
liquidity risk premium estimated from a cross-section regression for each sub-period. 
The results indicate that the liquidity risk premium varies quite markedly over time. All 
estimates are significant, except that for the 20062009 period.  The global price of 
liquidity risk (or investors’ risk aversion toward liquidity comovement) seems to relate 
to general economic conditions as it is higher (more negative value) after the 199799 
period of Asian, Russia and LTCM crises. Therefore, in this section, we turn our 
attention to conditional liquidity risk. 
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Figure 3-2: Liquidity risk premia in sub-periods 
This figure shows liquidity premia estimated from five three-year sub-periods (199496, 199799, 
200002, 200305 and 200609) using the cross-sectional regression equation of model 5.3 in Table 3-5.  
However, because of data availability, we employ the entire sub-period sample rather than rolling 
window approach in the time-series beta estimation for each sub-period. t-statistics from Newey West 
(1987) are reported in the parentheses and the significance level is labeled by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 for 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively.  
 
3.5.1 Regime-switching model of bond betas (time-series) 
The model creates two regression equations relating the bond returns to relevant risk 
factors for each regime. We allow all betas to be potentially different between two 
regimes. The general hypothesis is that liquidity risks vary across two different states of 
the world, with the states determined by the switching function. We use the model of 
Goldfeld and Quandt (1973), in which the return observations are sorted by a linear 
switching (or constraint) function whose parameters are not known. The switching 
function sets up a boundary, as it were, between the two regimes. In their studies of  
time-varying liquidity betas, Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) and Acharya, Amihud and 
Bharath (2010) employ the Markov regime-switching model of Hamilton (1994), where 
-0.022c ( -4.59)
0.041b (2.44)
-0.040a (-1.97)
-0.170c (-17.32)
-0.001(-0.41)
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
1994-96 1997-99 2000-02 2003-05 2006-09 (Feb)
liquidity risk premium in sub-periods
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the probabilities of state transition are assumed to be constant rather than varying with 
some exogenous variables. For instance, the asset returns might be subject to the 
random shifts without any economic interpretation. However, in our model, we relate 
the switching probability to underlying economic conditions as proxied by U.S. equity-
market returns. For more detail about the Goldfeld and Quandt regime-switching 
employed here, please see Appendix B.  
The two regimes with constraints are given by 
, , ,
1 1 1 1 1 1
_ _
1
, , ,
2 2 2 2 2 2
,
if ( ) 0 and
,
if (
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
i f i ILLIQ i DEF i TERM i i
S t S S t S t S t S
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                               (3.8) 
where the r
i
t is the monthly return in U.S. dollar on bond portfolio i at time t, r
f
 is the 
monthly return for holding one-month U.S. Treasury bills, ILLIQ (the innovation in 
bond market illiquidity as computed in Section 3.3.3) serves as the market liquidity 
factor, R
USEQ_MKT
 is the monthly return on the U.S. equity market, st = 1, 2 represents the 
regimes and the other notations are the same as in Equation (3.5).  α1
i
, a2
i
, 1, 2, p
US
 
(scaling parameter), 1
i
 and 2
i
  (the standard deviation of residuals from Equation (3.8)) 
are parameters to be estimated by the maximum likelihood method. Our null hypothesis 
is that the regimes do not make any difference among the t = 1,….,T portfolio return 
observations, i.e., that betas or return sensitivity to factors are not time-varying and are 
not significantly different between regimes. The likelihood ratio (LR) method is applied 
to test this hypothesis.  
The residual vector in Equation (3.8) is of the following form: 
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This means that the residual is assumed to follow a bivariate Gaussian process with a 
state-dependent variance-covariance matrix. We allow the residuals to be 
heteroscedastic among the two states, but assume that their covariance is zero for the 
sake of estimation.  
We relate the change in regime to the monthly change in U.S. equity market returns, 
leading to a switching function of the form, p
US
(Rt
USEQ_MKT – Rt-1
USEQ_MKT
).
72
 We use U.S. 
equity returns because: 1) we are looking from the U.S. investor’s point of view, so the 
performance of the U.S. equity market should be highly relevant since it is a large part 
of their whole portfolio;
73
 2) U.S. equity market performance is positively related to 
global economic conditions and global economic sentiments; and 3) our empirical 
results in Section 3.4.4 indicate that the U.S. equity market has an influence on 
international bond prices. The bad state (or high preference uncertainty or low degrees 
of market optimism) occurs when (Rt
USEQ_MKT – Rt-1
USEQ_MKT
)  0 and the normal state 
(or low preference uncertainty or high degree of market optimism) occurs when 
(Rt
USEQ_MKT – Rt-1
USEQ_MKT
) > 0.  The bad and good states are denoted as Regime 1 and 
Regime 2 respectively. Later, as a robustness test, we will repeat the same analysis 
                                                          
72
 The results reported below are still the same when we use the quarterly performance of U.S. 
equity market, i.e., p
US
[(Rt
USEQ_MKT 
+ Rt-1
USEQ_MKT 
+ Rt-2
USEQ_MKT
)  (Rt-3
USEQ_MKT 
+ Rt-4
USEQ_MKT 
+ 
Rt-5
USEQ_MKT
)], rather  than the monthly performance. 
73
 For example, a flight out of equities will lead to a flight onto bond markets when the risk in 
equity market increases (Connolly, Stivers and Sun (2005)).  
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using the change in aggregate bond market volatilities as another switching function 
because this factor is also important for bond returns from the unconditional regression 
in Section 3.4.4.  
3.5.1.1 Regime-switching results 
Our main objective is to discover whether liquidity betas are time-varying, i.e., liquidity 
betas are significantly different between the two regimes. We separate individual bonds 
into two groups according to the level of market development because we expect to find 
that less-developed countries exhibit higher liquidity-risk betas than developed 
countries and they should become even larger in a downturn.
 74
  This conjecture is 
supported by the findings of Karolyi, Lee and Dijk (2009), where stocks in emerging 
countries show higher level of commonality in liquidity (i.e., liquidity risk) than those 
in developed nations. 
Table 3-8 reports the estimated parameters of the regime-switching model of Equation 
(3.8). The table is divided into two columns representing the two bond portfolios (i.e., 
developed GBI and emerging EM bond portfolios), which are estimated separately. The 
two sub-columns for each bond portfolio represent the results for Regimes 1 and 2 
respectively. The estimation is done by maximum likelihood, using a monthly sample 
from December 1989 to February 2009.
75
   
 
                                                          
74
 The results in Appendix A suggest that liquidity risk is relatively more important in less-
advanced countries. Such grouping is also for parsimony of estimated econometric models. The 
list of GBI and EM countries can be seen in Appendix A. 
75
 It should be noted that the number of observations included for the EM bond portfolio is less 
than that for the GBI bond portfolio because its data is available from February 2002 onwards. 
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Table 3-8: Regime-switching regression (time-series) with U.S. equity returns  
This table shows estimated parameters of the following bivariate regime-switching model: 
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1 1 1 1 1 1
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     
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where the r
i
t is the monthly return in U.S. dollar on bond portfolio i at time t, r
f
 is the monthly return for 
holding one-month U.S. Treasury bill, ILLIQ or the innovation in bond market illiquidity as computed in 
Section 3.3.3 serves as a liquidity factor, DEF is the difference between value-weighted monthly return 
on all non-investment grade bonds with at least ten years to maturity and that of all investment grade 
bonds, TERM is the difference between the monthly government bond return on a value-weighted 
portfolio of all bonds with at least ten years to maturity and the monthly one-month U.S. Treasury-bill 
return, R
USEQ_MKT
 is the monthly return on the U.S. equity market, p
US
 is the switching function parameter 
and st = 1, 2 represents the regimes. We sort portfolio i into 2 groups, GBI and EM. The estimation is 
done by the maximum likelihood method. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 respectively. 1
i
 and 2
i
  are the standard deviation of 
residuals corresponding to states 1 and 2 respectively. The table also shows the likelihood ratio (LR) test 
on various parameters restrictions. The LR tests give the probability of being greater than the relevant 2 
value (or the lowest significance level at which a null hypothesis can be rejected). The data start from 
December 1985 to February 2009. 
 
  GBI (developed) 
 
EM (emerging) 
  Regime 1 Regime 2 
 
Regime 1 Regime 2 
Constant (α) 1.859 b -0.171 
 
 
5.146 
 
1.611 
 
 
(2.52) 
 
-(0.22) 
 
 
(1.05) 
 
(0.34) 
 
ILLIQ -26.827 
 
8.531 
 
 
-88.699 b 5.603 
 
 
-(1.25) 
 
(0.70) 
 
 
-(2.36) 
 
(0.08) 
 
DEF 0.043 
 
-0.029 
 
 
0.346 b 0.288 a 
 
(1.37) 
 
-(0.83) 
 
 
(2.19) 
 
(1.96) 
 
TERM 0.709  c 0.686 c  
 
1.195 c 0.364 
 
 
(11.44) 
 
(10.44) 
 
 
(5.77) 
 
(1.58) 
 
St 1.037 
c 1.159 c  
 
2.705 c 2.649 c 
 
(7.95) 
 
(7.49) 
 
 
(7.34) 
 
(7.21) 
 
pUS 0.110 
 
0.181b 
 
(1.46) 
 
(2.17) 
Number of observations 160 
 
85 
R2  0.812 
 
0.577 
Adjusted R2 0.779 
 
0.520 
 
  
   
 
  
   
LR test: Pr > 2   
   
 
  
   
α1
 = α 2 0.037 
 
0.687 
1 
ILLIQ = 2
ILLIQ 0.074 
 
0.023 
1
DEF  = 2
DEF 0.192 
 
0.830 
1
TERM = 2
TERM 0.840 
 
0.009 
St=1 = St=2 0.551  0.917 
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We find that the liquidity betas or the estimated coefficients on the innovation in bond 
market illiquidity (ILLIQ) of the two portfolios vary significantly across the two 
regimes. The likelihood ratio (LR) test in the bottom panel of the table shows that 
liquidity betas for Regime 1 are significantly more negative than those for Regime 2 for 
both GBI and EM bonds. The null hypothesis that ILLIQ1 = 
ILLIQ
2 is rejected with p-
value below 0.074 for GBI bonds and 0.023 for EM bonds. The more negative (and 
significant) liquidity beta in Regime 1 for the EM bond portfolio suggests that the 
global liquidity factor is more important for countries with less-developed bond markets 
during times of stress. Note that the magnitude of liquidity risk is greater for EM bonds 
than that for GBI bonds for each regime, but this difference is significant only in bad 
times (Regime 1). 
Turning to the other variables, the DEF betas are not significantly different across 
regimes according to the LR test. They are significantly positive only for the EM bond 
portfolio in both regimes and, as expected, higher in Regime 1 (the bad state). The 
TERM betas are positive as expected and statistically different across regimes for the 
EM bonds, but not for the GBI bonds.  
The estimated bond volatilities (St) are all positive and highly significant. As expected, 
the volatilities of the EM bond portfolio are significantly higher than those of the GBI 
portfolio in both regimes.
76
 However, the LR tests at the bottom the table cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that st=1
i
 = st=2
i
 for i = GBI, EM. The volatilities therefore vary 
                                                          
76
 The hypothesis tests that H0: st=1
EM
  1.037 and H0: st=2
EM
  1.159 are both strongly rejected 
or Prob (ˆ st=1
EM  1.037+ [t0.01 * (standard error of ˆ st=1
EM
)]) = 0.99  and  Prob (ˆ st=2
EM  
1.159+ [t0.01 * (standard error of ˆ st=2
EM
)]) = 0.99. And the same results apply for H0: st=1
GBI
  
2.705 and H0: st=2
GBI
  2.649. 
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across bond asset classes, but not across time in our sample. The estimated scaling 
parameter, p
US
, suggests that if U.S. market returns drop by one standard deviation, 
probability of being in bad states is about 40% (44%) for GBI (EM) bonds.   
Panel A of Figure 3-3 plots the time series of the indicator variable, where it equals to 
one if the probability of being in Regime 1 is greater than 0.9, using results from the 
regression in Table 3-8 for EM bonds. An increase in the probability of being in Regime 
1 coincides with global economic crises such as the U.S. stock market crash of October 
1987, the Iraq war of August 1990, the Asian Crisis of mid 1997, the Russian currency 
devaluation of August 1998, the LTCM crisis of September 1998, the Post Dot Com 
bubble burst of 200002 and the most recent credit crunch of 2008. Panel B of Figure 3-
3 shows that similar results are obtained if a cut-off probability of 0.8 is used instead of 
0.9. Both figures are consistent with the plot of innovations in aggregate illiquidity costs 
or liquidity shocks given earlier in Figure 3-1. 
We have also experimented with different portfolios including individual country bond 
portfolio, region (Asia, Europe and Latin America) portfolio and G5-country portfolio. 
The results of time-varying liquidity betas are similar to those already reported. 
3.5.1.2 Economic significance 
The economic significance of the conditional liquidity risk reported in Table 3-8 is also 
stronger during bad times (Regime 1) for both GBI and EM bonds. Table 3-9 shows 
how much of a standard deviation in returns is related to a standard deviation shock in a 
risk factor. During bad times, one standard deviation increase in liquidity risk factor is 
associated with  28  per cent (49 per cent) of one standard deviation shock in GBI bonds  
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Figure 3-3: Indicator variable of high illiquidity regime (Regime 1) from a regime- 
switching model 
Panel A (Panel B) plots the time-series of an indicator variable, where it depicts “1” when the probability 
of being in Regime 1 is greater than 0.9 (0.8) and “0” otherwise. The probability of being in Regime 1 is 
calculated by parameters estimated from the regime-switching regression of EM bonds in Table 3-8.   
 
Panel A: with probability threshold of 0.9 
Panel B: with probability threshold of 0.8 
 
(EM bonds) returns, which is 2.80 times (12.25 times) as large as those during normal 
times. In terms of returns, one standard deviation in liquidity shock generates the return 
change of 6.72 and 13.12 per cent per annum for GBI and EM bonds respectively, 
which are quite large. Clearly, the time-varying liquidity effect is considerably stronger 
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for EM bonds. Meanwhile, the DEF effect seems to be relatively stable for both GBI 
and EM bonds. As expected, its effect is more important for EM bonds, which feature 
lower credit ratings. Hence, they are more sensitive to an aggregate credit quality shock. 
The TERM effect is also stable for GBI bonds, while it is more volatile for EM bonds, 
where it increases by 2.48 times in bad times. Consistent with Beber, Brandt and 
Kavajecz (2009), for Euro bonds, the liquidity effect plays a substantially smaller role 
during the normal or unconditional times and increases significantly during times of 
heighten market uncertainty.  
Table 3-9: Economic significance of estimated coefficients in the regime switching 
model 
This table reports the economic significance of estimated coefficient in the regime switching model from 
Table 3-8. r
GBI
 and r
EM
 are the monthly return in U.S. dollar on bond portfolio of GBI and EM 
respectively. ILLIQ or the innovation in bond market illiquidity as computed in Section 3.3.3 serves as a 
liquidity factor, DEF is the difference between value-weighted monthly return on all non-investment 
grade bonds with at least ten years to maturity and that of all investment grade bonds. TERM is the 
difference between the monthly government bond return on a value-weighted portfolio of all bonds with 
at least ten years to maturity and the monthly one-month U.S. Treasury-bill return. st = 1, 2 represents the 
regimes (stress and normal times). The data start from December 1985 to February 2009. 
 
 Bad time: Regime 1 (st=1)  Normal time: Regime 2 (st=2) 
 coefficient  coefffactor return  coefficient  coefffactor return 
GBI return (rGBI)  2.00    1.86  
ILLIQ -26.83 0.02 28%  8.53 0.02 10% 
DEF 0.04 4.89 10%  -0.03 5.35 8% 
TERM 0.71 2.60 92%  0.69 2.47 91% 
EM return (rEM)  3.77    2.76  
ILLIQ -88.70 0.02 49%  5.60 0.02 4% 
DEF 0.35 4.89 45%  0.29 5.35 56% 
TERM 1.20 2.60 82%  0.36 2.47 33% 
In summary, return sensitivity to global liquidity factor for domestic bonds around the 
world exhibits a time-varying component (i.e., is subject to a change in regime). In 
addition, liquidity betas of emerging countries are more sensitive to regime changes 
than those of developed countries because the difference in illiquidity betas between the 
two regimes (ILLIQ1  
ILLIQ
2) is greater for the EM bond portfolio. We find that a 
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liquidity factor is more important 1) for a country, where the bond market is not fully 
mature and 2) during times of stress related to bad U.S. equity market performance.  
3.5.1.3 Robustness test  
If the international bond markets are segmented from the U.S. equity market, then using 
aggregate bond volatility as the switching function might be more appropriate. The 
results in Section 3.4.4 support that volatility is important for bond pricing. In addition, 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanaym (2000) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) argue that 
volatility within a market causes that market to value liquidity relatively more because 
the changes in market volatility affect systematic liquidity by creating correlated 
patterns among investors and affect the supply of liquidity by market makers. Therefore, 
we test this with a new constraint function, given by p
VOL  VOLt, where VOLt is the 
aggregate bond market volatility and p
VOL
 is a scaling parameter to be estimated. We are 
likely in the Regime 1 (bear market) when the market volatility is greater than an 
estimated threshold level p
VOL
. The test hypothesis remains that liquidity beta is time-
varying and increases in the state of relatively high volatility (or high uncertainty). With 
this constraint function, we can estimate the parameter p
VOL
, which represents the 
maximum volatility level before the transition from the low to high liquidity risk state. 
The two regimes with the new constraints are therefore given by 
, , ,
1 1 1 1 1 1
, , ,
2 2 2 2 2 2
, if 0,
, if 0.
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
i f i ILLIQ i DEF i TERM i i VOL
S t S S t S t S t S t
i f i ILLIQ i DEF i TERM i i VOL
S t S S t S t S t S t
r r ILLIQ DEF TERM p VOL
r r ILLIQ DEF TERM p VOL
    
    
     
     
       
       
 (3.10) 
Table 3-10 reports the results from estimating Equation (3.10). In general, the results 
are consistent with those in Table 3-8, in the sense that liquidity beta is significant and 
higher in  Regime  1  for  the  EM  bond  portfolio.  Liquidity risk  remains significantly 
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Table 3-10: Regime-switching regression (time-series) with changes in bond volatility 
This table shows estimated parameters of the following bivariate regime-switching model: 
 
, , ,
1 1 1 1 1
, , ,
2 2 2 2 2
,  if 0,
, if 0,
t t t t t
t t t t t
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S t S S t S t S t t
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where the r
i
t is the monthly return in U.S. dollar on bond portfolio i at time t, r
f
 is the monthly return for 
holding one-month U.S. Treasury bill, ILLIQ or the innovation in bond market illiquidity as computed in 
Section 3.3.3 serves as a liquidity factor, DEF is the difference between value-weighted monthly return 
on all non-investment grade bonds with at least ten years to maturity and that of all investment grade 
bonds, TERM is the difference between the monthly government bond return on a value-weighted 
portfolio of all bonds with at least ten years to maturity and the monthly one-month U.S. Treasury-bill 
returns, VOLt is the aggregate bond market volatility, p
VOL
 is the switching function parameter, and st = 1, 
2 represents the regimes. We sort portfolio i into 2 groups, GBI and EM. The estimation is done by the 
maximum likelihood method. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level is indicated by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 respectively. 1
i
 and 2
i
  are the standard deviation of residuals 
corresponding to states 1 and 2 respectively. The table also shows the likelihood ratio (LR) test on various 
parameters restrictions. The LR tests give the probability of being greater than the relevant 2 value (or 
the lowest significance level at which a null hypothesis can be rejected). The data start from December 
1985 to February 2009. 
 
  GBI (developed) 
 
EM (emerging) 
  Regime 1 Regime 2 
 
Regime 1 Regime 2 
Constant (α) 1.116 
 
0.838 a        
 
10.332 a -32.476 
 
 
(0.05) 
 
(1.91) 
 
 
(1.92) 
 
-(0.89) 
 
ILLIQ 10.711 
 
-9.313 
 
 
-147.281 a 514.708 
 
 
(0.04) 
 
-(1.56) 
 
 
-(1.89) 
 
(0.89) 
 
DEF 0.569 
 
-0.010 
 
 
0.216 
 
1.407 a 
 
(0.53) 
 
-(0.53) 
 
 
(1.55) 
 
(1.79) 
 
TERM 0.790 
 
0.680 c 
 
0.751 c 1.999 a 
 
(1.55) 
 
(16.60) 
 
 
(4.75) 
 
(1.94) 
 
St 0.311 
 
0.880 c 
 
2.839 c 1.927 c  
 
(0.04) 
 
(12.64) 
 
 
(5.69) 
 
(5.72) 
 
pVOL 4.121b 
 
1.176b 
 
(3.88) 
 
(2.41) 
Number of observations 160 
 
85 
R2  0.807 
 
0.525 
Adjusted R2 0.794 
 
0.468 
     
 
    
LR test: Pr > 2 
    
 
    
α1
 = α 2 0.735 
 
0.009 
1 
ILLIQ = 2
ILLIQ 0.911 
 
0.003 
1
DEF  = 2
DEF 0.222 
 
0.051 
1
TERM = 2
TERM 0.883 
 
0.157 
St=1 = St=2 0.966  0.375 
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different across regimes for the EM bond portfolio, but not for the GBI bond portfolio. 
The  volatility  threshold  level  (p
VOL
)  for  regime  switching  is  4.12%  and  1.18% per 
month (or 14.28% and 4.07% per annum) for the GBI and EM bond portfolios 
respectively.
77
 This implies that the GBI bond portfolio is much more resilient to an 
increase in the market volatility or the shock in market return, i.e., the aggregate market 
volatility has to reach 14.28% per annum to justify the switch from a normal to bad state. 
Meanwhile, it is only 4.07% per annum for EM bonds. This also means that emerging 
bond markets experience a high liquidity risk state more often than their more 
developed counterparts. 
3.5.2 Estimation of conditional liquidity risk premium  
In this section, following the approach of Watanabe and Watanabe (2008), we test 
whether the liquidity risk premium varies across the two liquidity-beta states. From the 
cross-section pricing model in Equation (3.6), 
, , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) .i f DEF DEF i TERM TERM i ILLIQ ILLIQ i it tE r r               
If we allow the liquidity betas to vary discontinuously across two states, we can define a 
conditional liquidity factor as 
,t t tCILLIQ I ILLIQ                                                                                                  (3.11) 
                                                          
77
 The average aggregate market volatility ranges within 5-6% per annum historically.  
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where It is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the estimated probability of 
being in Regime 1 (stress state) is higher than 0.9 in month t.
78
 Month t is in high 
liquidity beta state  if It = 1. The indicator variable is computed as in Section 3.5.1.1 and 
plotted in Figure 3-3. We test the role of the conditional liquidity factor, CILLIQt, by 
once again using the 2-stage Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimation. The 1
st
 stage time-series 
and 2
nd
 stage cross-section estimations are respectively 
, , , ,
, , , ,
,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ,
i f i DEF i TERM i ILLIQ i CILLIQ i i
t t t t t t t t
i f DEF DEF i TERM TERM i ILLIQ ILLIQ i CILLIQ CILLIQ i i
t t t
r r DEF TERM ILLIQ I ILLIQ
E r r
     
         
       
      
     (3.12) 
where CILLIQ,i
 
is the time variation in the liquidity beta or conditional beta. Aggregate 
liquidity beta equals ILLIQ,i + CILLIQ,i
 
in Regime 1 (stress state) and switches to just 
ILLIQ,i
 
in Regime 2 (normal state). The other notations are the same as Equations (3.5) 
and (3.6). In the two-stage estimation, the entire sample is, however, employed in the 
time-series beta estimation because the liquidity beta is time-varying by the indicator 
rather than by the rolling estimation. We set the probability threshold of being in 
Regime 1, which is used to compute the indicator variable, to be either 0.9 or 0.8.
79
 We 
expect to see a significantly negative premium on conditional liquidity risk, CILLIQ,i, if 
the price of liquidity risk is greater during periods of higher risk. 
Table 3-11 reports the results from cross-sectional regressions for country bond 
portfolios.
80
  It  shows  that including the conditional liquidity betas does not change the 
                                                          
78
 This is the probability that Probability (St = 1 | t-1) > 0.90, where t-1 is the all information 
available at time t1.  
79
 The probability threshold of 0.6 or 0.7 also gives similar conclusions. 
80
 We do not include the illiquidity cost in Table 3-11 since it does not change the results. 
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Table 3-11: Country portfolios and Fama-MacBeth regression with conditional 
liquidity factor (cross-section) 
This table reports the time-series averages of coefficients of each beta obtained in a cross-sectional 
regression. A two-step Fama-Macbeth (1973) procedure is employed. First, estimates of the systematic 
risk (betas) are obtained by running a regression of bond’s monthly returns, rit on different risk factors. 
The models are alternative cases of the following equation: 
, , , , ,( ) ,i f i DEF i TERM i MKT i MKT f ILLIQ i CILLIQ it t t t t t t t t tr r DEF DEF TERM r r ILLIQ I ILLIQ                
where i
 
is the intercept, r
f
t 
is the risk-free rate, DEF,i is the default beta of the ith bond, DEFt is the 
difference between value-weighted monthly return on all non-investment grade bonds with at least ten 
years to maturity and that of all investment grade bonds, TERM,i
 
is the term beta, TERMt is the difference 
between the monthly government bond return on a value-weighted portfolio of all bonds with at least ten 
years to maturity and the monthly one-month U.S. Treasury-bill return, MKT,i
   
is the bond market beta, 
rt
MKT 
is the value-weighted bond market monthly return, ILLIQ,i is the liquidity beta, ILLIQt is the 
innovation in the market illiquidity and ItILLIQt is the conditional liquidity factor, where It is one when 
the probability of being in Regime 1 is greater a specific threshold and zero otherwise. The betas are 
estimated using the entire sample. Our sample starts from December 1985 to February 2009.  
In the second stage, expected bond returns adjusted for default loss, E(r
i
t – r
f
t), are regressed on the 
estimated betas from Equation (3.12) in the different cross-sectional models for each month in the sample 
period.  For each month, the cross-sectional regressions are of the following alternatives:  
, , , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) .i f MKT MKT i DEF DEF i TERM TERM i ILLIQ ILLIQ i CILLIQ CILLIQ i it t tE r r                     
t-statistics from Newey West (1987) are reported in the parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level is indicated by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 respectively. 
 
Variable 
Probability of being in  
Regime 1 is greater  0.90 
 
Probability of being in  
Regime 1 is greater  0.80 
11.1 11.2  11.3 11.4 
Intercept () 0.092c 0.161c  0.115c 0.154c 
 
(4.14) (13.92)  (6.57) (13.23) 
DEF beta ( ,ˆDEF i
t ) 0.078
c 
 
 0.051b 
 
 
(2.75) 
 
 (2.19) 
 
TERM beta ( ,ˆTERM i
t ) 0.120
c 
 
 0.077c 
 
 
(3.35) 
 
 (2.82) 
 
Bond market beta ( ,ˆMKT i
t )  
0.011  
 
0.010 
  
(0.96)  
 
(0.90) 
Liquidity beta *100( ,ˆ ILLIQ i
t ) -0.101
c -0.053c  -0.122c -0.097c 
 
-(3.73) -(2.93)  -(4.40) -(4.85) 
Conditional Liquidity beta *100( ,ˆCILLIQ i
t ) -0.001 -0.001  -0.005
b -0.004c 
 
-(1.00) -(1.21)  -(2.55) -(2.75) 
R2 0.282 0.151  0.315 0.216 
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.006  0.157 0.089 
Number of observations 4,588 4,588  4,588 4,588 
results much relatively to those of unconditional models in Table 3-5. When we use the  
probability threshold of 0.9 in models 11.1 and 11.2, the liquidity risk (ILLIQ,i) is still 
significantly priced and the risk premium of the conditional liquidity beta (CILLIQ,i) is 
not significant. The DEF and TERM premia are also positive and significant in model  
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11.1. Again the market betas are always not significant (models 11.2 and 11.4). When 
we reduce the probability threshold to 0.8 in models 11.3 and 11.4, we find that the 
other results are still the same, except that the conditional liquidity risk premium now 
becomes significant for both regressions. This is due to the fact that we have more 
observations in bad times. The results in models 11.3 and 11.4 support our hypothesis 
that the liquidity risk premium is time-varying and increases during times of stress. 
Observing the Argentinian and Chinese bond portfolios once again as extremes in terms 
of liquidity risk countries, we reported earlier in Section 3.4.3 that liquidity risk can 
account for 0.09% out of the 1.00% per annum of unconditional yield difference 
between those two country bond portfolios. Using the result in Table 3-11, model 11.3, 
the unconditional liquidity risk can explain a similar amount of 0.08%, whereas the 
conditional liquidity risk can explain another 0.04% of the unconditional yield 
difference between Argentinian and Chinese bond portfolios.   
To summarize, we find the evidence of 1) time-varying liquidity risk for emerging-
country bonds and 2) a small time-varying liquidity risk premium using a dummy for 
regime.
81
 Our findings are consistent with conditional liquidity risk of Watanabe and 
Watanabe (2008) for the U.S. equity market.
82
 However, the economic significance of 
the conditional liquidity risk premium on bond credit spreads measured here is quite 
stable over time.  
                                                          
81
 The modest economic significance of time-varying liquidity risk premium might be because 
using a dummy for regime is not able to produce sufficient variation in the liquidity beta over 
time. 
82
 Although they find that conditional liquidity risk premium is positive and significant, the risk 
premium for unconditional liquidity risk is negative, which is unexpected, and insignificant. 
Their expected signs are opposite to ours because they measure liquidity, whereas we measure 
illiquidity. 
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3.6 Conclusions 
The paper examines the role of global liquidity risk in the pricing of domestic 
government bonds around the world. We employ both unconditional and conditional 
models to relate liquidity risk to bond returns.  We also investigate differences between 
developed and emerging markets. In the unconditional version, with bond portfolios 
grouped by country of issuance, liquidity risk is significant in all specifications, even in 
the presence of individual bond characteristics and U.S equity risk factors. Investors 
accept lower expected returns for holding a bond that: 1) performs well when the market 
becomes illiquid and 2) has lower transaction costs. Since there is a spillover effect 
from U.S. equity market to domestic bond markets across the world, investors require a 
lower expected return when holding a bond that has more diversification benefit (i.e., a 
bond that performs well when the U.S. stock market declines or becomes more illiquid). 
The combined effects of liquidity risk and liquidity level in the unconditional model can 
explain as much as 41 basis points per annum of extra spread for the highest versus the 
lowest liquidity risk countries, which are China and Argentina respectively. 
The conditional (regime-switching) model indicates that liquidity risk can be 
considerably different across regimes, particularly for government bonds issued by less-
developed economies. The liquidity factor also becomes stronger in the bad state. Less-
developed bond markets experience a state of high liquidity risk state much more often 
than developed ones. Therefore, fund managers, especially who manage emerging-
country bond funds, should consider not only the level of liquidity risk, but also the 
abrupt change in this risk. Even though there is an evidence that periods of high 
liquidity risk coincide with those of high liquidity risk premia, this leads to only 4 basis 
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points per annum of extra spread between Argentinian and Chinese government bonds. 
The price of conditional liquidity risk is relatively modest. 
While our results suggest that global risk factors are important in pricing government 
bonds in both unconditional and conditional frameworks, local risk factors may be one 
of missing factors here since there might be a lack of ability for U.S. dollar investors to 
hold locally-diversified market portfolios at the country level. This conjecture of an 
omitted-factor problem is supported by significant positive constants or pricing errors in 
many specifications (both unconditional and conditional ones). Joint tests on the degree 
of importance of local and world factors on asset pricing could be fruitful. No study has 
yet investigated both local and global liquidity risk in the international bond market.
83
 
In addition, since there is time-variation in liquidity, further investigation of the 
multivariate dynamics of liquidity and its impact on asset pricing could be an important 
direction for future research.  
  
                                                          
83
 For the international stock markets, see Liang and Wei (2006) and Lee (2010). 
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Appendix 3A: Testing for the Liquidity Effect with Individual Bonds 
We repeat the test in Table 3-5, but using individual bonds rather than country bond 
portfolios as test assets. Although the study with an individual bond will add more noise, 
it helps increase the test power and removes potential biases due to the sorting 
procedure. Before grouping the sample bonds into two groups according to their market 
development, it is useful to start with a regression, which uses the whole sample. Table 
3A-1 below reports the Fama-MacBeth regression using all individual government 
bonds in the sample. 
Table 3A-1: Individual bonds and Fama-MacBeth regression 
Variable A1.1 A1.2 A1.3 A1.4 A1.5 A1.6 
Intercept () 0.163c 0.097c 0.117c 0.071b 0.094c 0.165c 
 
(12.58) (8.36) (8.52) (2.40) (3.69) (11.31) 
Bond market beta ( ,ˆMKT i
t ) -0.003 0.093 -0.093  
-0.086 -0.098
c
 
 
-(0.06) (0.94) -(1.44) 
 
-(1.21) -(2.62) 
Liquidity beta *100( ,ˆ ILLIQ i
t ) -0.023
b
 -0.145
c
 -0.063
a
 (0.011) -0.077
b
 -0.026
a
 
 
-(2.20) -(2.97) -(1.72) (0.32) -(2.15) -(1.71) 
DEF beta ( ,ˆ DEF i
t )  
-0.004 -0.046 0.170 0.080 
 
  
-(0.02) -(0.37) (1.49) (0.88) 
 
TERM beta ( ,ˆTERM i
t ) 0.286
b
 0.113
a
 -0.082 0.110
a
 
 
 
 
(2.43) (1.75) (-1.17) (1.72) 
 
Bond volatility beta (
,ˆ BONDVOL i
t ) 
 
    
-0.007
b
 
 
 
    
-(2.10) 
Illiquidity cost ( i
tc )  
0.084
b
 -(0.037) 0.103
c
 0.062
b
 
 
 
 
(2.44) -(0.72) (2.88) (2.04) 
Modified duration 
  
0.006
c
 0.004
c
 
 
 
 
  
(11.43) (5.95) 
 
ln (bond market value) 
  
0.005 -0.001 
 
 
 
  
(0.90) -(0.31) 
 
R
2
 0.255 0.276 0.376 0.274 0.443 0.365 
Adjusted R
2
 0.221 0.245 0.335 0.243 0.410 0.308 
Number of observations 36,677 38,810 31,873 30,035 30,608 29,294 
Note: significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 respectively.  
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The results are very similar to those in Table 3-5, both in terms of the magnitudes and 
signs of estimated parameters. As expected, using individual bonds adds more noise to 
the pricing function. This can be supported by empirical results in Table 3A-1 that the 
risk premium for TERM becomes less significant and the risk premium for the DEF is 
not significant in any regression specification, whereas that for the TERM risk is 
positive and significant except in the model A1.4, where it is negative and insignificant. 
Nonetheless, the liquidity risk premium and coefficient of individual bond illiquidity 
cost remain significant with correct signs (again except in model A1.4).  Models A1.4 
and A1.5 indicate that bond modified duration is highly significant, while the bond 
market capitalization now becomes insignificant. In the model A1.6, the bond volatility 
beta is again priced with correct sign. The increase in the test power can be witnessed 
by the improvement in adjusted R
2
 in this individual bond testing (compared to the 
adjusted R
2  
in Table 3-5).   
Small and less-developed bond markets are arguably more sensitive to liquidity shocks. 
In order to investigate whether the liquidity factor is more important in emerging 
markets, we separate individual bonds in the whole sample into two country groups 
according to the level of bond market development (i.e., JPMorgan Government Bond 
Index (GBI) and JPMorgan Government Bond Index-Emerging Market (EM)) and test 
with the same methodology as in the Section 3.4. GBI countries are Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Czech, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, 
Portugal, Singapore, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, U.K. and U.S. EM countries consist 
of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, Russia, 
Thailand and Turkey. The list of GBI countries is almost identical to that of OECD 
123 
 
   
nations, except for Hong Kong and Singapore in GBI countries. While Turkey, an 
OECD country, is included in EM countries. In effect, grouping bond portfolios by the 
degree of domestic bond market development is virtually equivalent to doing so by 
countries’ per capita income. Table 3A-2 below shows the cross-sectional regression 
results for individual bonds within GBI and EM groups respectively.  
Table 3A-2: Individual bonds and Fama-MacBeth regression by GBI and EM countries 
Variable 
GBI bonds (developed)   EM bonds (emerging) 
A2.1 A2.2 A2.3 A2.4   A2.5 A2.6 A2.7 A2.8 
Intercept () 0.170
c
 0.123
c
 0.129
c
 0.076
b
   0.097 -0.284
b
 0.081 -0.284 
 
(13.26) (5.50) (8.74) (2.56)   (1.59) -(2.26) (1.63) -(0.77) 
Bond market beta ( ,ˆMKT i
t ) -0.040 -0.085
a
 
  
  -0.762 -0.703 
  
 
-(1.31) -(1.79) 
  
  -(0.59) -(0.55) 
  
Liquidity beta *100( ,ˆ ILLIQ i
t ) -(0.016) -(0.03) 0.018 0.014   -0.306
a
 -0.439
a
 -0.742 -0.645 
 
-(1.04) -(1.43) (0.60) (0.40)   -(1.78) -(1.70) -(1.12) -(0.95) 
DEF beta ( ,ˆDEF i
t )   
0.058 0.135   
  
0.944 -0.388 
   
(0.48) (1.16)   
  
(0.55) -(0.18) 
TERM beta ( ,ˆTERM i
t )   
-0.003 -0.085   
  
0.479 0.979 
   
-(0.05) -(1.10)   
  
(1.41) (1.41) 
Illiquidity cost ( itc ) 0.090
c
 0.089
c
 (0.058) (0.068)   -(0.073) (0.02) -(0.085) (0.146) 
 
(4.29) (3.37) (1.01) (1.17)   -(0.95) (0.31) -(1.24) (0.92) 
Modified duration 
 
0.004
c
 
 
0.005
c
   
 
0.005 
 
0.016
a
 
  
(7.5) 
 
(9.95)   
 
(1.14) 
 
(1.80) 
ln (bond market value) 
 
-0.001 
 
0.004   
 
0.109
c
 
 
0.06 
  
-(0.30) 
 
(0.72)   
 
(2.89) 
 
(0.56) 
R
2
 0.296 0.239 0.289 0.307   0.545 0.714 0.627 0.763 
Adjusted R
2
 0.256 0.210 0.255 0.276   0.279 0.478 0.379 0.544 
Number of observations 29,244 27,045 28,362 27,130   2,139 2,139 2,139 2,139 
Note: significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 respectively.  
In Table 3A-2, liquidity risk is not priced in any specifications for GBI bonds, but it is 
priced for EM bonds in some specification. This is not surprising as we will see later in 
Tables 3-8, and 3-9 (in Section 3.5, a time-series regime-switching model) indicating 
that the liquidity risk factor is insignificant in both Regimes 1 and 2 for GBI bonds. 
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However, the illiquidity cost is positive and significant in models A2.1 and A2.2, but 
not significant for EM bonds. It suggests that liquidity level is more relevant than 
liquidity risk for bonds issued by developed economies. And the bond modified 
duration is in most cases positive and significant, whereas the bond market 
capitalization is not. 
The most striking finding in Table 3A-2 is that the liquidity risk becomes relatively 
more important than liquidity level for bonds, which are included in EM (i.e., emerging 
economies). The magnitude of the liquidity risk premium for EM bonds is considerably 
greater than that estimated from the whole bond sample in Table 3A-1. Therefore, the 
economic significance of the liquidity risk premium in explaining the credit spreads is 
substantially higher in the case of domestic bonds issued by emerging markets rather 
than advanced economies. 
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Appendix 3B: Regime-switching by Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) 
Two regimes and constraints are given by 
1 1 1 1 1
1
2 2 2 2 2
1
,  if z 0
and
,  if z 0,
p
t t t t j jt
j
p
t t t t j jt
j
y a b x z
y a b x z
 
 


    
    


                (3B.1) 
where yt and xt are dependent and independent variables, t are the error terms, zit are 
exogenous variables related to the t-th month’s observation, j are unknown coefficients 
to be estimated (along with a1, a2, b1 and b2), and subscripts 1 and 2 represent two 
different regimes (say, bad and good states). zit and j determine whether the t-th 
month’s observation belongs to Regime 1 or Regime 2 in terms of probability.  In other 
words, a constraint function zt serves as a switching function, which is estimated by the 
maximum likelihood method. Introduce a unit indicator function as 
1
1
0 if 0
and
1 if 0.
p
t j jt
j
p
t j jt
j
D z
D z




 
 


                      (3B.2) 
From the practical and statistical points of view, the above unit step function is usually 
replaced by a continuous cumulative normal distribution on zt as follows: 
2
2
1
( ) exp ,
22
tz
td z d


 
 
  
 
                  (3B.3)  
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where  is a new parameter and is estimated simultaneously with j. zt is the upper 
boundary of the normal probability density function.  If  approaches zero, Equation 
(3B.3) becomes Equation (3B.2). The d(zt) forms an n-dimensional diagonal matrix D 
=[d(zt)]. The two regressions in Equation (3B.1) can be combined with probability (I – 
D) and D for the respective regime in vector form as  
1 2( ) ,Y I D XB DXB W                      (3B.4) 
where W=(I  D)U1 + DU2 is the vector of unobservable and heteroscedastic error 
terms. The variance-covariance matrix of W is given by 
2 2 2 2
1 2( ) .I D D                       (3B.5) 
The covariance between 1t and 2t is assumed to be zero for the sake of estimation. The 
maximum likelihood parameters to be estimated are a1, a2, b1, b2, j, 1 and 2 by 
maximizing the following log-likelihood function: 
    11 2 1 2
1
log log 2 log
2 2
1
( ) ( ) .
2
T
L
Y I D XB DXB Y I D XB DXB


   
       
             (3B.6)
 
The hypothesis is that each regime will have its own different regression function. The 
likelihood ratio (LR) method is applied to test such hypothesis. More specifically, the 
null hypothesis is that the regimes do not make any difference among the t = 1,….,T 
portfolio return observations.  
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CHAPTER 4 
LIQUIDITY SPILLOVERS:  
THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM EMERGING BOND MARKETS 
 
Abstract 
We examine whether liquidity spillovers between sovereign bonds are systematic or 
idiosyncratic in character. A theoretical model is developed, which demonstrates that 
idiosyncratic spillovers require returns to be correlated, whereas systematic spillovers 
require volatilities to be correlated. We apply the model to sovereign bonds in 35 
emerging markets, aggregated for some analyses into Asian, European and Latin 
American regions. We find liquidity spillovers mainly from Latin America to the other 
regions and they are both systematic and idiosyncratic in character. Further cross-
sectional analysis (by country) and time-series analysis (by region) show that systematic 
spillovers are more important than idiosyncratic spillovers. The conclusion is that most 
liquidity risk across emerging bond markets is systematic and therefore cannot easily be 
hedged away. This has important implications for portfolio selection by fund managers 
and for the regulation of systemic risk.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Most studies of liquidity have assumed that it is exogenously determined, i.e., without 
having an explicit causal mechanism. In this paper, we address the fundamental 
questions of what lies behind liquidity risk and what drives liquidity spillovers across 
financial markets beyond national boundaries.
84
 In previous two chapters, we find that 
liquidity risk is important and priced in both U.S. dollar-denominated sovereign bonds 
issued by emerging countries and domestic-currency government bonds issued by both 
developed and developing nations. In this paper, we take a step back and investigate 
more closely why there is liquidity risk or liquidity co-movement in the first place. 
The paper addresses both theoretical and empirical questions of what are the 
fundamental determinants of liquidity commonality. Building on Fernando (2003), we 
develop a model for two assets with correlated returns. Liquidity shocks are defined as 
changes in an asset’s value that are not caused by fundamentals. Such shocks can be 
decomposed into two components, systematic and idiosyncratic: systematic shocks are 
common across all investors, whereas idiosyncratic shocks affect individual investors 
differently. Our model suggests that these two components are related to different types 
                                                          
84
 According to Acharya and Pedersen (2005), liquidity risk is defined as liquidity co-movement 
with the market factors and it can be decomposed into three components, 1) commonality in 
individual asset’s liquidity and market-wide liquidity or Cov(ci,cM), 2) return loading on 
aggregate liquidity or Cov(r
i
,c
M
) and 3) co-movement between market return and individual 
asset’s liquidity or Cov(ci,rM), where ri (ci) is the return (illiquidity cost) of security i and rM (cM) 
are the market return (market illiquidity cost). As suggested by the first research paper in 
Chapter 2, all three liquidity risks are highly correlated. In this paper, we therefore focus our 
interest on the first component of the liquidity risk, which is the same liquidity risk as studies in 
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2000) and Huberman and 
Halka (2001). Throughout the paper, the term “liquidity spillovers” is referred to the cross-
autocorrelation of liquidity across markets. We sometimes replace this term with “liquidity 
transmission”, “commonality in liquidity” and “contagion in liquidity. 
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of liquidity contagion and they have different effects on asset prices, trading volumes 
and volatilities.  
A systematic liquidity shock affects all bonds and investors equally and there is 
therefore no incentive for investors to buy or sell any particular bond in response to 
such a shock: relative bond prices do not change. At the same time, any bond 
transactions, which occur, will face larger bid/ask spreads, so all bond volatilities will 
rise. A systematic liquidity shocks is therefore associated with an increase in the second 
moment of log bond prices (volatility), but no change in the first moment of log relative 
bond prices (returns).  
An idiosyncratic liquidity shock is one which, by definition, applies to one bond (or 
group of bonds), but not to any other bonds. The response of investors to such a shock 
would be to try to sell the affected bond, but this is made difficult by the shock, which 
has occurred to the liquidity of that bond. Investors therefore prefer to sell a close-
substitute (correlated-return) bond, i.e., one which has not been directly affected by the 
reduction in liquidity, but which behaves similarly to the bond in question. An 
idiosyncratic liquidity shock is therefore associated with a change in the first moment of 
log bond prices (returns) for a subset of related bonds, but has no general impact on the 
second moment of log bond prices (volatility). It follows that an idiosyncratic shock can 
only induce commonality in liquidity if asset returns are mutually related 
We apply the model to a sample of U.S. dollar sovereign bonds issued by 35 emerging 
countries, which runs daily from December 1993 to January 2010. There have been 
several previous studies on liquidity commonality, which focus on one particular 
country, in most cases, the U.S. stock market. Fortunately with this set of data, we are 
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able to investigate liquidity spillovers for a large number of countries without the need 
to concern on exchange rate movements. The empirical analysis is divided into two 
parts. In the first, a vector autoregression (VAR) is used to track liquidity, return and 
volatility spillovers and in the second, “commonality” measure is estimated for liquidity, 
returns and volatility for each country and region, which is then used as a dependent 
variable in a further regression to explain whether systematic or idiosyncratic liquidity 
spillovers are more important. 
In the first part, using the VAR approach, we find that there is a consistent pattern of 
spillovers in liquidity, returns and volatility from Asia to Europe and from Latin 
America to both Asia and Europe. Both systematic and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks 
are found to be relevant in explaining liquidity transmission across regions.  
In the second part, both cross-section and time-series analyses find that commonality in 
liquidity is more closely associated with commonality in volatility than with 
commonality in returns. It follows that systematic shocks are more statistically and 
economically significant than idiosyncratic shocks in explaining liquidity transmission, 
both across countries (at one time) and across regions (over time). We also find that 
commonality in liquidity varies considerably over time and increases sharply during 
periods of global financial crisis.   
The implication is that most liquidity risk across emerging-market bonds is systematic 
and cannot easily be diversified away. This is an important finding for fund managers 
and regulators of financial markets because it implies that the benefits of emerging 
market portfolio diversification, which are based on low return correlations, can be 
swiftly cancelled out by an abrupt reduction of market liquidity (as occurred, for 
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example, in the Asian crisis of 1997 and during the U.S. subprime crisis of 2007). 
Markets, which have little return correlation, may still have high liquidity commonality. 
Regulators need to be aware that liquidity risk in the home market is not only generated 
from domestic fundamentals, but also from a global liquidity factor. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the related literature. The model 
of liquidity transmission is developed in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 gives data descriptions 
and their summary statistics. The empirical studies of liquidity spillovers and the 
relative importance of idiosyncratic and systematic shocks to liquidity are examined in 
Sections 4.5 and 4.6. Section 4.7 provides the conclusions of the paper. 
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4.2 Related Literature 
The literature can conveniently be divided into theoretical and empirical parts, which 
will be discussed in the following two sub-sections. 
4.2.1 Theoretical studies 
To understand liquidity spillovers, one needs to use at least a two-asset model. However, 
most of the theoretical works to date have focused on the liquidity of a single asset and 
have not examined the liquidity transmission across assets. Many models, which relate 
liquidity to information asymmetry, include Kyle (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), 
Bhushan (1991), Chowdhry and Nanda (1991), Foster and Viswanathan (1996) and 
Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002). In general, they argue that the interplay of 
informed and uninformed traders influences the security’s liquidity level. Another 
strand of the literature links liquidity to the inventory risk faced by market makers, who 
are forced to hold less-than-perfectly diversified portfolios (for example, Stoll (1978), 
Amihud and Mendelson (1980) and Grossman and Miller (1988)).  
There are rather few works in a multi-asset framework. Cabelle and Krishnan (1994) 
show that a security’s market price is not solely determined by its own order flow, but 
also by that of other securities because of correlated fundamentals. Baruch, Korolyi and 
Lemmon (2007) develop a model of multimarket trading and predict that the 
distribution of trading volume across exchanges is related to the correlation of cross-
listed asset returns with returns of other assets traded in the respective market since high 
correlations enable market-makers to learn more by observing other stocks. 
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Our model makes a clear distinction between (i) liquidity spillovers caused by shocks, 
which are common (systematic) to every investor and (ii) spillovers caused by shocks, 
which are idiosyncratic. Some previous works also make this distinction. With respect 
to systematic shocks, Watanabe (2008) develops a model, where new information 
causes an increase in return volatility. When market makers observe an increase in the 
volatility of returns on liquid assets, they mark-up the trading costs of illiquid assets 
even more to allow for these assets’ higher expected future volatility. Therefore, in this 
approach, liquidity spillovers co-move with volatility spillovers, but do not necessarily 
go together with spillovers of returns. With respect to idiosyncratic shocks, it is 
somewhat counterintuitive that they can lead to liquidity spillovers. This may happen if 
investors respond to a shock on an asset by shifting their trading to another asset with 
correlated returns (Fernando (2003)). Huberman and Halka (2001) make a similar 
argument based on shocks caused by noise traders.  
4.2.2 Empirical studies 
Empirical works, which study the dynamics of liquidity, include Chordia, Shivakumar 
and Subrahmanyam (2004), Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005a), Chordia, 
Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005b), Lee (2006) and Goyenko and Ukhov (2009). 
Chordia et al. (2004), Chordia et al. (2005a) and Lee (2006) study liquidity dynamics 
across large and small U.S. stocks, using a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework. 
Chordia et al. (2005b) demonstrate that there are interactions among returns, volatilities 
and the quoted spreads for size-decile portfolios. In general, they find that innovations 
in stock and bond market liquidity are correlated and liquidity of small firms helps 
predict the future level of liquidity of large firms and vice versa. Goyenko and Ukhov 
(2009) show there is a lead-lag in liquidity between bond and stock markets and 
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monetary policy shocks are reflected in bond illiquidity first. However, most empirical 
evidence is from U.S. financial markets and may have only limited reference to global 
financial markets. There is little evidence of commonality in liquidity on non-U.S. 
equity market; the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong by Brockman and Chung (2002) and 
the Australian Stock Exchange by Fabre and Frino (2004). Heretofore, the only two 
empirical works explore commonality in liquidity, returns and trading volume around 
the world. The first one is by Karolyi, Lee and Dijk (2009), who study commonality in 
liquidity, returns and trading volumes across 40 stock markets. They observe much 
greater commonality among emerging markets than among developed stock markets 
and more of that commonality is related to demand-side factors rather than to supply-
side factors. The second one is by Brockman, Chung and Perignon (2009), who 
examine commonality in liquidity using data from 47 stock exchanges in 38 countries. 
They find that commonality in liquidity spills over the national border and individual 
firms are subject to both local (industry-level, exchange-level and region-level) and 
global (aggregate) sources of commonality. However, both studies do not explain how 
the three commonalities liquidity, returns and volatility  are related to one another. 
This paper fills a gap in understanding the channels through which liquidity 
commonality in region of the world affect liquidity changes in another. 
Another feature of previous studies on liquidity spillovers is a focus on stocks rather 
than bonds. The exception is the paper by Goyenko, Subrahmanyam and Ukhov (2008), 
which finds that liquidity shocks are transferred from the short end to long end of the 
term structure. This transmission can be related to information because short-term (more 
liquid and informationally-efficient) bonds absorb macroeconomic shocks first and then 
the shocks move into illiquidity of long-term bonds. Fontaine and Garcia (2009) find 
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that bond liquidity co-varies with changes in aggregate uncertainty as measured by the 
volatility implied by S&P500 options and with changes in monetary policy as measured 
by bank reserves and monetary aggregates. Our empirical results are consistent with 
both of these previous studies, which show that liquidity spillovers can be caused by 
either idiosyncratic or systematic shocks.   
To summarize, the theoretical literature mainly focuses on liquidity formation for a 
single asset. The few studies that have studied liquidity transmission across assets relate 
liquidity spillovers either (i) to idiosyncratic shocks (Cabelle and Krishna (1994), 
Fernando (2003) and Baruch et al. (2007)) or (ii) to systematic shocks (Watanabe 
(2008)). Our model in the next section incorporates both types of liquidity spillover. 
With respect to the empirical literature, in general it finds commonality in returns, 
liquidity and volatility especially in the U.S. financial markets. However, most studies 
do not investigate a basic question of what drives spillovers. Our paper is the first to 
investigate liquidity spillovers across international sovereign bond markets and to 
examine the extent to which systematic and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks cause these 
spillovers. In order to do so, the next section develops a model that relates return and 
volatility spillovers to idiosyncratic and systematic liquidity shocks.   
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4.3 The Model: Transmission of Returns, Trading and Liquidity  
Do spillovers arise mainly because of idiosyncratic shocks or systematic shocks, or 
both? To motivate the discussion, consider the following two stylized examples, first of 
an idiosyncratic shock to liquidity and then of a systematic shock to liquidity.   
In the first stylized example, the context is very approximately that which existed early 
in the year 2010. Let there be two cash-rich investor nations, say Germany and China, 
buying assets abroad.  Investors in each of these two countries hold one unit of Greek 
sovereign bonds and one unit of Portuguese sovereign bonds, with all bonds being 
denominated in U.S. dollar. A liquidity shock to the Greek economy now starts to hit 
Greek bonds. Investors in Germany and China would like to sell Greek bonds, but 
illiquidity is a problem. As a result, they also sell Portuguese bonds, which are seen to 
be close substitutes as Greece and Portugal are considered to have similar economic 
fundamentals. The result is that an idiosyncratic liquidity shock to Greek bonds causes a 
drop in their prices and in their ex post returns, which is also transmitted to the prices 
and returns of Portuguese bonds. So the example suggests that idiosyncratic liquidity 
shocks may spill over from one country’s bonds to another country’s bonds if the two 
issuing countries (i.e., Greece and Portugal) have similar macroeconomic fundamentals 
and therefore have correlated bond returns. 
In addition, soon the shock has an impact on the Euro/U.S.$ exchange rate, which falls, 
and this increases the dollar value of Greek and Portuguese bonds from a German 
investor’s (Euro) perspective, but not from a Chinese investor’s (Renminbi) perspective. 
The idiosyncratic liquidity shock to Greek bonds therefore has a larger negative 
spillover impact on returns experienced by Chinese investors than on it does on returns 
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experienced by German investors. It also means that the impact may be felt differently 
across investors (Germany and China) due to exchange-rate movements. 
In the second stylized example, the context is the U.S. subprime crisis, which starts in 
2007. This is a worldwide systematic shock to liquidity and affects all bonds equally. So 
it increases the bid/ask spreads and volatilities of both Greek and Portuguese bonds. But 
there is no incentive for any trading by German or Chinese investors because of the 
generality of the impact. The systematic shock to liquidity raises bond volatilities 
worldwide, but does not have any differential impact across investors or induce any new 
trading. So the example suggests that systematic liquidity shocks may not necessarily be 
associated with correlated bond returns, but are always associated with correlated bond 
volatilities. A “blow up”, such as the subprime crisis, affects the liquidity of both Greek 
and Portuguese bonds, but an effort by investors to avoid it by buying or selling these 
two countries’ bonds would be completely ineffective and they would therefore not try 
to do so.
85
  
We now develop a model, which shows more precisely how idiosyncratic liquidity 
shock may be associated with correlated returns and how systematic shocks may be 
associated with correlated volatilities. Our empirical results in Sections 4.5 and 4.6 do 
not entirely depend on this model because some of the model restrictions may be 
violated, but the model allows a clearer interpretation and intuition of those results. 
4.3.1 Model setup 
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 This is a stylized world with two issuers and two investors. In reality investors exhibited 
flight to quality by purchasing U.S. Treasury bonds in this period. This is somewhat ironic as 
the sub-prime shock is originated in the U.S.  
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Our model extends the framework of Fernando (2003) to two risky assets with returns 
that may be correlated.
 86
 Consider an exchange economy with a group of M risk-averse 
investors. There are three dates, t = 0, 1, and 2. At time t = 0 each investor is endowed 
with one unit of each asset: two risky bonds with superscripts A and B and one riskless 
asset. At time t = 1, trading happens. At time t = 2, both risky bonds mature and pay a 
random quantity of the numeraire riskless asset, ( )
AE v and ( )
BE v  > 1. These bonds’ 
expected returns are common knowledge (i.e., there is no asymmetric information) and 
are normally distributed with means, Av and ,
Bv  variances, 2,A
v and
2, ,Bv  and 
correlation, ,A B
v . The risk-free rate is assumed to be zero. Investors maximize a 
negative exponential utility function of their terminal wealth at time t = 2, u(w2) = 
exp(aw2),  where a > 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. 
All investors are identical except that they experience heterogeneous liquidity shocks. 
The idea is that investors with lower exposure to liquidity shocks will provide liquidity 
to those with higher exposure via trading , therefore, enjoy a higher risk-adjusted return. 
In our setting, the liquidity shock faced by an investor i, ,i  is unknown at t = 0 and 
realized at time t = 1 with the distribution being known ex ante at time t = 0. The 
liquidity shock can arise due to a broad range of events that affect the investor’s 
valuation of the risky asset without new information about the fundamental value. 
Following Karpoff (1986), Michaely and Villa (1995), Michaely, Vila and Wang (1996), 
and Fernando (2003), the shock is assumed to be additive to investor i’s valuation of 
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 Fernando (2003)’s model focuses on liquidity transmission across investors, but ours 
emphasizes on how liquidity transmits across securities. 
139 
 
   
payoff v  on the risky bond.
87
 Therefore, the shock changes each investor’s valuation of 
the asset without affecting the asset’s fundamental return.  
The liquidity shock can be decomposed into two random additive components, one 
being systematic and the other being idiosyncratic. The systematic shock is defined as a 
shock that hits all investors equally, whereas the residual shock after removing the 
systematic shock is denoted as the idiosyncratic shock. Then the shocks to bonds A and 
B as seen by investor i can be written as  
,
,
A A
i i
B B
i i
  
  
 
 
                                        (4.1) 
where  is the systematic component (which is perfectly correlated across all bonds and 
investors, so bears no subscript i and no superscript A or B), and A
i  and 
B
i  are the 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks to bonds A and B faced by investor i. All ,  
A
i  and 
B
i are 
assumed to be i.i.d. and normally distributed with common means of zero, but different 
variances of 2 2,, A   and 
2,B
  respectively. These shocks affect investors’ valuation of 
the two risky assets and induce trading to rebalance their portfolios as soon as a shock is 
realized at time t = 1.  
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 In general, liquidity shocks can be a result of changes in preferences (or uncertainty about 
preference) and changes in endowments. For a tractability reason, we restrict the definition of 
liquidity shocks in this paper to any changes in investors’ valuation that does not have any 
impact on the asset’s fundamentals. 
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Trading occurs in a simple batch market with all trades clearing at a single price at time 
t = 1. For simplicity, we assume there are no transaction costs in trading.
88
 Investor i  
rebalances her portfolio in order to maximize the following utility function: 
2,
2, 1, 1, 1 1, 1
1, 0, 1 0 1 0
max [ ( )],   M,
( ) ( ),
( ) ( ),
i
A A A A B B B B
i i i i i i
A A B B
i i
E u w i
w w x v p x v p
w w p p p p
 

      
    
                            (4.2) 
where wt,i is the wealth of investor i at the end of time t, 1,
A
ix and 1,
B
ix  is the amount of 
bonds A and B held by investor i at the end of time t = 1, 
tp is the bond price at time t. 
Other variables were already mentioned before.  
4.3.2 Equilibrium prices and optimal holdings  
We can solve for prices of the two bonds ( A
tp and
B
tp ) and holdings by investor i ( ,
A
i tx
and ,
B
i tx ) at times t = 0 and 1 using a recursive method. At time t = 1 the clearing prices 
and equilibrium holdings of bonds A and B by investor i, p1 and x1,i, are given by
89
 
2, ,
1
2, ,
1
, 2, 2, ,
1, 2, 2, ,
,
1,
ˆ ˆ ( ),
ˆ ˆ ( ),
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) (1 )
,
(1 )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
A A A A A B A B
M v v v v
B B B B A B A B
M v v v v
A
A A B B A B A A Bv
i M M i v v vB
vA
i A A B
v v
B
B B A A A B v
i M M i v A
vB
i
p v a
p v a
a
x
a
x
     
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
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
 

    

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    
 
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
 
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 
2, 2, ,
2, 2, ,
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,
(1 )
B A B
v v
B A B
v v
a
a
 
 
 

         (4.3) 
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 The main results are not changed and the testing applications are still the same even if we 
introduce transaction costs. 
89
 See Appendix 4A for a proof of this section. 
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where ˆ
 
and ˆi  denote the realizations of   and  .i
, ,
1
ˆ ˆ  = 
MA B A B
M ii
M 
 are the market-
average realization of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks with respect to bonds A or B across 
the investor base M.  
When the number of investors approaches infinity (M  ), the bond price at time t = 1 
reflects the expected bond return,  ,v  the realized systematic (undiversified) component, 
ˆ,  the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, a, the return volatility, 
2
v, and the return 
correlation, v
A,B
. In this case ˆA
M and ˆ
B
M  0 and the realized idiosyncratic shock is not 
priced.  Intuitively, only common risk, ˆ , which cannot be diversified away by trading, 
is important when the investor base is large enough. Hence, only that is priced. The 
stronger the positive correlation in returns, the lower is the price of both bonds since the 
investor is more unable to diversify. Trading is a result of the risk-sharing of 
heterogeneous investors, who have different exposures to realizations of idiosyncratic 
shocks at time t = 1. The valuation of bonds by investors will differ from market prices 
due to investors’ heterogeneous exposures to the shocks. Investors, who experience a 
positive (relatively to the market) shock, will value a security more than those, who are 
hit by a negative one. Therefore, the shifting of a liquidity shock via trading is 
beneficial to both agents. Low (high) exposure investors receive a higher (lower) risk-
adjusted return. This difference in trading demand as a result of a different exposure to 
shocks is only transmitted from one asset to another if the two assets’ returns are 
correlated.  
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At time t = 0, the equilibrium prices are given by
90
 
2,
2, , 2
0
2,
2, , 2
0
( ),
( ).
A
A A A A B A B
v v v v
B
B B B A B A B
v v v v
p v a
M
p v a
M





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
    
    
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                      (4.4) 
Similarly, the price at time t = 0 incorporates the liquidity discount (
2,
2( )
A
a
M



  ), 
reflecting the possible liquidity shocks in the future at time t = 1. Again, as M  , 
only systematic liquidity risk is relevant in determining prices.  
4.3.3 Trading volume and volatility 
The quantity traded by investor i in bonds A and B at time t = 1 is given by  
,
1, 2, 2, ,
,
1, 2, 2, ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
,
(1 )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
,
(1 )
A
A A B B A B v
i M M i v B
A v
i A A B
v v
B
B B A A A B v
i M M i v A
B v
i B A B
v v
x
a
x
a

    

 

    

 
  
 

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 

                                                   (4.5) 
where x1,i  = x1,i  1. From Equation (4.5), the trading volume of bond A depends on 
realizations of (i) bond A’s own idiosyncratic shock and (ii) the idiosyncratic shock of 
bond B given that A and B returns are correlated. If we have a trading cost when 
investors rebalance their portfolios at time t = 1, everything is still the same except that  
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 Even though trading is allowed at time t = 0. The optimum holdings of bonds are still the 
same as investors’ initial endowment (See Appendix A). Therefore no trading occurs at time t = 
0.  
143 
 
   
bond A’s transaction cost affects trading volume of both bonds A and B.91 Note that 
investors trade only if they are different in some way. In our model, trading occurs only 
if liquidity shocks have different impacts across investors via the idiosyncratic liquidity 
shock.
92
 Therefore, idiosyncratic shocks that have different effects across securities, but 
are common across investors do not generate investors’ trading. However, assets’ prices 
will be adjusted accordingly.  
The expectation at time t = 0 of trading volume for each investor at time t = 1 is given 
by 
 
 
2, 2, 2,
2, ,
0 1, 2, 2, , 2,
2, 2, 2,
2, ,
0 1, 2, 2, , 2,
( 1) ( 1)1 2
| | ,
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( 1) ( 1)1 2
| | .
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A B A
A A B v
t i vA A B B
v v v
B A B
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a M M
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   


   
     
    
   
     
    
              (4.6) 
As can be seen from Equation (4.6), the expected trading volume of bond A increases 
with 1) the idiosyncratic liquidity risk of bond A, 2,A
 , and 2) the idiosyncratic liquidity 
risk of bond B, 2,B
 , given that bond A and B returns are correlated, i.e.,  
,A B
v   0. 
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 If the transaction cost is a function of cx21, where c is per unit transaction cost and we 
assume that c
A
  0 and cB = 0 (i.e., there is no transaction cost in trading bond B),  the trading 
volume of bonds A and B by investor i at time t = 1 is given by 
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92
 As an example, the across-investor idiosyncratic liquidity shocks affect individual agent’s 
asset valuation differently because of different tax treatment of dividends (or bond coupons) and 
capital gains for each investor. See Michaely and Vila (1995) for more detail.  
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The price volatility at time t = 1 can be directly derived from Equation (4.3) as follows:  
1
1
2,
2, 2
2,
2, 2
,
.
A
A
p
B
B
p
M
M





 

 
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                                           (4.7) 
The price volatility is a result of both systematic and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, but 
the importance of idiosyncratic shocks diminishes once the market has a large number 
of investors. As in the no-trade equilibrium of Milgrom and Stokey (1982), the 
systematic liquidity shock exacerbates price volatility because the price will adjust to 
reflect the shock, but investors are unable to mutualize their liquidity shocks by trading 
at time t = 1. Therefore the secondary market collapses. Fleming and Remolona (1999) 
also show empirically that price responses to public information do not require trading.  
4.3.4 Model implications: liquidity spillovers 
Our model implies that systematic and idiosyncratic liquidity shocks deliver different 
results in terms of return and volatility commonalities.  
By definition, a systematic shock is perfectly correlated across assets, so that 
commonality of this liquidity shock arises by default. As a result, we should observe 
that commonality in liquidity coincides with that in volatility, but not necessarily with 
that in returns (unless investors do not have the same exposures to systematic liquidity 
risk). Figure 4-1 summarizes the mechanism by which volatility spills over if there is 
systematic liquidity risk. For example, a market-wide crisis, such as the U.S. subprime 
crisis of 2007, simultaneously increases the volatility of all emerging-market bonds 
even though their fundamentals are not closely related. 
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Figure 4-1: Systematic liquidity shock and co-movement in liquidity and volatility  
  
 
 
 
 
 
By contrast, if we experience an idiosyncratic shock across investors (for example, an 
illiquidity shock in bond A, which hits investor i, but not investor j), there will be no 
subsequent effect on prices of bonds A and B and commonality in volatility will not be 
observed. However, there will be a liquidity spillover upon the arrival of the 
idiosyncratic liquidity shock due to concentration of trading volume in bond B, given 
that returns on A and B are correlated or it is difficult to trade bond A due to a friction in 
the market.
93
 Figure 4-2 summarizes this mechanism. The higher is the correlation in 
returns, the greater is the trading concentration and, hence, the larger is the liquidity 
spillover. For instance, an idiosyncratic liquidity shock specific to one nation, such as 
the Greek crisis of 2010, induces the trading of Greek bonds as well as that of substitute 
bonds issued by other countries (as in our stylized example, Portugal). In our model, 
idiosyncratic liquidity spillovers are caused by trading among substitute bonds, whose 
prior returns are correlated with Greek bonds. 
                                                          
93
 In this model, what transmits across assets is the trading volume and it is, however, unclear 
which aspect of liquidity is transferred following transition of trading volume. 
Security A Price volatility  
by 2
  
No effect on 
trading volume 
Systematic 
liquidity risk  
2(  is positive)  
Security B 
Price volatility  
by 2
  
No effect on 
trading volume 
Volatility spillover Liquidity commonality Liquidity spill ver 
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Figure 4-2: Idiosyncratic liquidity shock and co-movement in liquidity and return  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3 plots the expected trading volume of bond B at time t = 0 of investor i, 
 0 1,| |Bt iE x  , as computed in Equation (4.6) against the idiosyncratic liquidity risk of 
bond A, 2,A , and the return correlation of bonds A and B, 
,A B
v . The expected trading 
volume of bond B monotonically increases with the idiosyncratic risk of bond A. The 
return correlation of bonds A and B is the key determinant of trading volume because it 
allows investors to offset the illiquidity shock in one security by trading in another. This 
view is also supported by Caballe and Krishman (1994) and Huberman and Halka 
(2001). The former argues that whether or not liquidity shocks in the market are 
correlated, a spillover in volume occurs only when fundamentals are correlated. The 
latter provides empirical evidence that the availability of a substitute asset causes a 
liquidity spillover, which leads to commonality of liquidity. 
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Figure 4-3: Return correlation, idiosyncratic liquidity risk of bond A and expected 
trading volume spilled over to bond B 
This figures plots the expected trading volume of bond B at time t = 0 of investor i,  0 1,| |Bt iE x   as 
computed in Equation (4.6) against the idiosyncratic liquidity risk of bond A, 2,A , and the return 
correlation of bonds A and B, ,A B
v .  Other parameters in Equation (4.6) are set as follows: a = 3,  
2,B
  = 
5%,  2,A
v  = 5% and
2,B
v = 5%. 
 
 
In summary, our model predicts that commonality in liquidity should coincide with that 
in volatility if the liquidity shocks are caused by a systematic factor. On the contrary, 
spillovers in liquidity caused by an idiosyncratic shock should be associated with 
spillovers in returns. Before turning to empirical tests of the model, the next section 
describes the data used and their key features. 
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4.4 Data and Summary Statistics  
The data are obtained from J.P. Morgan. Our main test assets are bonds in the Emerging 
Market Bond Index (EMBI).
94
 The EMBI bonds are 1) denominated in U.S. dollar with 
outstanding face-value of 500 million U.S. dollar or more, 2) issued by sovereign or 
quasi-sovereign entities of eligible emerging countries, 3) at least 2.5 years away from 
maturity at the inclusion (a bond is removed from the EMBI when its maturity is less 
than 12 months), 4) accessible to international investors, 5) issued with legal 
jurisdiction that is domestic to a G7 country and 6) able to settle internationally. Since 
all bonds are issued in U.S. dollar, we do not have to be concerned with currency 
movements. The following 35 countries in three regions, Asia, Europe and Latin 
America,  are included in this study.
95
 
Asia Europe Latin America 
1. China (CN) 
2. Indonesia (ID) 
3. Korea (KR) 
4. Kazakhstan (KZ) 
5. Lebanon (LB) 
6. Sri Lanka (LK) 
7. Malaysia (MY) 
8. Philippines (PH) 
9. Pakistan (PK) 
10. Thailand (TH) 
11. Vietnam (VN) 
 
1. Bulgaria (BG) 
2. Serbia (CS) 
3. Greece (GR) 
4. Croatia (HR) 
5. Hungary (HU) 
6. Poland (PL) 
7. Russia (RU) 
8. Turkey (TR) 
9. Ukraine (UA) 
1. Argentina (AR) 
2. Brazil (BR) 
3. Belize (BZ) 
4. Chile (CL) 
5. Columbia (CO) 
6. Dominican  (DO) 
7. Ecuador (EC) 
8. Jamaica (JM) 
9. Mexico (MX) 
10. Panama (PA) 
11. Peru (PE) 
12. El Salvador (SV) 
13. Trinidad Tobago (TT) 
14. Uruguay (UY) 
15. Venezuela (VE) 
                                                          
94
 EMBI is arguably the most comprehensive U.S. dollar emerging market debt benchmark. It 
includes Brady bonds, Eurobonds and traded loans issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign 
entities.  
95
 In fact, EMBI also includes the countries from Africa. However, their market share is very 
small (less than 3% of the total EMBI market capitalization). For the sake of parsimony, we 
therefore exclude them from our regression analyses. We will, however, provide their simple 
statistics for cross-region comparisons. 
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The sample period runs from 31 December 1993 to 15 February 2010.
96
 The data (on 
bid and ask prices, bond returns, and market capitalizations) are collected on a daily 
basis. In our main specification, we group the bonds into their countries and regions of 
issuance. The market value of EMBI is 342 billion U.S. dollar at the end of 2009 with 
215 bond issues. Latin American countries have the largest proportion (46%) of the 
total market capitalization. European and Asian countries account for 28% and 24% 
respectively. The majority of the bonds (55%) are of investment grade. More than 90% 
are above BB. The average maturity is 11.98 years. Figure 4-4 shows the composition 
of the EMBI market capitalization by region, credit rating, and maturity.  
4.4.1 Bond returns and volatility 
The daily total return for a bond between period t1 and t is calculated as 
1 1
1,
j j j
j t t t
t j j
t t
P AI Coupon
R
P AI 
  
  
   
                                  (4.8) 
where R
j
t is total return of bond j at month t incorporating principal and interest, P
j
t is 
closing clean price for the bond j at month t, AI
j
t is accrued interest, which is the coupon 
payment scaled by the ratio of days since the last payment date to the days between last 
payment and next payment and Coupon
j
t is the coupon payment, if any, of bond j at 
month t. We calculate the bond portfolios’ returns using market value weighting to 
ensure the portfolio investability.
 
 
                                                          
96
 This is when the data on EMBI were first available.   
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Figure 4-4: EMBI composition by region, credit rating and maturity at the end of 2009 
        
EMBI composition by region EMBI composition by credit rating 
 
 
 
EMBI composition by maturity 
 
From bond return series, we compute a bond’s daily volatility using an exponentially-
weighted moving average (EWMA) method, where the higher weight is given to the 
more recent observations: 
1 2
1
(1 ) ( ) ,
T
j t j j
t
t
VOL R R  

                                                  (4.9) 
where the smoothing or decay parameter, ,  is set to be 0.94 with a rolling window of 
75 days.  
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4.4.2 Illiquidity measures 
With the EMBI data set, we can construct the illiquidity measure for each bond in each 
country by its quoted bid/ask spread.
97
 At each day t during the study period, the quoted 
bid/ask spread, C
j
t, is collected for each individual bond j, where C
j
t is the ratio of the 
quoted bid/ask spread to the bid/ask midpoint: 
,
j j
j t t
t j
t
Ask Bid
C
Mid

                                          (4.10) 
where Midt
j
 = (Askt
j
 + Bidt
j
)/2, Askt
j
 and Bidt
j
 are mid, ask and bid quoted prices of bond 
j at day t. Similarly, we use market-weighted to calculate the illiquidity at the portfolio 
level.  
Table 4-1 provides summary statistics of the return, volatility, and illiquidity cost as 
measured by the percentage bid/ask spread for all bonds in the EMBI and for regional 
portfolios. The market-wide bid/ask spread and volatility are high during periods of 
liquidity crises in emerging countries such as the Mexican Peso devaluation (December 
1994), the Asian crisis (mid 1997), the Russian Ruble devaluation (August 1998), the 
LTCM crisis (September 1998), the Brazilian Real devaluation (January 1999), the 
Turkish Lira devaluation (March 2001), Argentina’s debt moratorium (December 2001), 
and the U.S. subprime crisis (2008-2009). However, there is no clear pattern for return 
series across regions.  
                                                          
97
 For international bond markets, the trading volume data are usually unavailable. Hence, we 
cannot compute the volume-based measure of illiquidity such as trading volume, turnover ratio, 
Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity (ILLIQ) and Checko (2006)’s latent liquidity measure. 
However, many studies, for example, D’Souza, Gaa and Young (2003) and Fleming (2003) find 
that the bid/ask spread is one of the most suitable liquidity measures as it is highly correlated 
with other measures.   
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Table 4-1: Summary statistics of the return, volatility and illiquidity measures at the 
portfolio level 
This table provides the year-by-year summary statistics on all U.S. dollar sovereign bonds in the EMBI. 
The daily sample runs from January 1994 to December 2009. The means of daily bid/ask spreads, returns 
and volatility are reported. The number in the parentheses is standard deviation. The market weighting 
method is employed. Bonds are sorted into the region of issuance, which is Africa, Asia, Europe and 
Latin America. 
 
All issues 199495 199697 199899 200001 200203 200405 200607 200809 19942009 
Bid/ask 
spread 
0.75 0.41 0.98 0.79 0.79 0.62 0.50 1.12 0.75 
(0.25) (0.19) (0.47) (0.15) (0.12) (0.10) (0.07) (0.60) (0.40) 
Return 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 
  (1.27) (0.75) (1.11) (0.63) (0.47) (0.39) (0.24) (0.65) (0.78) 
Volatility  1.61 0.97 1.41 0.91 0.68 0.57 0.35 0.72 0.89 
  (0.91) (0.59) (1.00) (0.32) (0.29) (0.20) (0.12) (0.67) (0.80) 
Bid/ask spread (by region) 
      
  
Africa 1.69 0.86 2.49 2.53 1.93 1.29 0.94 1.87 1.70 
 
(0.78) (0.50) (1.38) (0.49) (0.43) (0.25) (0.17) (1.30) (1.05) 
Asia 0.88 0.55 1.36 0.57 0.44 0.53 0.45 1.35 0.77 
  (0.35) (0.33) (0.62) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (1.01) (0.66) 
Europe 0.66 0.40 1.52 0.82 0.50 0.48 0.39 1.27 0.77 
 
(0.33) (0.22) (0.82) (0.17) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.91) (0.65) 
Latin 
America 
  
0.71 0.37 0.74 0.71 0.88 0.62 0.50 0.87 0.68 
(0.25) (0.17) (0.37) (0.20) (0.18) (0.11) (0.07) (0.26) (0.29) 
Return (by region) 
       
  
Africa 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 
 
(1.46) (0.78) (1.15) (0.69) (0.42) (0.22) (0.14) (0.45) (0.80) 
Asia 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
  (0.57) (0.32) (0.52) (0.24) (0.29) (0.28) (0.20) (0.77) (0.47) 
Europe 0.03 0.11 -0.05 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05 
 
(1.72) (1.08) (1.69) (0.80) (0.48) (0.42) (0.21) (0.80) (1.06) 
Latin 
America 
0.02 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04 
(1.36) (0.80) (1.27) (0.79) (0.69) (0.48) (0.31) (0.72) (0.89) 
Volatility (by region) 
       
  
Africa 2.03 1.08 1.44 0.99 0.60 0.32 0.21 0.54 0.87 
 
(0.88) (0.46) (0.99) (0.41) (0.27) (0.13) (0.05) (0.45) (0.82) 
Asia 0.63 0.42 0.70 0.36 0.44 0.43 0.30 0.81 0.51 
  (0.32) (0.19) (0.43) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.82) (0.48) 
Europe 2.16 1.36 2.31 1.22 0.70 0.61 0.31 0.86 1.16 
 
(1.04) (0.84) (1.26) (0.31) (0.28) (0.23) (0.10) (0.86) (1.08) 
Latin 
America 
1.76 1.05 1.56 1.12 0.98 0.70 0.45 0.85 1.04 
(0.97) (0.63) (1.18) (0.45) (0.43) (0.24) (0.18) (0.66) (0.88) 
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 4.4.3 Innovations in illiquidity, returns and volatility 
As the illiquidity cost measured by bid/ask spread in Section 4.4.2 is highly persistent 
and we are interested in the transmission of liquidity shocks, we need to calculate 
liquidity shocks, which satisfy the stationarity condition in a time-series analysis. For 
example, the bid/ask spread for the market-wide portfolio has a high daily 
autocorrelation of 0.96.
98
 We compute the innovations in illiquidity (termed “liquidity 
shock” for the rest of the paper), returns and volatility using autoregressive processes 
with four lags, AR(4).
99
 The remaining autocorrelations of these innovations are very 
low, for example, they are respectively 0.010, 0.000, 0.002 for innovations in liquidity, 
return, and volatility for the market-wide portfolio. Figure 4-5 shows the time series of 
the market-wide (EMBI) illiquidity cost, measured by percentage quoted bid/ask spread, 
and innovations in that series based on the AR(4) process. Both series are very volatile 
during global liquidity crises as mentioned earlier.  
For an initial demonstration that there exist commonalities in liquidity, returns and 
volatility, Figure 4-6 plots the average-across-region 100-day rolling window 
correlations of innovations in liquidity, returns and volatility for each region (Africa, 
Asia, Europe and Latin America) with those of each other region.  Not only do these 
average correlations seem to move together closely, but they are also time-varying with 
abrupt changes during 19941995 (Mexican Peso crisis), 19971998 (Asian and LTCM 
crisis), and 20082009 (U.S. subprime crisis).  
                                                          
98
 Autocorrelation of market-wide return and volatility series are 0.17 and 0.98 respectively.  
99
 Admittedly, choice of the number of lags for an AR process is arbitrary. The more lags in AR 
do not show much further improvement both in terms of an R
2
 and a degree of autocorrelation. 
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Figure 4-5: Time-series of daily market-wide illiquidity cost (bid/ask spread) and its 
innovations 
This figure depicts time series of illiquidity cost and its innovation for the global or market-wide portfolio. 
The illiquidity cost is the percentage quoted bid/ask spread as computed by (quoted ask pricet  quoted 
bid pricet)/ mid pricet. The innovation is computed using an AR(4) specification. The market portfolio is 
formed using the value weighting method.  
 
The next two sections present the empirical analyses. Section 4.5 employs a vector 
autoregression (VAR) model to identify the patterns of liquidity, return and volatility 
transmissions. Section 4.6 estimates commonality measures for liquidity, returns and 
volatility. These results are then used in a further regression to investigate whether 
return or volatility commonality is more associated with the liquidity commonality in 
both cross-section (across countries) and times-series (across regions).    
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Figure 4-6: Time-series of correlations in liquidity, return and volatility across regions  
This figure plots the average-across-region correlations of innovation variables in one region (Africa, 
Asia, Europe and Latin American) and those of other regions (the aggregate market). Interested variables 
are innovation in illiquidity cost (percentage bid/ask spread), returns and volatility. The innovation is 
calculated using the autoregressive process with four lags. Time-series correlations for each region are 
computed using 100-day rolling windows.   
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4.5 Spillovers in Liquidity, Returns and Volatility: Empirical Tests and Results 
From the model in Section 4.3, it is not difficult to visualize liquidity transmission in the 
case of two assets with different illiquidity costs. Once a group of investors is hit by an 
idiosyncratic liquidity shock in one asset, given that two assets are substitutes, there will 
be more demand by investors for trading in both securities in order to minimize the 
adverse impact of this shock on their terminal wealth. Particularly if securities have 
transaction cost, investors have to sell liquid securities before they sell illiquid securities 
to minimize the trading cost. This generates lead and lag patterns from more liquid to 
less liquid securities.  The higher the degree of substitution, the stronger are liquidity 
spillovers among securities. This view can be called the “Idiosyncratic Liquidity 
Hypothesis (ILH)”. 
If the market experiences a systematic shock, we should observe instantaneous 
movement of liquidity and volatility in both assets, provided that information is 
effectively processed by market participants. However, if we assume as in Watanabe 
(2008) that some securities provide stronger information than other securities, investors 
will update information obtained by observing past signals from the more information-
rich securities. To the extent that signals from liquid securities are more informationally 
meaningful, i.e., they have a higher quality signal, and even though the shock is 
common across securities, we should observe the impact of a liquidity shock in more 
liquid securities before less liquid ones.
100
 Regardless of the existence of return 
correlation, this produces liquidity and volatility spillovers among securities with a time 
lag. We call this the “Systematic Liquidity Hypothesis (SLH)”.       
                                                          
100
 One of the reasons of more meaningful signals from liquid securities is that investors are 
more active in monitoring higher trading-volume and more liquid securities. 
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We develop a set of testing hypotheses as follows:  
4.5.1 Liquidity lead/lag hypothesis  
First of all, as an initial and necessary step, we test whether changes in liquidity spill 
over from one market to another. Note that at this stage we do not consider whether 
shocks are idiosyncratic or systematic. We test for spillovers by employing the 
following vector autoregression (VAR) model relating innovations in liquidity to lagged 
value across regions: 
1, 1 1, 1,
1
2, 2 2, 2,
1
3, 3 3, 3,
1
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where 
31 2
1, 2, 3,
, , , ,
,
,
t j t j t j t j
cc cC
k j k j k j k j
C c c c
  
   
   
    
   
where c1,t, c2,t and c3,t are the innovations in liquidity (or liquidity shocks as computed in 
Section 4.4.3) at time t of portfolios of bonds issued by Asia, Euro and Latin America 
countries, respectively. This grouping (i) enables us to investigate whether there is any 
transmission of liquidity shock across regions and (ii) is for parsimony of econometric 
models. Their corresponding capital letter (Ct-j) represents row vectors of lag values 
(lag-j subscripts).  is 3x1 ( is a scalar) parameter vectors of  coefficients. Scalar  is 
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intercepts. t is error terms. J is the maximum number of lags in the VAR system. We 
set J equal to four lags for our daily data.
101
  
Table 4-2 shows the Equation (4.11) VAR estimation results using the whole sample 
period. The estimated coefficient of lagged ck,t-j for cik,t equations are in most cases 
positive, indicating that there are liquidity spillovers across regions. We observe a 
significant lead/lag relation in liquidity shocks from the Asian bond portfolio to Europe 
(c1,t-j  c2,t) and from Latin America to Asia and Europe (c3,t-j  c1,t  and c3,t-j  c2,t), 
but not the other way around. The spillover effects from Latin America are most 
powerful in terms of the magnitudes of estimated coefficients and t-statistics. Not 
surprisingly, the coefficients estimated of lagged ck,t-j for its own ck,t are mostly negative 
and significant since liquidity shocks (innovations in liquidity) follow a mean-reverting 
process.
102
  
This evidence of liquidity spillovers is consistent with our liquidity lead/lag hypothesis. 
In addition, the spillover originates from the Latin America sovereign bond market, 
which is the largest in terms of market capitalization (see Figure 4-4) and has the lowest 
average bid/ask spread (see Table 4-1) among the three regions.  
To ensure that the results are robust over time, we divide the whole sample into four 
sub-periods, 19941997, 19982001, 20022005 and 20062010 (January) and apply 
the same VAR model as in Equation (4.11). Table 4-3 confirms that there are similar 
                                                          
101
 We realize that the lead/lag patterns in variables of interest can result from the time-zone 
difference. Therefore, J needs to be greater than one in order to address this concern. In addition, 
our observations are based on U.S. working days (i.e., excluding Saturday, Sunday, and U.S. 
holiday) and therefore the Monday observations incorporate the effects accumulating during the 
weekend. Information criteria (AIC and SIC) also suggest a lag length up to four. 
102
 By contrast, as mentioned before, the liquidity level is persistent. 
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patterns in liquidity transmission across regions in every sub-period. Liquidity shocks in 
Latin America’s sovereign bonds spill over to emerging Asian and European bond 
markets. Up to four (daily) lags of the estimated coefficient of lagged c3,t-j for c1,t and 
lagged c3,t-j for c2,t are significant and positive. Interestingly, during the recent sub-
period, 20062010 the magnitudes of estimated lagged ck,t-j on cki,t are larger and 
remain mostly positive. This suggests that there have been liquidity spillovers all over 
the world especially during the recent subprime crisis.     
Table 4-2: Spillovers in liquidity across regions 
This table shows the VAR estimation results on liquidity shocks (interactions). Bonds are sorted into 
three portfolios based on their region of issuance. Subscript 1 stands for Asia, 2 for Europe and 3 for 
Latin America. The daily liquidity shocks, ci, are computed using an AR(4) process of percentage bid/ask 
spread and they are market-value weighted.  is the intercept. The VAR system of Equation (4.11) is 
estimated with J = 4 days for a whole sample period, 31 December 1994 to 31 January 2010. The column 
variables are dependent variables. t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level is indicated by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 respectively 
 
 
c1,t-1 c1,t-2 c1,t-3 c1,t-4 
c1,t -0.026 -(1.555) -0.008 -(0.467) 0.014 (0.878) 0.038
b (2.341) 
c2,t 0.115
c (4.393) 0.174c (6.682) 0.029 (1.104) 0.098c (3.813) 
c3,t 0.014 (0.942) 0.040
c (2.671) 0.000 (0.001) 0.057c (3.872) 
 
c2,t-1 c2,t-2 c2,t-3 c2,t-4 
c1,t 0.000 -(0.017) 0.045
c (4.246) 0.005 (0.491) -0.012 -(1.227) 
c2,t -0.131
c -(7.895) -0.111c -(6.663) -0.081c -(4.879) -0.129c -(8.006) 
c3,t 0.019
b (1.969) 0.016 (1.633) -0.014 -(1.513) 0.012 (1.341) 
 
c3,t-1 c3,t-2 c3,t-3 c3,t-4 
c1,t 0.183
c (9.894) 0.085c (4.441) 0.046 c (2.386) -0.006 -(0.324) 
c2,t 0.401
c (13.669) 0.273c (8.969) 0.028 (0.917) 0.016 (0.538) 
c3,t -0.030
a -(1.772) -0.044b -(2.541) -0.055c -(3.107) -0.126c -(7.206) 
 
 
      
c1,t 0.000 -(0.002)       
c2,t 0.000 -(0.003)       
c3,t 0.000 -(0.001)       
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Table 4-3: Spillovers in liquidity across regions in sub-periods 
This table shows the VAR estimation results. Bonds are sorted into three portfolios based on their region of issuance. Subscript 1 stands for Asia, 2 for Europe and 3 for 
Latin America. The daily liquidity shocks, ci, are computed using an AR(4) process of percentage bid/ask spread and they are market-value weighted. The VAR system of 
Equation (4.11) is estimated with J = 4 days for four sub-periods, 1994-1997, 1998-2001, 2002-2005 and 2006-2010 (January). The column variables are dependent 
variables. t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 respectively. To save spaces, the intercept is not reported here.   
 
 
 1994-1997  1998-2001 
 c1,t-1 c1,t-2 c1,t-3 c1,t-4  c1,t-1 c1,t-2 c1,t-3 c1,t-4 
c1,t -0.185
c -(5.260) -0.080b -(2.259) -0.021 -(0.587) 0.020 (0.582)  -0.056a -(1.723) -0.048 -(1.491) 0.073b (2.333) 0.023 (0.734) 
c2,t -0.089
a -(1.920) 0.112b (2.397) 0.065 (1.389) 0.019 (0.414)  0.328c (4.157) 0.312c (3.945) -0.037 -(0.488) 0.207c (2.708) 
c3,t -0.051
a -(1.656) 0.070b (2.282) 0.002 (0.071) -0.008 -(0.262)  0.077c (1.996) 0.026 (0.670) 0.014 (0.371) 0.144c (3.862) 
 c2,t-1 c2,t-2 c2,t-3 c2,t-4  c2,t-1 c2,t-2 c2,t-3 c2,t-4 
c1,t -0.057
b -(2.032) -0.025 -(0.899) -0.082c -(2.959) 0.045a (1.648)  -0.023a -(1.791) 0.041c (3.080) 0.027b (2.052) -0.029b -(2.260) 
c2,t -0.104
c -(2.807) -0.194c -(5.239) -0.145c -(3.982) -0.081b -(2.288)  -0.197c -(6.152) -0.108c -(3.332) -0.092c -(2.836) -0.178c -(5.687) 
c3,t 0.034 (1.409) -0.031 -(1.277) -0.087
c -(3.604) 0.027 (1.133)  0.012 (0.793) 0.036b (2.280) 0.021 (1.319) 0.016 (1.029) 
 c3,t-1 c3,t-2 c3,t-3 c3,t-4  c3,t-1 c3,t-2 c3,t-3 c3,t-4 
c1,t 0.372
c (8.564) 0.282c (6.009) 0.161c (3.280) 0.007 (0.153)  0.086c (3.137) 0.013 (0.472) 0.022 (0.784) 0.021 (0.764) 
c2,t 0.486
c (8.506) 0.435c (7.023) 0.192c (2.981) -0.071 -(1.144)  0.389c (5.830) 0.243c (3.560) -0.050 -(0.723) 0.085 (1.243) 
c3,t -0.028 -(0.733) 0.039 (0.963) -0.042 -(0.976) -0.167
c -(4.061)  -0.074b -(2.282) -0.102c -(3.061) -0.087c -(2.586) -0.105c -(3.127) 
                  
 2002-2005  2006-2010 (January) 
 c1,t-1 c1,t-2 c1,t-3 c1,t-4  c1,t-1 c1,t-2 c1,t-3 c1,t-4 
c1,t -0.231
c -(7.218) -0.160c -(4.880) -0.128c -(3.961) -0.069b -(2.169)  0.107c (3.282) 0.030 (0.924) -0.075b -(2.333) 0.058a (1.841) 
c2,t -0.049 -(0.847) -0.001 -(0.023) -0.162
c -(2.771) -0.058 -(1.021)  0.090c (3.509) 0.025 (0.962) 0.003 (0.107) 0.088c (3.519) 
c3,t -0.016 -(0.306) -0.008 -(0.140) -0.043 -(0.794) -0.026 -(0.484)  0.024 (1.455) 0.003 (0.160) 0.018 (1.118) 0.066
c (4.162) 
 c2,t-1 c2,t-2 c2,t-3 c2,t-4  c2,t-1 c2,t-2 c2,t-3 c2,t-4 
c1,t 0.056
c (3.140) 0.040b (2.238) 0.009 (0.510) 0.036b (2.007)  0.186c (4.446) 0.174c (4.102) 0.030 (0.732) -0.067a -(1.670) 
c2,t -0.126
c -(3.899) -0.160c -(4.894) 0.022 (0.685) -0.055a -(1.694)  0.150c (4.562) 0.012 (0.373) -0.045 -(1.379) -0.081 c -(2.579) 
c3,t 0.044 (1.477) 0.033 (1.103) -0.018 -(0.596) 0.010 (0.346)  0.036
a (1.720) 0.016 (0.780) -0.050b -(2.429) 0.003 (0.147) 
 c3,t-1 c3,t-2 c3,t-3 c3,t-4  c3,t-1 c3,t-2 c3,t-3 c3,t-4 
c1,t 0.035
a (1.808) 0.046b (2.384) -0.005 -(0.286) -0.014 -(0.750)  0.265c (3.986) 0.160b (2.358) 0.141b (2.008) -0.097 -(1.400) 
c2,t 0.147
c (4.224) 0.102c (2.915) -0.039 -(1.122) 0.003 (0.100)  0.313c (5.960) 0.456c (8.485) 0.134b (2.412) 0.093a (1.698) 
c3,t 0.054
a (1.693) -0.087c -(2.695) 0.030 (0.939) -0.139c -(4.344)  -0.029 -(0.877) 0.057 (1.667) 0.051 (1.442) -0.038 -(1.106) 
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4.5.2 Liquidity and return spillover hypothesis 
Next, we examine whether liquidity commonality is associated with return commonality. 
According to the Idiosyncratic Liquidity Hypothesis (ILH), if idiosyncratic liquidity 
shocks are important, we should find that the lead and lag patterns in returns and those 
in liquidity shocks are similar. For the test, we extend the VAR model of Equation 
(4.11) to include innovations in return, ri, in testing the lead/lag relationship between 
liquidity and returns. The modified VAR can be rewritten as 
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where r1,t , r2,t and r3,t are the innovations in returns as computed in Section 4.4.3 at time 
t of portfolios of Asian, European and Latin American bonds respectively. The capital 
letter R represents row vectors of lag values (lag-j subscripts).  is a 3x1 (scalar) 
parameter for vectors of  coefficients. Scalar  is intercepts. t is error terms. The other 
notations are the same as in Equation (4.11). 
The results in Table 4-4 are consistent with those of Table 4-2 in terms of liquidity 
transmission within regions. Liquidity spills over from bonds issued in Latin America to 
those issued in developing Asian and European countries strongly and significantly. In 
most of the significant cases, the lagged liquidity shock, ct-j, is positively associated 
with the contemporaneous return, rt. This means that investors demand higher returns if 
a bond has higher contemporaneous liquidity shocks. Consistent with previous studies, 
for example, by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam 
(1996), we find that liquidity has a positive effect on required returns. Interestingly, 
these effects are also transmitted across regions. In addition, when experiencing a 
positive return shock, the liquidity is expected to improve in the next period (negative 
coefficients of lagged rt-j for ct).  
The same pattern of lead/lag occurs in returns as in liquidity shocks, in the sense that we 
observe a strong positive lead/lag in returns from the Asian bond portfolio to Europe 
(r1,t-j  r2,t) and from Latin America to Asia and Europe (r3,t-j  r1,t  and r3,t-j  r2,t), 
but not the other way around. The story here is in line with the Idiosyncratic Liquidity 
Hypothesis, where a return correlation is necessary for liquidity spillovers to be caused 
by idiosyncratic liquidity shock.  
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Table 4-4: Spillovers in liquidity and returns across regions 
This table shows the VAR estimation results. Bonds are sorted into three portfolios based on their region 
of issuance. Subscript 1 stands for Asia, 2 for Europe and 3 for Latin America. The daily liquidity shocks, 
ci, are computed using an AR(4) process of percentage bid/ask spread and they are market-value weighted. 
The return shocks, ri, are also estimated using an AR(4) process. The VAR system of Equation (4.12) is 
estimated with J = 4 days for a whole sample period, 31 December 1994 to 31 January 2010. The column 
variables are dependent variables. t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level is indicated by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 respectively. To save spaces, the intercept is not reported here.   
 
 
c1,t-1 c1,t-2 c1,t-3 c1,t-4 
c1,t -0.089
c -(5.154) -0.046c -(2.649) -0.023 -(1.330) 0.022 (1.277) 
c2,t 0.068
b (2.470) 0.111c (4.025) 0.008 (0.302) 0.090c (3.327) 
c3,t -0.015 -(0.938) 0.034
b (2.166) 0.001 (0.051) 0.036b (2.381) 
r1,t 0.059 (0.779) 0.050 (0.673) 0.241
c (3.241) -0.095 -(1.297) 
r2,t 0.311
a (1.803) 0.268 (1.563) -0.214 -(1.257) -0.470c -(2.792) 
r3,t 0.625
c (4.121) 0.018 (0.116) -0.109 -(0.727) -0.127 -(0.859) 
 
c2,t-1 c2,t-2 c2,t-3 c2,t-4 
c1,t -0.028
c -(2.649) 0.031c (2.906) -0.006 -(0.578) -0.022b -(2.146) 
c2,t -0.162
c -(9.649) -0.149c -(8.830) -0.096c -(5.754) -0.140c -(8.605) 
c3,t -0.003 -(0.295) 0.005 (0.501) -0.021
b -(2.203) 0.009 (1.029) 
r1,t 0.102
b (2.220) -0.141c -(3.055) 0.018 (0.406) 0.050 (1.141) 
r2,t 0.258
b (2.459) 0.081 (0.765) 0.173a (1.661) -0.408c -(4.029) 
r3,t 0.198
b (2.150) 0.025 (0.274) 0.303c (3.327) -0.265c -(2.988) 
 
c3,t-1 c3,t-2 c3,t-3 c3,t-4 
c1,t 0.109
c (5.162) 0.014 (0.623) 0.013 (0.589) -0.035a -(1.651) 
c2,t 0.260
c (7.674) 0.165c (4.748) -0.069b -(1.984) -0.020 -(0.574) 
c3,t -0.167
c -(8.716) -0.123c -(6.265) -0.107c -(5.398) -0.164c -(8.490) 
r1,t -0.061 -(0.665) 0.092 (0.970) 0.262
c (2.767) -0.018 -(0.196) 
r2,t -0.060 -(0.283) -0.085 -(0.394) 0.576
c (2.652) 0.143 (0.675) 
r3,t -0.018 -(0.095) 0.490
c (2.576) 0.933c (4.891) -0.119 -(0.638) 
 
r1,t-1 r1,t-2 r1,t-3 r1,t-4 
c1,t -0.021
c -(4.725) -0.011b -(2.359) -0.026c -(5.617) -0.009b -(1.968) 
c2,t 0.012 (1.612) -0.022
c -(2.987) 0.002 (0.235) 0.001 (0.122) 
c3,t 0.003 (0.760) 0.003 (0.719) 0.007
a (1.679) -0.008a -(1.898) 
r1,t -0.055
c -(2.758) 0.017 (0.865) 0.029 (1.453) -0.001 -(0.072) 
r2,t 0.154
c (3.397) 0.136c (2.990) 0.124c (2.723) 0.143c (3.199) 
r3,t 0.072
a (1.805) 0.089b (2.218) 0.052 (1.309) 0.117c (2.996) 
 
r2,t-1 r2,t-2 r2,t-3 r2,t-4 
c1,t -0.006
b -(2.468) -0.001 -(0.376) -0.006c -(2.787) -0.009c -(3.844) 
c2,t -0.005 -(1.529) -0.020
c -(5.474) -0.014c -(3.780) -0.015c -(4.243) 
c3,t 0.001 (0.275) -0.002 -(1.147) -0.005
c -(2.598) -0.001 -(0.278) 
r1,t -0.050
c -(5.103) -0.007 -(0.711) 0.036c (3.615) 0.000 (0.010) 
r2,t -0.156
c -(6.985) 0.020 (0.887) 0.037 (1.632) -0.055b -(2.465) 
r3,t -0.080
c -(4.073) -0.002 -(0.125) 0.077c (3.863) -0.015 -(0.780) 
 
r3,t-1 r3,t-2 r3,t-3 r3,t-4 
c1,t -0.004 -(1.410) -0.012
c -(3.951) 0.001 (0.306) -0.001 -(0.434) 
c2,t -0.021
c -(4.707) -0.003 -(0.606) -0.010b -(2.222) -0.001 -(0.218) 
c3,t -0.026
c -(10.229) -0.014c -(5.394) -0.008c -(2.941) -0.011c -(4.336) 
r1,t 0.152
c (12.537) 0.026b (2.057) -0.031b -(2.449) -0.001 -(0.118) 
r2,t 0.250
c (8.967) -0.022 -(0.745) -0.054a -(1.848) 0.011 (0.380) 
r3,t 0.062
b (2.537) 0.034 (1.335) 0.004 (0.159) -0.025 -(1.009) 
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4.5.3 Liquidity and volatility spillover hypothesis 
We now examine whether the Systematic Liquidity Hypothesis (SLH) may also hold, 
under which contemporaneous liquidity and volatility of informationally-efficient assets 
(large bonds) should determine the future liquidity and volatility of informationally-
passive assets (small bonds) rather than their returns. If SLH is relevant in explaining 
liquidity spillovers, then we should observe consistent patterns of spillovers in liquidity 
and volatility. To test this hypothesis, we include the innovations in volatility, voli, in 
the VAR system of Equation (4.11) resulting in the following system: 
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where vol1,t , vol2,t and vol3,t are the innovations in volatility as computed in Section 
4.4.3 at time t of portfolios of Asian, European and Latin American bonds respectively. 
The capital letter VOL represents row vectors of lag values (lag-j subscripts).  a is a 
3x1 (scalar) parameter for vectors of  coefficients. Scalar  is intercepts. t is error terms. 
The other notations are the same as in Equation (4.11). 
Again, in Table 4-5 we find consistent and significant patterns in liquidity transmission 
across regions in the same way as those found in Tables 4-2 and 4-4. Liquidity shocks 
are transmitted 1) from bonds in Latin America to those in Asia and Europe and 2) from 
bonds in Asia to those in Europe. The lead/lag patterns in volatility across regions are 
the same as for those in liquidity. These observed liquidity and volatility commonalities 
are in agreement with the Systematic Liquidity Hypothesis (SLH).
103
 More specifically, 
if liquidity of a bond issued in one region is affected more by the liquidity of a bond 
issued in another region, then the pattern of volatility movement will be the same as that 
of liquidity. 
Another significant relation is that positive lagged volatility innovations are followed by 
higher liquidity shocks. Intuitively, an increase in volatility poses higher risks, which 
need to be compensated directly through a higher bid/ask spread to compensate a dealer 
for holding less than fully diversified portfolios. As expected, this effect is more 
pronounced within regions rather than across regions. 
 
                                                          
103
 For a robustness test, we also include all innovations in illiquidity cost, returns and volatility 
in the VAR system at the same time and the results are essentially the same as reported before. 
Therefore, to save spaces, we do not report the results here.  
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Table 4-5: Spillovers in liquidity and volatility across regions 
This table shows the VAR estimation results. Bonds are sorted into three portfolios based on their region 
of issuance. Subscript 1 stands for Asia, 2 for Europe and 3 for Latin America. The daily liquidity shocks, 
ci, are computed using an AR(4) process of percentage bid/ask spread and they are market-value weighted. 
The volatility shocks, voli, are also estimated using an AR(4) process. The VAR system of Equation 
(4.13) is estimated with J = 4 days for a whole sample period, 31 December 1994 to 31 January 2010. 
The column variables are dependent variables. t-statistics are in the parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level is indicated by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 respectively.  To save spaces, the intercept is not reported here.   
 
 
c1,t-1 c1,t-2 c1,t-3 c1,t-4 
c1,t -0.053
c -(3.200) -0.030a -(1.806) 0.001 (0.038) 0.036b (2.176) 
c2,t 0.085
c (3.225) 0.139c (5.276) 0.019 (0.742) 0.090c (3.481) 
c3,t -0.005 -(0.349) 0.020 (1.292) -0.001 -(0.079) 0.047
c (3.143) 
vol1,t -0.013 -(1.023) 0.014 (1.054) 0.019 (1.426) 0.083
c (6.474) 
vol2,t -0.048
a -(1.705) 0.033 (1.173) -0.052a -(1.883) 0.197c (7.220) 
vol3,t 0.001 (0.024) 0.026 (1.124) 0.003 (0.139) 0.158
c (7.067) 
 
c2,t-1 c2,t-2 c2,t-3 c2,t-4 
c1,t -0.006 -(0.587) 0.042
c (3.939) 0.003 (0.277) -0.019a -(1.890) 
c2,t -0.150
c -(8.921) -0.132c -(7.788) -0.083c -(4.966) -0.144c -(8.853) 
c3,t 0.018
a (1.913) 0.017a (1.758) -0.013 -(1.333) 0.004 (0.425) 
vol1,t -0.015
a -(1.736) 0.009 (1.096) 0.007 (0.852) -0.007 -(0.908) 
vol2,t -0.010 -(0.561) 0.007 (0.372) 0.009 (0.514) -0.015 -(0.858) 
vol3,t -0.040
c -(2.751) 0.016 (1.121) -0.024 -(1.631) -0.032b -(2.259) 
 
c3,t-1 c3,t-2 c3,t-3 c3,t-4 
c1,t 0.151
c (7.540) 0.051b (2.460) 0.036a (1.738) 0.003 (0.154) 
c2,t 0.309
c (9.703) 0.160c (4.878) -0.042 -(1.271) -0.033 -(1.010) 
c3,t -0.094
c -(5.140) -0.094c -(4.980) -0.071c -(3.775) -0.150c -(8.091) 
vol1,t 0.053
c (3.322) 0.051c (3.112) 0.001 (0.041) -0.004 -(0.271) 
vol2,t 0.120
c (3.553) 0.111c (3.201) 0.031 (0.891) 0.000 (0.009) 
vol3,t 0.187
c (6.787) 0.172c (6.047) 0.075c (2.642) 0.046 (1.625) 
 
vol1,t-1 vol1,t-2 vol1,t-3 vol1,t-4 
c1,t 0.101
c (4.269) 0.109c (4.578) 0.123 (5.138) 0.050b (2.080) 
c2,t -0.002 -(0.042) 0.148
c (3.902) 0.036 (0.949) 0.054 (1.433) 
c3,t -0.002 -(0.116) 0.079
c (3.640) 0.011 (0.526) 0.074c (3.372) 
vol1,t -0.045
b -(2.437) -0.019 -(0.990) -0.016 -(0.850) 0.048b (2.539) 
vol2,t 0.203
c (5.127) -0.023 -(0.571) 0.009 (0.220) 0.196c (4.874) 
vol3,t -0.052 -(1.600) -0.082
b -(2.489) -0.077 -(2.342) 0.121c (3.664) 
 
vol2,t-1 vol2,t-2 vol2,t-3 vol2,t-4 
c1,t -0.019 -(1.557) -0.008 -(0.641) 0.001 (0.073) 0.019 (1.530) 
c2,t 0.034
a (1.740) 0.064c (3.291) -0.007 -(0.359) 0.035a (1.800) 
c3,t -0.015 -(1.371) -0.026
b -(2.368) -0.011 -(0.953) 0.015 (1.319) 
vol1,t -0.001 -(0.107) -0.021
b -(2.222) -0.013 -(1.339) -0.003 -(0.288) 
vol2,t -0.082
c -(4.007) -0.036a -(1.771) -0.022 -(1.050) -0.026 -(1.280) 
vol3,t 0.005 (0.287) 0.044
c (2.647) 0.008 (0.467) -0.009 -(0.537) 
 
vol3,t-1 vol3,t-2 vol3,t-3 vol3,t-4 
c1,t 0.026
a (1.644) 0.040c (2.546) -0.021 -(1.318) -0.059c -(3.817) 
c2,t 0.096
c (3.906) 0.080c (3.209) 0.071c (2.850) -0.007 -(0.286) 
c3,t 0.108
c (7.652) 0.068c (4.770) -0.001 -(0.090) -0.005 -(0.344) 
vol1,t 0.047
c (3.852) 0.017 (1.341) 0.018 (1.453) 0.011 (0.913) 
vol2,t 0.045
a (1.739) 0.021 (0.779) 0.009 (0.350) 0.012 (0.476) 
vol3,t -0.045
c -(2.119) -0.072c -(3.347) -0.020 -(0.952) -0.033 -(1.555) 
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To summarize this section, we find that there exist liquidity commonalities across 
regions and patterns of liquidity transmission are consistent with those of both returns 
and volatility. Our empirical evidence supports both ILH and SLH, i.e., the 
synchronized pattern of liquidity dynamics is caused by both systematic and 
idiosyncratic shocks to liquidity. Indeed, explanations of liquidity spillovers by these 
two hypotheses are not necessarily competing, but they are complementary. In the next 
section, we will look more closely at the significance of the causal relation between 
commonality in liquidity versus that in returns and volatility in order to examine the 
relative degree of importance of the ILH and SLH for liquidity spillovers.  
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4.6 Importance of Idiosyncratic versus Systematic Shocks  
From previous section’s results, we know that liquidity spillovers coincide with both 
bond return commonalities and bond volatility commonalities. However, we do not 
know which is more important. To find out, we need to develop precise commonality 
measures for liquidity, returns, and volatility. Following Roll (1988), Morck, Yeung and 
Yu (2000) and Karolyi, Lee and Dijk (2009), we use the R
2
 of a regression of individual 
bond portfolios on the overall market as a measure of the degree to which liquidity, 
returns and volatility of bond portfolios move together, i.e., we use the R
2
 as our 
measure of commonality in liquidity, returns and volatility. In constructing our 
commonality measures, we would like to separate-out the effects of liquidity, returns 
and volatility on one another. Therefore, we first run a filtering regression on our daily 
data for each country bond portfolio as follows: 
5
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , ,
5
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , ,
,
,
,
i c i r i vol i c M r M vol M D i
t i c t i c t i c t i c t i c t i c t i c n t c
n
i c i r i vol i c M r M vol M D i
t i r t i r t i r t i r t i r t i r t i r n t r
n
i
t i v
C C R VOL C R VOL D
R C R VOL C R VOL D
VOL
       
       

     
     
       
       



5
1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , , ,
c i r i vol i c M r M vol M D i
ol t i vol t i vol t i vol t i vol t i vol t i vol n t vol
n
C R VOL C R VOL D                 
     (4.14) 
where Ct
i  
(Rt
i
 and VOLt
i
)
 
is the daily bid/ask spread (return and volatility) of country i at 
date t as computed in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, superscript M stands for the aggregate 
emerging bond market and Dn denotes day-of-the-week dummy. In constructing the 
commonality measures, we use the residuals (it) from the filtering regression of 
Equation (4.14) because of two reasons: 1) we control for any possible mechanistic 
relation between the underlying market liquidity, returns and volatility and 2) we 
include lagged variables to address the persistent nature in liquidity and volatility. These 
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estimated residuals also reflect shocks or unexpected fluctuation in liquidity, returns and 
volatility. We are interested in the degree of association of these individual residuals 
with their market movements. Therefore, we derive the monthly commonality measures 
in liquidity (R
2
c), in returns (R
2
r) and in volatility (R
2
vol) by taking the R
2
s from the 
following regression of residuals from Equation (4.14) on the aggregate residuals using 
daily data within a given month: 
1
, , , ,
1
1
, , , ,
1
1
, , , ,
1
ˆ ˆ ,
ˆ ˆ ,
ˆ ˆ ,
i i i M i
t c c J c t J c t c
J
i i i M i
t r r J r t J r t r
J
i i i M i
t vol vol J vol t J vol t vol
J
a b
a b
a b
  
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
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
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  
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  



                 (4.15) 
where M denotes the aggregate residual from Equation (4.14) with the market-value 
weighting of the residuals for all country bond portfolios excluding country i.  
Following Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) and Karolyi, Lee and Dijk (2009), 
the contemporaneous aggregate market residuals plus their one lead and one lag are 
included as regressors in Equation (4.15). The lead and lag help alleviate any spurious 
dependence in computing the commonality measures. R
2
s are computed for every 
month, which has at least 10 days of observations. The commonality measures, or R
2
s, 
always have values ranging from [0,1] and therefore should suffer less scaling effects.   
4.6.1 Summary statistics: commonality measures  
First of all, Table 4-6 provides summary statistics of market capitalization, yield to 
maturity, maturity, bid/ask spread, return and volatility for every country bond  
 
 
170 
 
   
Table 4-6: Summary of country/region bond portfolios’ statistics at the end of 2009 
 
Country/region 
Market cap 
Yield to 
maturity (%) 
Maturity 
(year) 
2009’s Avg. 
daily bid/ask 
spread (%) 
2009’s 
Avg. daily 
return (%) 
2009’s Avg. 
daily 
volatility 
(%) 
(billionU.S.$) (% in total) 
Argentina 4.82 (1.41%) 10.85 22.12 1.83 0.36 3.38 
Belize 0.41 (0.12%) 15.51 14.37 2.94 0.19 0.96 
Brazil 43.27 (12.64%) 5.91 14.84 0.58 0.04 0.68 
Bulgaria 1.53 (0.45%) 4.39 5.03 1.28 0.10 0.53 
Chile 4.81 (1.41%) 4.56 9.31 1.48 0.05 0.73 
China 6.05 (1.77%) 3.14 4.27 1.71 0.03 0.48 
Colombia 12.74 (3.72%) 5.83 13.10 0.63 0.06 0.71 
Croatia 1.63 (0.48%) 5.67 9.83 0.47 -1.78 2.96 
Dominican Republic 0.71 (0.21%) 6.90 5.80 2.23 0.26 1.27 
Ecuador 0.61 (0.18%) 10.53 5.94 2.49 0.32 1.75 
Egypt 1.15 (0.34%) 0.76 1.51 2.17 0.05 0.27 
El Salvador 3.94 (1.15%) 7.28 14.91 1.33 0.14 0.80 
Gabon 0.95 (0.28%) 7.25 7.93 3.14 0.22 1.30 
Georgia 0.51 (0.15%) 6.46 3.28 4.43 0.24 1.16 
Ghana 0.88 (0.26%) 7.93 7.74 3.28 0.28 1.53 
Hungary 1.53 (0.45%) 4.54 5.08 3.41 0.09 1.05 
Indonesia 20.65 (6.03%) 6.15 13.53 1.83 0.16 1.41 
Iraq 2.16 (0.63%) 8.51 14.28 3.34 0.28 1.65 
Jamaica 0.45 (0.13%) 11.31 28.19 5.95 0.13 1.89 
Kazakhstan 5.68 (1.66%) 6.83 5.95 2.44 0.21 1.31 
Lebanon 10.60 (3.10%) 5.82 5.54 1.85 0.10 0.37 
Malaysia 10.92 (3.19%) 4.72 6.75 0.92 0.05 0.49 
Mexico 40.10 (11.72%) 5.86 14.33 0.78 0.05 0.89 
Pakistan 1.24 (0.36%) 10.02 6.94 4.67 0.38 2.54 
Panama 8.41 (2.46%) 5.78 16.17 0.84 0.09 0.59 
Peru 8.99 (2.63%) 5.67 14.82 0.69 0.08 0.72 
Philippines 27.08 (7.91%) 5.93 12.27 0.80 0.09 0.62 
Poland 7.56 (2.21%) 4.51 6.76 1.76 0.05 0.70 
Russia 36.72 (10.73%) 5.58 8.59 0.81 0.14 0.90 
Serbia 1.08 (0.31%) 6.75 7.57 3.83 0.23 1.18 
South Africa 5.51 (1.61%) 4.92 7.58 0.93 0.09 0.57 
Sri Lanka 1.07 (0.31%) 6.03 3.92 2.52 0.23 1.58 
Tunisia 1.51 (0.44%) 3.17 2.30 1.98 0.06 0.34 
Turkey 34.27 (10.01%) 5.77 11.72 1.46 0.09 0.86 
Ukraine 3.58 (1.05%) 12.34 4.32 3.06 0.32 2.15 
Uruguay 5.86 (1.71%) 6.52 17.44 1.02 0.13 0.81 
Venezuela 22.30 (6.51%) 13.98 13.71 1.48 0.20 1.87 
Vietnam 1.00 (0.29%) 6.07 6.03 1.80 0.12 1.13 
        Africa Region 9.10 (2.66%) 5.35 6.49 1.71 0.11 0.48 
Asia Region 80.35 (23.47%) 5.79 10.63 1.26 0.10 0.61 
Europe Region 95.64 (27.94%) 5.80 8.95 1.37 0.12 0.71 
Latin Region 157.20 (45.93%) 7.47 14.76 0.90 0.08 0.72 
        Total 342.30 
 
6.71 11.98 1.15 0.10 0.57 
        Mean 9.01 
 
6.84 9.84 2.06 0.10 1.16 
Median 4.38 
 
5.98 7.84 1.82 0.12 0.93 
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portfolio included in the EMBI at the end of 2009. The market value of overall 
aggregate bonds is 342 billion U.S. dollar. In terms of market capitalization, Brazilian 
bonds are the largest, being 12.64 per cent of the total. The average aggregate maturity 
is 11.98 years. Each country’s bid/ask spread tends to co-move together with its return 
and volatility. Cross-sectional correlations of bid/ask spreads with respect to returns and 
volatility are 0.36 and 0.37 respectively. In 2009, the aggregate volatility of the 
emerging sovereign bond markets is about 9.01 (0.572500.5) per cent per annum.   
Figure 4-7 depicts the average values of estimated liquidity, return and volatility 
commonalities (R
2
c, R
2
r and R
2
vol) computed from Equation (4.15) over the period from 
January 2000 to January 2010 across 23 countries from Asia, Europe and Latin 
America.
104
 Uruguay has the highest average values of R
2
c, R
2
r and R
2
vol (42%, 53% and 
57%). Besides Uruguay, another country that has high liquidity commonality is 
Dominican Republic. Both are Latin American nations. The figure also shows that the 
ranking of countries across the three commonality measures is consistent; many 
countries are in a similar ranking position in all three diagrams. The correlations and 
rank correlations (not tabulated) between the commonality measure are all more than 
0.79 and 0.40 respectively. At the country level, this cross-sectional evidence again 
supports the view that liquidity, returns and volatility tend to move together.  
Our model in Section 4.3 suggests that both idiosyncratic and systematic liquidity 
shocks can cause liquidity commonality or liquidity spillovers, but they should relate to 
different patterns of return and volatility co-movements. If the commonality in liquidity 
                                                          
104
 For the sake of comparison, Figure 4-7 includes only countries, which have balanced data 
covering January 2000 to January 2010 (23 countries). All 35 countries are included in the 
cross-section (by country) and time-series (by region) analyses. 
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is caused by idiosyncratic shocks, we should observe consistent patterns in liquidity and 
returns. On the other hand, if the spillovers are induced by the systematic shocks, the 
coincidence of the liquidity and volatility commonality should be strong. We investigate 
these relations both in cross-section and time-series below.  
Figure 4-7: Liquidity, return and volatility commonalities 
This figure depicts the average monthly commonality in liquidity, returns, volatility (R
2
c, R
2
r and R
2
vol) of 
23 countries, which all have balanced data from January 2000 to January 2010.  For each country bond 
portfolio, R
2
s are computed from monthly regressions of daily observations of illiquidity cost, returns and 
volatility on the lead, lag and contemporaneous aggregate market value of liquidity cost, returns and 
volatility respectively (see Equation (4.15) for more detail). Countries are sorted from high to low values 
of commonality measures. 
 
                        Liquidity R2 (R2c)                                  Return R
2 (R2r)
                                                        Volatility R2 (R2vol) 
 
4.6.2 Cross-section analysis of commonality measures (35 countries) 
To analyze cross-country variations of commonality in liquidity, returns and volatility, 
we run cross-sectional regression of average liquidity commonality (R
2
c) on 
combinations of return and volatility (R
2
r and R
2
vol) in 35 countries across Asia, Europe 
and Latin America continents. Table 4-7 reports the results. In models 7.1 and 7.2,  
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Table 4-7: Cross-sectional regression of country bond portfolio’s liquidity commonality 
on return and volatility commonalties 
This table reports OLS estimation results of cross-sectional regression of the time-series average 
commonality in liquidity (R
2
c) on those in returns and volatility (R
2
r and R
2
vol) in 35 countries. Bonds are 
grouped by country of issuance and the grouping employs the market value weighting. The models are 
alternative cases of the following equation: 
2 2 2
, 1 , 2 , .c i r i vol iR R R      
t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 respectively. R
2
 and Adjusted R
2
 are reported in the last column. 
  
Model Constant 
Explanatory variable 
R
2
  
(adj-R
2
) Return commonality  
(R
2
r) 
Volatility commonality 
(R
2
vol) 
7.1 0.090 0.368
a 
 
0.23 
 
(1.602) (1.861) 
 
(0.21) 
7.2 0.023  
0.706
c
 0.48 
 
(0.510) 
 
(3.810) (0.46) 
7.3 0.020 -0.608 1.443
c
 0.60 
 
(0.590) -(0.823) (4.301) (0.57) 
where R
2
r and R
2
vol are entered in the regression as separate regressors, both  
commonalities  are  significantly  and  positively  related  to  the  liquidity  commonality. 
Even though a different time interval (monthly data for commonality measures in this 
section as opposed to daily data in Section 4.5) is deployed, again results here are in line 
with our previous findings that a country, which has higher co-movement of return and 
volatility, experiences higher liquidity co-movement with the aggregate market liquidity, 
i.e., both ILH and SLH hold. However, when both R
2
r and R
2
vol are included in model 
7.3 of Table 4-7, the impact of the R
2
r is no longer significant. The estimated coefficient 
on R
2
vol is still positive and significant. In fact, the inclusion of the R
2
r does not produce 
much improvement in terms of the adjusted R
2
 compared to the case when just R
2
vol is 
entered in model 7.2 (0.46 and 0.57). In terms of economic significance, the impact of 
R
2
vol is also larger. From models 7.1 and 7.2, an increase of one standard deviation in 
R
2
vol is related to a rise in R
2
c by 4.54% (about 0.60 times of one cross-sectional 
standard deviation in R
2
c), whereas an increase of one standard deviation in R
2
r 
increases R
2
c by 2.88% (or 0.38 times of one cross-sectional standard deviation in R
2
c). 
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In general, the results suggest that commonality in liquidity is more associated with that 
in volatility (systematic liquidity shocks) than with that in returns (idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks) in the cross-country analysis and the volatility effect on liquidity is 
more economically significant. 
4.6.3 Time-series analysis of commonality measures (three regions) 
As in Section 4.5, using the market value weighing, we group our emerging bonds into 
three regions, Asia, Europe and Latin America, and compute regional measures of 
commonality in liquidity, returns and volatility from country measures following 
Equations (4.14) and (4.15). Figure 4-8 depicts the time-series of six-month moving 
average commonality measures in liquidity, returns and volatility for Asian, European 
and Latin American sovereign bond portfolios. Both within a region and across regions, 
they generally move in similar patterns. For Asian bonds, all three commonalities hit 
their peak in the mid 1997 at the onset of Asian Crisis. The Asian crisis appears to 
stimulate the liquidity, return and volatility commonalities in Europe and Latin America 
as well. The figure also indicates that all commonalities (and to a lesser extent, liquidity 
co-movement, R
2
c) vary markedly over time. An increase in these commonalities 
coincides with periods of global economic disorder such as the Mexican Peso 
devaluation of December 1994, the Asian Crisis of mid 1997, the Russian Ruble 
devaluation of August 1998, the LTCM crisis of September 1998, the Brazilian Real 
devaluation of January 1999, the Turkish Lira devaluation of February 2001, 
Argentina’s debt moratorium of December 2001, the Turkish and Romanian currency 
devaluation of early 2005, the U.S. subprime crisis of mid 2007 and the Lehman 
Brothers collapse of September 2008. In addition, the sharply-increased commonalities  
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Figure 4-8: Time-series of commonality measures by a region bond portfolio 
This figure depicts the time-series of six-month moving average commonality measures in liquidity, 
returns and volatility for Asian, European, Latin American bond portfolios in Panels A, B and C 
respectively.  
 
Panel A: Asian bond portfolio 
 
 
Panel B: European bond portfolio 
 
 
Panel C: Latin American bond portfolio 
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driven by such crises seem to spill over across regions, which is consistent with our 
previous empirical results using the Vector Autoregression (VAR) model in Section 4.5. 
Note that currency devaluation event is one of the important factors driving the 
commonality in all regions partly because our sample is U.S. dollar-denominated bonds 
traded mainly in the international community rather than in their own local markets. 
In order to investigate whether idiosyncratic or systematic liquidity shocks are more 
important for commonality in liquidity over time, we run a time-series regression of 
commonality in liquidity (R
2
c) on those in returns and volatility (R
2
r and R
2
vol) in three 
regions, Asia, Europe and Latin America. When only R
2
r and R
2
vol are included as an 
explanatory variable, regression results in Table 4-8 always find a positive and 
significant relation between R
2
vol and R
2
c, but not between R
2
r and R
2
c. The finding is 
consistent across all regions.  The results in all regressions are barely changed even if 
the relevant one-month lagged variables (R
2
c,t-1, R
2
r,t-1 and R
2
vol,t-1) are added-in. The 
only significant variable is the lag of liquidity commonality for the Asian region, 
indicating that Asia encounters more persistent commonality in liquidity. In the last row 
of Table 4-8, we run a regression of the commonality in aggregate market liquidity on 
those in returns and volatility. The coefficients on R
2
vol are still positive and significant. 
As before, we have positive coefficients on R
2
r, but they are not significant in every 
specification. The economic significance of the effects of the R
2
vol on R
2
c is also 
stronger. For example, in the case of the first model of the aggregate market, one 
standard deviation increase in R
2
vol is associated with an increase in the R
2
c by 1.94% 
(or 0.27 times of one time-series standard deviation in R
2
c) while an increase of one 
standard deviation in R
2
r increases R
2
c by 0.89% (or 0.12 times of one standard 
deviation in R
2
c). 
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Table 4-8: Time-series regression of region bond portfolio’s liquidity commonality on 
return and volatility commonalities  
This table reports OLS estimation results of time-series regression of the commonality in liquidity (R
2
c) 
on those in returns and volatility (R
2
r and R
2
vol) in three regions, Asia, Europe and Latin America and the 
aggregate market. Bonds are grouped by region of issuance and the grouping employs the market value 
weighting. The models are alternative cases of the following equation: 
2 2 2 2 2 2
, 1 , 2 , 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , .c t r t vol t c t r t vol tR R R R R R             
In some specification, lagged variables are included. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is indicated by 
a
, 
b
and 
c
 respectively.  R
2
 and Adjusted R
2
 are 
reported in the last column. 
 
Region constant R
2
r R
2
vol R
2
c,t-1 R
2
r,t-1 R
2
vol,t-1 
R
2
  
(adj-R
2
) 
Asia  0.085
c 
0.070 0.087
c
    0.17 
(R
2
c, Asia) (4.401) (1.529) (2.607)    (0.15) 
        
 0.024 0.101 0.074
b
 0.522
c
 0.040 0.012 0.43 
 (1.252) (1.599) (2.267) (8.235) (0.641) (0.207) (0.41) 
        
Europe  0.120
c
 0.063 0.090
a
    0.08 
(R
2
c, Europe) (9.378) (1.289) (1.926)    (0.07) 
        
 0.113
c
 0.048 0.086
a
 0.071 0.041 -0.044 0.08 
 (6.722) (0.900) (1.816) (0.946) (0.786) -(0.927) (0.06) 
        
Latin America  0.135
c
 0.066 0.089
a
    0.08 
(R
2
c, Latin America) (9.193) (1.341) (1.789)    (0.07) 
        
 0.110
c
 0.029 0.090
a
 0.103 0.062 -0.014 0.10 
 (5.748) (0.549) (1.809) (1.403) (1.166) -(0.272) (0.08) 
        
Aggregate 
Market  
(R
2
c, Market) 
0.128
c
 0.059 0.121
c
    0.14 
(10.648) (1.312) (2.718)    (0.12) 
       
 0.101
c
 0.014 0.127
c
 0.171
b
 0.059 -0.039 0.17 
 (6.329) (0.288) (2.876) (2.345) (1.188) -(0.853) (0.15) 
        
To summarize this section, both the cross-country and time-series analyses show that 
the relationship between R
2
vol and R
2
c is more pronounced than that between R
2
r and R
2
c. 
Its economic significance is also stronger. In other words, systematic liquidity shocks 
are more important than idiosyncratic liquidity shocks in explaining the transmission of 
liquidity in emerging U.S. dollar sovereign bonds during our sample period. 
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4.7 Conclusions 
In contrast to previous studies that assume liquidity to be an exogenous factor, we 
develop a model of the dynamics of liquidity across securities. Our model differentiates 
between liquidity spillovers caused by idiosyncratic liquidity risks and those caused by 
systematic liquidity risks by relating them to spillovers in returns and in volatility 
respectively. The first explanation for liquidity spillovers is based on idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks. If the two assets are correlated in returns and one asset is hit by this 
type of shock, there will be a concentration of trading in the other. This implies 
consistency of return and liquidity spillovers. An alternative explanation, which is more 
obvious, is that liquidity spillovers are due to the systematic liquidity shocks. It predicts 
that the lead and lag patterns in liquidity should be consistent with those in volatility, 
but not necessarily with those in returns. The model also shows that liquidity can be 
transmitted across assets even though there is (i) no information asymmetry, (ii) the 
same initial endowment for each investor and (iii) the same investors’ expectation about 
future liquidity shocks. 
The model is then applied to U.S. dollar sovereign bonds in 35 emerging markets, 
grouped into Asia, Europe and Latin America. The empirical results shows that liquidity 
spillovers are mainly from Latin America to other regions and they are both systematic 
and idiosyncratic in character. Therefore, systematic and idiosyncratic liquidity risks are 
not competing, but complementary explanations of liquidity spillovers and liquidity 
cannot be considered in isolation. Cross-section (across countries) and time-series 
(across regions) analyses find that systematic spillovers are more statistically and 
economically significant than idiosyncratic spillovers. It follows that the liquidity risk is 
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related predominantly to systematic factors, which investors cannot easily diversify 
away. 
Our demonstration that liquidity spillovers are not solely generated by return co-
movement has important implications for financial market participants. Liquidity can 
adversely affect portfolio performance and swiftly cancel out diversification benefits.
 105
 
Fund managers cannot perfectly diversify their international portfolios by just investing 
in bonds, which have low correlations in returns, because such bonds may have high 
liquidity co-movements. In addition, understanding the nature of liquidity spillovers 
helps market participants to be aware of the risk of their trading. Financial market 
regulators and central banks should acknowledge that liquidity formation in their local 
market can, at times, be more related to global or systematic factors than to their 
country-specific fundamentals. To prevent future liquidity crises, they should put more 
effort into monitoring the co-movement of volatility rather than that of returns. 
Moreover, the commonality in liquidity, returns and volatility increases sharply during 
periods of global economic crises and is transmitted among regions. Researchers should 
incorporate time-varying liquidity risk for a more realistic asset pricing model. 
Though it is not this paper’s focus, a further cross-country study on why commonality 
varies across countries could be beneficial for policy makers, who would like to reduce 
the liquidity risk in their financial markets. Identifying the possible determinants of 
cross-country commonality, such as the level of economic and financial development, 
                                                          
105
 The study that find the international diversification benefits includes De Santis and Gerard 
(1997), Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) and Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004).  
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investor sentiment, funding liquidity
106
, institutional ownership
107
, the role of 
institutional and foreign investors and the related regulatory issues, could be a direction 
for future research. 
  
                                                          
106
 Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) define funding liquidity as the ease with which market 
makers can obtain funding.  
107
 Kamara, Lou and Sadka (2008) find that the firm’s cross-sectional commonality in liquidity 
increases with institutional ownership because institutional investing and index trading 
concentrate more in large-cap stocks than in small-cap stocks. 
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Appendix 4A: Proof of the Liquidity Spillover Model 
With a negative utility function, Equation (4.2) can be rewritten as 
, ,
,0,
0 1 0, 0, 1 0 1, 1
0, 1 0 1, 1
max {max [ exp{ [ ( ) ( )
                                                       ( ) ( )]}]}.
A B A B
t ii
A A A A A A A
i i i ix x
B B B B B B B
i i i
E E a w x p p x v p
x p p x v p


      
    
            (4A.1) 
Using a recursive method, investor i at time t = 1 maximizes the following utility 
function: 
,
,
1 0, 1, 1 1, 1
ˆ ˆmax [ exp{ [ ( )  ( )]}].A B
t i
A A A A B B B B
i i i i ix
E a w x v p x v p                     (4A.2) 
Therefore, the first order conditions with respective to 1,
A
ix  and 1,
B
ix are given by 
2, ,
1 1, 1,
2, ,
1 1, 1,
ˆ 0,
ˆ 0.
A A A A A A B A B B
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                  (4A.3) 
The market clearing condition implies that 
1, 1,1 1
.
M MA B
i ii i
x x M
 
                     (4A.4) 
Note that 1
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ,
M A
iA Ai
M M
M

    

and combining Equations (4A.2) and (4A.3) yields 
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1
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1
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                (4A.5) 
Substituting Equation (4A.5) into the fist order condition, Equation (4A.3) gives 
, 2, 2, ,
1, 2, 2, ,
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              (4A.6) 
Investor i at time t = 0 maximizes the following objective function: 
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, ,
,0,
0 1 0, 0, 1 0 1, 1
0, 1 0 1, 1
max {max [ exp{ [ ( ) ( )
                                                       ( ) ( )]}]},
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or equivalently, 
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Substituting the equilibrium 1 1 1,, ,
A B A
ip p x and 1,
B
ix from Equations (4A.5) and (4A.6) into 
(4A.8) and then maximizing Equation (4A.8) with respect to 0,
A
ix  and 0,
B
ix with a market 
clearing constraint, 0, 0,1 1
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                           (4A.9) 
Note that optimum holding of bonds at time t = 0 is the same as investors’ initial 
holding. Even though we allow trading to occur at time t = 0, investors just hold their 
initial endowment because they are still indifferent at this stage. 
The trading volumes by investor i, x1,i for bonds A and B are given by Equation (4.5) 
and they are normally distributed with zero means and variances of the following forms: 
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2
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             (4A.10) 
From Equation (4A.10), the expected trading size of security A by investor i can be 
obtained by 
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Solving Equation (4A.11) gives 
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In similar manner, we derive the expected trading size of security B by investor i. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In the following three sections, I provide the summary and particular contributions of 
the thesis and make suggestions for further research.     
5.1 Summary of the Thesis 
This section summarizes the conclusions of the research. The thesis focuses on liquidity 
and asset prices. Classical asset pricing usually assumes perfect financial markets 
without frictions or trading costs. Hence, the diverse features of liquidity are ignored. 
We have helped to fill this gap by investigating the impacts of liquidity on bond prices 
in international markets.  
In the first research paper, we test the multiple channels of liquidity by extending the 
liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model (LCAPM) of Acharya and Pedersen 
(2005) to the U.S. dollar sovereign bonds issued by emerging countries during 1995-
2008. Our empirical results suggest that liquidity affects cross-sectional differences of 
bond returns both as a characteristic (liquidity level) and as a risk factor (liquidity risk). 
As for the economic significance, the effect of liquidity risk or co-movement of the 
liquidity with the market factors on the expected bond returns can, at times, be greater 
than that of their own illiquidity cost as measured by the bid/ask spread. In addition, the 
LCAPM outperforms the standard market-beta CAPM in terms of the empirical fit both 
in-sample and out-of-sample tests.  
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As opposed to the unconditional pricing model used in the first research paper and 
previous literature, the second research paper employs both unconditional and 
conditional models to study the liquidity impacts on local-currency government bonds 
in 39 countries (both emerging and developed). In the unconditional setting, liquidity 
risk (as solely represented in this paper by the return sensitivity to the market liquidity 
or 3 in LCAPM) remains the significant pricing factor after controlling for relevant risk 
factors (i.e., bond market risk, default risk, interest rate term risk and U.S. equity risk 
factors) as well as bond characteristics (i.e., illiquidity cost, bond duration and bond 
market value). In the conditional version, we employ a regime switching model and find 
that liquidity risk is significantly different across good and bad times especially for 
bonds issued by less-developed nations. The liquidity risk or liquidity commonality is 
considerably higher in the bad state of the world. However, the price or the premium 
required by investors for holding this time-varying risk is economically modest. 
The two previous papers find liquidity level and shocks to the market-wide liquidity to 
be priced state variables. Building on these findings, the third research paper studies the 
dynamics of liquidity transmissions across international bond markets. The key question 
is what drives liquidity spillovers beyond national boundaries. The mode is developed, 
which distinguishes between liquidity spillovers or liquidity co-movements caused by 
idiosyncratic shocks and those caused by systematic shocks. Our empirical tests indicate 
that the systematic shocks are more important than idiosyncratic shocks in explaining 
the liquidity commonality (i.e., liquidity risk) across emerging countries in Asia, Europe 
and Latin America. It follows that investors cannot entirely diversify away liquidity risk 
by trading with each other. The evidence that liquidity spillover is more systematic than 
idiosyncratic has important implications for financial market participants. Consistent 
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with the results in the second paper, we also find that our commonality measure in 
liquidity varies significantly over time and increases strongly during the times of 
financial distress. As such, a more realistic asset pricing model should acknowledge the 
existence of liquidity risk and its time-varying dynamics.  
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5.2 Contributions of the Whole Thesis 
Even though we have already described each research paper’s contributions in its own 
chapter, this section summarizes them again. There are five main contributions of this 
thesis: 
1. The thesis is the first to investigate the significance of liquidity both in terms of 
liquidity level and liquidity risk on international bond prices. Previous studies in 
asset pricing usually ignore liquidity and those, which consider liquidity, mostly 
focus their interests on the U.S. equity market and merely on the liquidity level. 
In addition, our asset pricing tests examine three different channels of liquidity 
risk and their impacts on bond prices. 
2. Typical asset pricing studies center their attention on equity markets. We 
concentrate on bond markets because, unlike stock returns, the ex ante risk 
premium for bond returns (or forward-looking yields) can be revealed and this 
leads to more reliable empirical asset-pricing tests in cross-section. 
3. Bonds provide a natural setting in which to explore liquidity effects because they 
are generally less liquid than equities. For this reason, our test assets cover both 
domestic (local-currency) and international (U.S. dollar) government bonds issued 
by both developed and emerging countries. In contrast to previous studies, we use 
the bid/ask price data to directly measure illiquidity, which has never been 
compiled before for these bonds 
4. This is the first time that the effect of time-varying liquidity risk on international 
bond prices has been studied. In our conditional pricing model, we also allow both 
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time-series (using a regime-switching model) and cross-sectional (using Fama-
MacBeth (1973) approach) variation in liquidity risks. 
5. The question of what causes liquidity contagion, which subsequently generates 
liquidity risk in international bond markets is investigated in both theoretical and 
empirical frameworks. We also examine the extent to which systematic and 
idiosyncratic shocks to liquidity give rise to liquidity spillovers in the 
international bond markets. 
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5.3 Suggestions for Future Research 
This thesis has investigated the effect of liquidity and liquidity risk on bond prices 
around the world. Controlling for a number of aggregate risks, liquidity level and global 
liquidity risk remain important for bond pricing, although liquidity can only explain part 
of the observed bond yield spreads. Moreover, the impact of liquidity risk is likely to be 
time varying. Therefore, future research in asset pricing should acknowledge the role of 
liquidity risk and its dynamics in addition to traditional risk factors such as market risk 
and default risk. My suggestions for further study are as follows:  
(i) Our findings suggest that liquidity risk is time-varying and becomes larger in 
times when nations experience difficulties. Going forward, research should 
devote more time to an asset pricing model with time-varying (conditional) 
liquidity. To achieve a more realistic asset pricing model, the dynamics of 
liquidity and its significance to asset pricing need to be considered. A more 
elaborate study of the key determinants of cross-country commonality in 
liquidity is one of the examples. This is particularly useful for policy makers, 
who would like to alleviate the potential impact of liquidity risk that can lead 
to disruptions in their financial markets. 
(ii) In the LCAPM and multi-factor model, equilibrium returns compensate 
investors for expected liquidity cost (liquidity level) and unexpected liquidity 
co-movement (liquidity risk). The model assumes that the demand for 
liquidity is inelastic with respect to the magnitude of trading costs and it does 
not co-vary with other fundamental risks. In other words, we rely on the 
assumption that it is possible to separate liquidity from other risk factors (e.g., 
credit risk and market risk). Unexpected change in liquidity can aggravate 
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other risks or can be aggravated by other risks. The interaction of liquidity 
with other risk factors may explain why the results in previous studies usually 
underestimate the impact of liquidity (and the impact of other risk factors) on 
asset prices.  
(iii) In addition, this thesis assumes that financial markets are fully integrated.  
Hence, only global risk factors are important. Despite the evidence that 
idiosyncratic country factors have almost no explanatory power in explaining 
yield spreads in the international bond market
108
, international investors 
might not be able to hold locally diversified portfolios at the country level. 
The local (industry-specific, country-specific and region-specific) risk factors 
are among the set of omitted variables, which may result in significant pricing 
errors in many of our pricing regressions. To rectify this, it would be useful to 
distinguish the impact of local and global risk factors on the bond prices.  
(iv) Because of data availability, we employ bid/ask spread as the measure of 
liquidity. Although it is one of the most direct liquidity measures, one may 
like to check the robustness of results using other measures. As soon as the 
data on trading volume or order flow become available for international bond 
markets
109
, we can compute other liquidity measures, such as the Amihud 
(2002)’s ILLIQ measure of price impact or the Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara 
                                                          
108
 Many studies (e.g., Kamin and Von Kleist (1999), Eichengreen and Mody (2000) and Arora 
and Cerisola (2001)) find that risk factors on the U.S. bond markets as proxies for global risk 
factors are the main determinants of sovereign spreads. Codogna, Favero and Missale (2003), 
Geyer, Kossmeier and Pichler (2004) and Favero, Pagano and von Thadden (2010) find that 
yield differentials in EMU countries are driven mainly by a common default risk factor.    
109
 For example, the introduction of TRACE and MTS systems make the trading volume data 
available for U.S. and European bonds. 
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(2002)’s probability of information-based trading (PIN), which measures the 
liquidity that is driven by information. 
(v) Since the evidence on the term structure of bond market liquidity premia is 
rare, further investigation of the term structure of liquidity premia might yield 
useful results. There are a few works, which study the term structures effects 
of bond liquidity level, for example, Goyenko, Subrahmanyam and Ukov 
(2008). However, none has studied the term structure of the liquidity risk 
premium. For portfolio construction, it is important to check which aspect of 
liquidity (risk or level) is transmitted (or not transmitted) across bond 
maturity. 
(vi) Lastly, it is natural to compare the liquidity risk found in the international 
bond markets to that in other financial markets, such as the international 
equity markets. The flight to quality observed in the markets suggests that 
when stock market faces heavy selling pressure, the government bond market 
typically encounters heavy buying pressure. There should be liquidity 
transmission across bond and equity markets. 
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